THE    ILLUSIONS  OF 
PROFESSOR  BERGSON 


MODERN   SCIENCE 

AND   THE    ILLUSIONS   OF 
PROFESSOR   BERGSON 


BY 

HUGH    S.    R.    ELLIOT 

EDITOR  OF  '  THE  LETTERS  OF  JOHN  STUART  MILL  ' 

With  a  Preface  by 
SIR  RAY  LANKESTER,  K.C.B.,  F.R.S. 

SECOND  hWPRESSION 


LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 
39   PATERNOSTER    ROW,    LONDON 

NEW  YORK,  BOMBAY,  AND  CALCUTTA 
1912 


'  Nam  certe  neque  consilio  primordia  rerum 
Ordine  se  suo  quaeque  sagaci  mente  locarunt 
Nee  quos  quaeque  (darent  motus  pepigere  profecto,) 
Sed  quia  multa  modis  multis  mutata  per  omne 
Ex  infinite  vexantur  percita  plagis, 
Omne  genus  motus  et  coetus  experiundo 
Tandem  deveniunt  in  talis  disposituras, 
Qualibus  haec  rerum  consistit  summa  creata, 
Et  multos  etiam  magnos  servata  per  annos 
Ut  semel  in  motus  conjectast  convenientis, 
Efficit  ut  largis  avidum  mare  fluminis  undis 
Integrent  amnes  et  solis  terra  vapore 
Fota  novet  fetus  summissaque  gens  animantum 
Floreat  et  vivant  labentes  aetheris  ignes.' 

LUCRETIUS. 


PREFACE 
BY  SIR  RAY  LANKESTER,  K.C.B.,  F.R.S. 

I  AM  glad  to  write  a  few  words  by  way  of 
preface  to  Mr.  Hugh  Elliot's  valuable  little 
book,  entitled  Modern  Science  and  the  Illusions 
of  Professor  Bergson.  I  am  glad  to  do  this, 
not  merely  because  I  think  that  the  books  in 
which  M.  Bergson  formulates  those  illusions 
are  worthless  and  unprofitable  matter,  causing 
waste  of  time  and  confusion  of  thought  to  many 
of  those  who  are  induced  to  read  them,  but  also 
because  an  unmerited  importance  has  been 
attached  to  them  by  a  section  of  the  English 
public,  misled  by  the  ingenious  and  systematic 
advertisement  of  M.  Bergson  by  those  who 
amuse  themselves  with  metaphysical  curiosities. 
He  has  been  introduced  to  us  as  a  'great 
French  philosopher.'  To  those  who  in  a 
thoroughgoing  way  occupy  themselves  in 

vii 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

collecting  and  comparing  and  classifying  all  the 
absurdities  which  have  been  put  forward  as 
1  metaphysics '  or  '  metaphysical  speculation ' 
since  the  days  of  Aristotle,  this  latest  effusion 
has,  no  doubt,  a  kind  of  interest  such  as  a 
collector  may  take  in  a  curious  species  of  beetle. 
To  the  student  of  the  aberrations  and  mon- 
strosities of  the  mind  of  man,  M.  Bergson's 
works  will  always  be  documents  of  value.  But 
it  is  an  injustice  as  well  as  an  inaccuracy  to 
speak  of  their  author  as  '  great,'  or  '  French,'  or 
a  'philosopher.' 

The  word  'metaphysics,'  which  is  commonly 
applied  to  such  speculations  as  those  which 
M.  Bergson  has  published,  has  a  strange  history, 
and  has  often  been  used  in  a  sense  which  can- 
not be  justified.  It  took  origin  from  the  fact 
that  the  early  disciples  of  Aristotle — not  the 
philosopher  himself — presented  his  treatises  in 
the  order  (i)  logic,  (2)  physics,  and  (3)  a  treatise 
concerning  what  he  called  Primary  Philosophy, 
Theology  and  about  Things  as  Things.  As 
this  third  section  was  made  to  follow  the  treatises 

viii 


PREFACE 

on  Physics  or  Natural  History  in  its  widest 
sense,  it  was  called  TO,  /ACTO,  ra  ^uo-t/ca,  which 
became  in  Latin  'metaphysica.'  The  term  was 
not  employed  (as  has  been  sometimes  believed) 
to  mean  '  supernatural  things '  but  simply  as 
indicating  the  position  which,  according  to  those 
who  first  used  it,  this  third  treatise  should,  as  a 
matter  of  convenience,  occupy.  The  questions 
which  were  discussed  in  this  treatise  and  by 
Aristotle's  earlier  followers  under  the  name 
'  metaphysics '  are  '  What  is  the  nature  of 
Being?'  and  '  What  is  the  nature  of  Knowledge?' 
Any  one  who  attempts  to  answer  these  questions, 
however  absurd  his  answers  may  be,  is  entitled 
to  be  called,  and  is  called,  'a  metaphysician.' 
Equally  entitled  to  be  classed  as  '  metaphysics ' 
are  the  reasoned  statements  of  those  who  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  it  is  not  within  the  power 
of  man  to  give  a  real  answer  to  the  question, 
1  What  is  the  world  of  things  we  know  ?  '  nor  to 
the  further  question,  '  How  do  we  know  that 
world?' 

Modern  science,  taking  it  as  it  stands  without 
ix 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

inquiring  into  the  gradual  steps  by  which  it  was 
cleared  of  traditional  superstitions,  baseless 
assumptions,  and  ignorant  fancies,  has  arrived 
at  a  systematic  interpretation  of  the  phenomena 
which  we  call  '  Nature '  as  a  vast  and  orderly 
mechanism,  the  working  of  which  we  can  to  a 
large  extent  perceive,  foresee  and  manipulate 
so  as  to  bring  about  certain  results  and  avoid 
others.  In  consequence  we  not  only  enjoy  that 
happiness  and  prosperity  which  arises  from  the 
occurrence  of  the  expected,  the  non-occurrence 
of  the  unexpected  and  the  determination  by 
ourselves  within  ever-expanding  limits  of  what 
shall  occur — but  we  also  experience  a  delight 
in  the  knowledge  of  the  order  of  Nature  which 
comes  from  the  exercise  of  our  intellectual 
faculty  and  from  an  increased  area  and  com- 
plexity in  the  sources  and  measure  of  that  joy 
which  we  call  '  the  sense  of  beauty.' 

As  to  what,  if  anything,  is  outside  or  behind 
this  mechanism  of  nature,  as  to  whence  or  how 
it  came  about  or  whither  it  is  going,  as  to 
what  it  and  what  our  consciousness  of  it  really 

x 


PREFACE 

are,  and  why  it  is,  and  why  we  are  here,  modern 
science  has  no  answer.  To  me  the  conclusion 
has  for  many  years  commended  itself — that  the 
materialist  and  mechanical  scheme  of  nature 
(including  man's  nature)  elaborated  by  physical 
science,  is  true  and  trustworthy,  whatever  there 
may  be  outside  and  beyond  the  possibilities  of 
human  knowledge.  That  scheme  is  an  elaborate 
system  of  relations  in  time  and  space,  the  state- 
ment of  an  order  the  truth  of  which  is  not 
affected  by  any  external  factors  which  may 
exist.  Those  factors  might,  if  they  could 
be  known,  give  a  different  complexion  to 
what  we  can  and  do  know :  the  reality  thus 
arrived  at  might  be  something  of  a  different 
kind  from  the  limited  reality  with  which,  owing 
to  the  limitation  of  our  faculties,  we  have  to  be 
content.  But  whatever  may  be  the  character 
of  those  unknown  factors,  our  determination  of 
observed  quantitative  relations  and  an  observed 
order,  remains  unassailable.  One  may  regard  the 
utmost  possibilities  of  the  results  of  human  know- 
ledge as  the  contents  of  a  bracket,  and  place  out- 

xi 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

side  that  bracket  the  factor  x  to  represent  those 
unknown  and  unknowable  possibilities  which  the 
imagination  of  man  is  never  wearied  of  suggesting. 
This  factor  x  is  the  plaything  of  the  metaphy- 
sician. Its  existence  is  vehemently  denied  by 
the  strict  materialist,  and  as  vehemently  asserted 
by  the  founders  of  theological  creeds  and  so-called 
metaphysical  systems.  The  attitude  of  those  who 
neither  deny  its  existence  nor  assert  it,  and,  in 
any  case,  hold  that  it  must  never  be  mistaken 
for,  or  confused  with,  the  contents  of  the  bracket, 
was  called  by  Huxley  '  Agnosticism.'  It  was 
his  own  position,  and  one  which  is  now  very 
general. 

There  is,  it  is  clear,  room  for  varieties  of 
Agnosticism.  Whilst  all  Agnostics  are  agreed 
that  x  is  not  within  the  bounds  of  knowledge, 
some  will  hold  that  the  less  we  trouble  about  x 
the  better,  others  that  though  we  cannot  know, 
we  can  yet  make  assumptions  and  suppositions 
about  it  of  greater  and  of  less  probability.  It  is 
held,  with  much  reason,  that  whilst  we  have  it  in 
our  power  to  develop  and  elaborate  the  contents 

xii 


PREFACE 

of  the  bracket  to  a  practically  unlimited  degree, 
with  ever  increasing  gain  to  humanity — the 
indulgence  in  imaginative  efforts  concerning  x, 
and  in  elaborate  discussion  and  exposition  of 
all  the  efforts  of  all  who  have  occupied 
themselves  in  this  way  —  is  a  fruitless 
pursuit. 

I  confess  that  I  am  not  myself  altogether 
indifferent  to  the  fancies  and  beliefs  of  man- 
kind as  to  what  x  may  possibly  or  probably 
be.  And  all  the  more  on  that  account  do 
I  deeply  resent  the  attempt  to  create  a  con- 
fusion as  to  the  validity  of  human  knowledge 
by  the  pretence  that  '  intuitions  '  and  '  supposi- 
tions'  about  x  can  be  in  any  way  legitimately 
used  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  or  nullifying 
the  conclusions  as  to  the  order  of  nature — the 
contents  of  the  bracket — which  are  the  expres- 
sion of  the  observed  and  verified  relations  of 
measurable,  demonstrable  things.  I  am  entirely 
convinced  that  the  ascertainment  of  the  order 
of  nature  never  has  been,  and  cannot  be  in  the 

xiii 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

future,  in  any  way  promoted  by  speculations  as 
to  the  probabilities  of  x. 

What  is  here  symbolised  as  x  I  willingly 
hand  over  to  serve  as  the  competition-puzzle 
of  metaphysicians.  Our  University  professors 
of  philosophy  are  maintained,  it  would  appear, 
for  the  purpose  of  keeping  a  record  of  the  very 
various  and  contradictory  hypotheses  of  this 
motley  crowd  of  assailants  of  a  dead  wall.  The 
professors  are  fairly  unanimous  in  their  pains- 
taking classifications  of  the  strange  and  con- 
tradictory suppositions  of  the  whole  series  of 
metaphysical  '  systems '  from  Aristotle  to  the 
present  day,  and  very  many  of  them  agree  in 
the  conclusion  that  nothing  except  a  good  many 
peculiar  words  and  phrases  has  come  of  those 
systems. 

The  self-appointed  task  of  the  metaphysician 
was  not  long  ago  compared  by  a  keen  thinker 
and  great  lawyer  to  that  of  '  a  blind  man  in  a 
dark  room  hunting  for  a  black  cat  which — is 
not  there ! '  The  black  cat  which  is  not  there  is 
the  reality  represented  by  x.  The  search  for  it 

xiv 


PREFACE 

is  surely  not  a  very  healthy  occupation  either  for 
the  blind  man  or  for  those  who  solemnly  give 
attention  to  his  accounts  of  his  subtle  devices 
and  evergreen  self-assurance. 

A  main  objection  to  M.  Bergson's  account  of 
his  own  performances  in  the  dark  chamber  is 
that  he  is  not  content  with  asserting  (and  ex- 
pecting us  to  accept  his  bare  assertion)  that 
time  is  a  stuff  both  '  resistant  and  substantial,' 
that  consciousness  is  not  always  dependent  on 
cerebral  structure,  that  intuition  is  a  true  guide 
and  the  intellect  an  erroneous  guide.  Such 
escapades  in  the  dark  room  astonish  and  in- 
terest only  those  who  are  unacquainted  with  M. 
Bergson's  numerous  predecessors  in  the  mad- 
dening hunt  of  the  illusive  black  cat.  It  is, 
however,  a  speciality  of  M.  Bergson  that  having 
by  mere  assertion  attempted  to  make  us  believe 
that  he  has  grasped  the  black  cat,  and  at  any 
rate  has  in  his  hand  some  hairs  from  its  tail — 
he  proceeds  in  the  same  spirit  to  make  absolutely 
baseless  assertions  about  the  domain  of  scientific 
fact — a  domain  '  tabooed  '  against  him  and  his 

xv 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

fraternity.  He  writes  of  the  facts  of  physical 
science  with  the  same  careless  assurance  as  that 
which  we  tolerate  with  indifference  when  he  is 
disporting  himself  in  the  extra-territorial  region 
of  x.  Having  made  his  arbitrary  assumptions 
about  x,  he  proceeds  in  an  inaccurate  way  to 
write  about  some  of  the  well-ascertained  facts 
of  the  structure  of  animals  and  plants.  He 
promulgates  novel  opinions  about  them  with  the 
air  of  one  who  has  given  serious  study  to  them, 
which,  however,  it  is  abundantly  evident  he  has 
not.  By  a  light-hearted  perversion  of  the  facts 
as  to  the  structure  of  the  eyes  of  animals  and 
other  such  things,  he  endeavours  to  make  them 
appear  as  evidence  in  support  of  his  arbitrary 
and  preposterous  fancies  about  x\  In  doing  so 
he  ceases  to  be  merely  an  amusing  juggler  with 
the  harmless  creations  of  his  own  and  other 
people's  fancy :  he  becomes  a  maker  of  untruth, 
and  for  those  who  listen  to  him  a  harmful 
'  Confusions-meister.' 

M.    Bergson    is    gifted    with    an    admirable 
facility  of  diction,  and  has  succeeded  in  arrest- 

xvi 


PREFACE 

ing  attention.  On  that  account,  since  he  has 
exceeded  the  limits  of  fantastic  speculation 
which  it  is  customary  to  tolerate  on  the 
stage  of  metaphysics,  and  has  carried  his 
methods  into  the  arena  of  sober  science,  it  is  a 
matter  of  urgency  that  his  illusions  and  per- 
versions should  be  exposed  with  uncompromis- 
ing frankness  to  the  reading  public  who  may  be, 
on  their  side,  under  an  illusion  as  to  the  im- 
portance of  his  teaching.  Mr.  Elliot's  book 
effects  this  exposure  in  a  masterly  way. 

E.  RAY  LANKESTER. 
March  1912, 


XV11 


CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  INTRODUCTION, i 

II.  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   PROFESSOR   BERG- 
SON, 16 

III.  REASONS    FOR    DISSENTING    FROM    THE 

PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON, .      54 

IV.  THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  .        .        .104 
V.  THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY,      .        .        .        .167 

VI.  THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES,     .        .        .        .195 
VII.  THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY,      .    219 

CONCLUSION, 245 

INDEX, 247 


xix 


CHAPTER   I 
INTRODUCTION 

'  Physics  beware  of  metaphysics.' 

SIR  ISAAC  NEWTON. 

IT  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  present  work  to 
furnish  a  detailed  refutation  of  the  philosophy 
of  Professor  Bergson.  It  is  my  purpose  to 
investigate  only  those  portions  of  it  which 
profess  to  be  founded  on  facts,  and  therefore 
to  come  within  the  province  of  science.  Meta- 
physical systems  generally,  however  we  may 
admire  their  wonderful  ingenuity  and  subtlety, 
can  have  no  interest  for  science  unless  they  are 
founded  on  gross  material  facts,  which  can  be 
examined  and  verified.  As  a  rule  their  beauti- 
fully interwoven  gossamer  threads  are  of  far  too 
fine  a  texture  to  bear  contact  with  the  brutal 
hardness  and  reality  of  a  fact.  They  can  float 
gaily  in  the  air  without  any  solid  support :  while 

A  I 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

thus  floating,  they  have  no  practical  interest  for 
us,  who  are  compelled  to  crawl  painfully  along 
the  earth.  But  when  one  of  these  ethereal 
systems  attempts  to  take  root  on  solid  ground, 
it  is  apt  to  get  mangled  and  torn,  wherever  it 
touches  earth  ;  and  the  best  chance  of  safety  for 
the  superstructure  is  to  float  off  again  into  the 
rarified  atmosphere  whence  it  came. 

The  metaphysic  of  Bergson  has  ventured  here 
and  there  to  come  to  earth.  Wherever  it  has 
thus  done  so  it  has  exposed  itself  to  damage 
from  scientific  criticism ;  and  my  purpose  here 
is  to  indicate  some  of  the  rocks  and  points  which 
have  made  large  rents  in  its  delicate  substance. 
But  the  superstructure  itself  will  be  left  intact. 
And  why  ?  Not  indeed  because  it  has  the 
slightest  claim  on  our  credulity,  but  because  it  is 
only  theories  that  profess  to  be  founded  on  facts, 
that  can  be  refuted  by  facts.  Take,  for  instance, 
one  of  the  great  questions  fought  over  by  the 
Schoolmen  of  the  Middle  Ages,  Utrum  Deus 
intelligent  omnia  alia  a  se  per  ideas  eorum,  an 
aliter.  The  process  by  which  God  conceives 
ideas  is  so  utterly  futile  a  discussion,  so  infinitely 
removed  from  all  contact  with  human  experience 

2 


INTRODUCTION 

or  facts,  that  a  hypothesis  on  the  subject  is  as 
little  susceptible  of  disproof  as  it  is  of  proof;  and 
any  one  attacking  the  hypothesis  falls  into  as 
many  absurdities  as  one  defending  it.  If  some 
one  were  to  rise  up  and  announce  that,  right  away 
in  the  depths  of  space,  beyond  the  reach  of  our 
most  powerful  telescopes,  there  existed  another 
Earth  identical  with  ours,  inhabited  by  our 
doubles,  who  were  doing  always  the  same  things 
that  we  were  doing  and  at  the  same  moment,  no 
sort  of  scientific  refutation  would  be  possible. 
All  that  science  could  say  would  be  :  Where  is 
your  evidence  ?  To  that  our  metaphysician  gives 
answer  that  he  knows  it  by  direct  intuition,  and 
triumphantly  invites  the  man  of  science  to  dis- 
prove it.  Not  improbably  he  will  add  some 
complimentary  expressions  about  people  who 
have  no  faith :  and  believe  only  in  the  things 
they  can  touch  and  see.  Now  the  man  of  science 
cannot  disprove  it :  the  matter  is  entirely  outside 
the  region  of  experience,  and  is  as  little  suscep- 
tible of  disproof  as  it  is  of  proof.  All  that  he 
can  say  is  that,  once  you  pass  beyond  experience, 
there  is  no  limit  to  what  you  may  believe :  de 
non  apparentibus  et  non  existentibus  eadem  est 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

ratio.  Any  statement,  however  ridiculous,  may 
be  supported  by  such  methods  ;  and  the  opposite 
of  that  statement  may  be  similarly  supported. 
And  so  the  metaphysician  goes  on  his  way 
rejoicing,  while  the  man  of  science  turns  con- 
temptuously from  what  he  can  only  regard  as 
foolish  puerilities. 

When  thus  crudely  stated,  the  futile  nature  of 
all  metaphysical  discussion  will  be  patent  to 
almost  every  one.  How  is  it,  then,  that  for 
thousands  of  years  back  these  ghostly  systems 
have  continued  to  be  spun  by  able  men,  and  have 
continued  to  find  disciples,  in  spite  of  the  regu- 
larly recurring  overthrow  which  inevitably  over- 
takes each  after  a  short  time  ?  The  answer  is 
that  their  stronghold  lies  in  their  obscurity,  in  the 
maze  of  words  through  which  they  are  invari- 
ably propounded.  One  thing  all  metaphysical 
systems  have  in  common — and  that  is,  incom- 
prehensibility, of  a  more  or  less  pronounced 
character.  An  intellect  stretched  and  strained 
to  the  uttermost  in  the  attempt  to  grasp  the 
leading  points  in  a  new  philosophy  is  by  that 
very  fact  disabled  from  judging  it  as  though  it 
were  a  simple  proposition.  Every  juggler  knows 

4 


INTRODUCTION 

how  easy  it  is  to  divert  attention  from  some- 
thing he  does  not  want  his  public  to  see.  By 
arranging  a  number  of  people  round  a  table, 
and  compelling  them  to  fix  their  attention  in  a 
certain  way,  we  can  make  them  honestly  believe 
that  the  table  is  turning  round  of  its  own  accord. 
In  short,  any  excessive  tax  upon  the  attention 
disables  the  judgment  proportionally  :  the  more 
the  mind  is  concentrated  on  one  point,  the  less 
is  it  capable  of  detecting  fallacies  outside.  In 
simple  matters  we  can  easily  see  through  a  diffi- 
culty :  the  ditch  is  promptly  jumped.  But  when 
we  come  to  precisely  the  same  difficulty  in  the 
misty  obscurity  of  metaphysics,  we  cannot  see 
the  other  side.  The  ditch  is  no  wider  than 
before,  but  we  have  on  our  backs  all  the  vast 
load  of  metaphysical  verbiage,  and  it  is  so  heavy 
we  cannot  jump  the  ditch  :  we  can  barely 
stagger  along  under  it  as  it  is.  Consequently  we 
find  that  metaphysical  systems  in  general  have 
a  vogue  directly  proportional  to  their  unintelli- 
gibility.  That  is  their  only  safeguard  :  to  put 
them  into  plain  language  would  be  to  bring  them 
tumbling  to  the  ground.  Roger  Bacon,  the  illus- 
trious forerunner  of  modern  science,  must  surely 

5 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

have  been  thinking  of  contemporary  philosophy, 
when  he  mentioned  as  a  great  stumbling-block  to 
truth  propriae  ignorantiae  occultatio  cum  ostenta- 
tione  sapientiae  apparentis,  the  concealment  of 
ignorance  by  ostentation  of  seeming  wisdom.  The 
elaboration  of  wonderful  schemes,  without  a  par- 
ticle of  evidence,can  onlypass  muster  in  these  days, 
provided  that  they  are  so  inscrutable  as  barely  to 
be  comprehensible  at  all.  Kant  denned  'self 
as  an  '  original  transcendental  synthetic  unity  of 
apperception.'  Now  there  are  many  propositions 
which  we  might  accept  about  the  original  trans- 
cendental synthetic  unity  of  apperception,  which 
we  should  decline  to  accept  about  our  'self.'  In 
these  days  philosophy,  developed  from  Hegel, 
has  maintained  itself  by  adopting  a  standard  of 
incomprehensibility  never  before  paralleled.  And 
the  public,  supposing  that  there  must  be  some- 
thing behind  these  fine  words,  gasp  with  admira- 
tion, and  blindly  worship  the  putative  wisdom  of 
the  latest  Delphic  oracle. 

The  attitude  maintained  throughout  this  book 
is  that  metaphysics  is  a  maze  of  sesquipedalian 
verbiage,  beyond  the  reach  of  Science  to  defend 
or  to  refute.  A  metaphysician  is  like  the  man 

6 


INTRODUCTION 

who  wishes  to  teach  us  the  geography  of  the 
other  side  of  the  moon.  Since  neither  he  nor 
we  have  ever  seen  it,  we  are  not  in  a  position 
to  confute  him.  But,  however  loudly  he  invokes 
his  direct  intuition,  we  are  not  going  to  believe 
it,  until  we  are  offered  some  evidence  on  the 
subject.  Nor  are  we  going  to  believe  the 
metaphysics  of  Bergson,  or  of  any  other  philo- 
sopher, until  we  are  presented  with  facts  that  we 
can  understand,  in  place  of  words  that  represent 
no  actual  ideas. 

The  metaphysic  of  Bergson  has  all  the 
qualities  of  incomprehensibility  that  are  essential 
to  the  most  respectable  philosophy.  His  theory 
of  time  and  the  vital  impetus  is  indeed  so 
obscure  that  it  was  only  after  close  study  that 
I  was  able  to  represent  mentally  the  author's 
point  of  view.  Having  mastered  his  doctrine,  I 
am  now  chiefly  concerned  to  mention  that  a 
thorough  search  through  his  works  has  failed  to 
disclose  one  single  fact,  one  particle  of  positive 
evidence,  offered  in  support  of  it ;  such  facts  as 
are  named  are  all  directed  only  against  antagon- 
istic doctrines.  Words,  metaphors,  fine  writing 
we  have  in  abundance ;  but  what  we  want  is 

7 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

facts,  and  that  is  just  what  we  have  failed  to 
find.  Doubtless  Bergson  has  felt  something  of 
this  little  deficiency ;  for  he  depreciates  the 
intelligence,  saying  that  it  cannot  understand 
life ;  but  that  only  instinct  can  understand  life. 
By  instinct  the  Professor  means  direct  intuition. 
And  of  what  use  to  us  is  the  direct  intuition  of 
Professor  Bergson? 

I  do  not  propose,  therefore,  to  enter  into  any 
discussion  of  Bergson's  metaphysics,  except  in 
so  far  as  they  touch  upon  material  facts.  I  would 
as  soon  start  wrangling  with  him  about  the 
other  side  of  the  moon.  But  since  he  does 
attempt  to  overthrow  certain  conclusions  rested 
by  science  on  facts,  I  am  concerned  to  meet  him 
on  these  particular  points. 

Before  his  arrival  upon  the  scene,  philosophy 
in  England  was  in  a  stagnating  condition.  The 
orthodox  metaphysics  of  the  time  was  of  so 
esoteric  a  character  as  to  be  almost  completely 
devoid  of  influence  outside  the  circle  of  its 
special  votaries.  It  was  opposed  by  the  Prag- 
matism of  William  James.  But  this  system, 
though  receiving  wide  support,  confines  itself 
mainly  to  a  discussion  of  the  nature  of  Truth, 

8 


INTRODUCTION 

and  could  not  satisfy  the  everlasting  craving  for 
knowledge  about  the  essential  phenomena  of 
Life.  Although,  therefore,  no  specific  philosophy 
was  before  the  public,  there  were  two  opposite 
streams  of  opinion,  which  vaguely  represented 
the  philosophy  of  the  general  run  of  humanity. 
On  the  one  hand,  there  was  the  teleological 
view  of  the  Universe — the  idea  that  all  things 
are  trending  towards  some  pre-arranged  goal, 
that  every  fact  and  every  event  has  some 
definite  purpose  in  the  fulfilment  of  a  plan  which 
is  to  bring  humanity  and  the  universe  to  the 
consummation  marked  out  for  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  was  the  so-called  mechanistic  view 
of  the  Universe — the  idea  that  the  laws  of 
mechanics,  physics,  and  chemistry,  are  adequate 
to  account  for  the  evolution  of  the  Universe, 
including  the  objective  phenomena  of  Life. 
According  to  this  view,  the  nebula  which  pre- 
ceded the  solar  system  developed, — under  the 
ordinary  laws  ol  matter  and  motion — to  the  state 
in  which  we  now  see  it;  in  such  wise  that  a 
physicist,  who  was  supplied  with  exact  data 
concerning  the  original  distribution  of  matter 
and  energy  in  the  nebula,  and  armed  with  an 

9 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

all-powerful  mathematic,  could  have  deduced 
the  exact  condition  of  the  universe  in  any  re- 
quired subsequent  era. 

The  teleological  view  was  that  which  most 
appealed  to  people's  sentiments  ;  it  was  the  view 
that  the  public  at  large  desired,  and  strongly 
desired,  to  see  triumphant.  The  mechanistic 
view,  on  the  other  hand,  seemed  to  have  the 
authority  of  Science :  it  was  supported  and 
strengthened  by  every  successive  scientific  dis- 
covery that  had  any  philosophical  bearing  what- 
ever :  it  was  thoroughly  popularised  by  the 
Darwinian  theory  of  Evolution,  in  which  mechan- 
istic methods  were  exclusively  employed.  In 
short,  the  position  was  that  the  public  nourished 
a  deep  desire  for  the  truth  of  the  teleological  view, 
accompanied  by  a  strong  feeling  of  its  inadequacy, 
and  a  deep  dread  of  the  mechanistic  view. 

Into  this  unsettled  state  of  affairs  has  now 
been  shot  the  thunderbolt  of  Bergson's  philo- 
sophy, in  which  a  third  alternative  is  presented. 
Bergson  repudiates  teleology ;  and  he  also  repu- 
diates the  universal  dominion  of  physical  law. 
He  postulates  a  Vital  Impetus  or  push  which 
drives  forward  the  development  of  life,  but  not 

10 


INTRODUCTION 

to  any  specific  end  or  with  any  specific  purpose. 
The  impetus  is  not  physical,  but  psychical,  and 
therefore  not  controlled  by  the  laws  of  Physics, 
or  any  other  science.  Can  we  wonder  that  this 
attempted  compromise  has  attracted  wide  sup- 
port? The  teleological  position  had  long  been 
felt  to  be  untenable,  and  men  warmly  welcomed 
a  new  theory  which  seemed  to  offer  a  possible 
escape  from  the  rigid  determinism  of  science. 
A  cynic  might  smile  at  the  way  in  which  many 
of  those,  to  whom  teleology  was  dearest,  have 
rushed  to  the  refuge  which  they  thought  they 
saw  in  Bergson's  metaphysics.  They  abandon 
their  theology  and  its  appropriate  metaphysics, 
with  an  alacrity  which  eloquently  tells  of  their 
small  confidence  in  it,  as  soon  as  they  hear  of 
any  other  hypothesis  that  will  keep  them  outside 
physical  law.  Various  men  of  science,  who  have 
sentiments  much  like  other  people,  have  in  a 
guarded  way  encouraged  the  new  belief;  while 
admitting  the  absence  of  evidence,  they  see  no 
reason  against  it,  or  they  think  there  is  a  *  loop- 
hole '  for  believing  in  it. 

The  attitude  of  this  book  is  purely  mechan- 
istic.    I  am  not  concerned  to  defend  the  tele- 

ii 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

ological  theories,  which  Bergson  so  ably  con- 
demns, and  which  are  so  readily  abandoned  by 
their  proper  defenders.  Let  them  enter  peace- 
ably into  the  crowded  metaphysical  lumber-room 
of  lost  causes.  I  am,  on  the  other  hand,  con- 
cerned to  defend  the  mechanistic  theory,  and 
to  examine  what  foundation  in  facts  is  presented 
by  the  new  hypothesis  now  ranged  against  it. 
In  the  inorganic  world,  the  dominion  of  physical 
law  is  now  rarely  questioned ;  the  controversy 
burns  only  round  the  organic  world,  and  to 
that  department,  therefore,  I  shall  give  special 
attention. 

At  the  outset,  I  may  be  asked  the  question, 
what  are  your  metaphysics  ?  I  answer — we  have 
no  metaphysics.  We  do  not  believe  in  meta- 
physics. We  do  not  believe  in  any  theory, 
unless  it  is  supported  by  facts  ;  and  any  investiga- 
tion of  facts  belongs  not  to  metaphysics,  but 
to  some  special  branch  of  science.  Still  we 
may  be  asked  to  define  our  position  on  certain 
definite  questions  :  are  we  idealist,  or  materialist, 
or  realist  ?  We  are  none  of  them.  Idealism, 
indeed,  offers  some  attraction  to  the  intellect. 
Our  whole  subjective  life  consists  of  conscious- 

12 


INTRODUCTION 

ness,  mental  images,  etc.,  of  a  non-material  order. 
They  are  awakened  by  purely  physical  activity 
occurring  in  the  cells  of  a  certain  part  of  the 
brain.  How,  then,  can  these  mental  images 
resemble  the  external  objects  they  represent 
when  called  up  only  through  the  intermediation 
of  a  nervous  current  ?  Absolute  nature  must  be 
altogether  different  from  our  mental  representa- 
tions, and  we  appear  to  be  landed  in  Berkeleyan 
idealism. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  look  at  the  universe 
through  materialist  spectacles,  we  find  no  neces- 
sity therein  for  postulating  any  consciousness 
whatever.  Things  and  events  would  be  just  the 
same  without  it.  So  that  there  is  an  element  of 
truth  both  in  idealism  and  materialism,  but — as 
we  believe — a  much  larger  element  of  meta- 
physical fancy  in  both  of  them.  Let  me  en- 
deavour to  elucidate  this  position. 

It  has  long  been  a  platitude  of  Psychology 
that  the  modus  operandi  of  the  intellect  is  by 
bringing  two  ideas  into  relation  with  one 
another.  The  relations  are  given  names  such 
as  association  by  contiguity,  by  similarity,  etc.; 
but  it  suffices  for  my  purpose  that  in  the  last 

'3 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

analysis  the  function  of  intellect  is  to  bring  two 
disconnected  ideas  into  relation.  Newton  saw 
an  apple  fall  upon  the  ground :  he  had  previously 
studied  the  orbits  of  the  planets  :  and  one  of  the 
most  profound  intellectual  operations  ever  per- 
formed was  that  in  which  one  of  these  events 
called  up  by  similarity  the  other,  the  two  being 
brought  into  relation  as  aspects  of  a  single  fact. 
Every  intellectual  operation  thus  requires  two 
terms.  Now  when  we  are  trying  to  explain  the 
universe ;  when,  that  is  to  say,  the  whole  of  our 
universe  is  one  of  the  terms,  there  is  nothing  left 
to  constitute  the  other  ;  nothing  remains  outside, 
into  relation  with  which  it  may  be  brought. 
Consequently  the  intellect  gropes  in  the  dark. 
It  feels  in  all  directions  for  a  second  term,  but 
nowhere  finds  it.  Why  then  assume  a  second 
term  ?  We  are  compelled  by  the  constitution  of 
our  minds  to  assume  it.  Invariably  our  cognitions 
have  two  terms ;  we  are  unable  to  conceive  of 
any  cognition  with  only  one  term.  The  intellect 
must  therefore  break  down  when  the  entire 
product  of  experience  constitutes  one  of  the 
terms.  It  is  like  a  man  who  tries  to  run  with 
only  one  leg.  The  mind  of  man  can  never  solve 


INTRODUCTION 

the  problem  of  metaphysics :  it  cannot  even  say 
whether  there  is  a  problem  to  be  solved.  All  it 
can  do  is  to  examine  the  limitations  under  which 
the  intellect  works,  to  note  that  those  limitations 
must  for  ever  give  rise  to  the  sensation  of  an  un- 
solved problem,  and  to  perceive  that  all  attempts 
to  solve  it  are  but  the  helpless  writhing  of  the 
soul  under  the  inexorable  conditions  of  its  own 
existence. 


CHAPTER    II 
THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

'  Man  usually  believes,  if  only  words  he  hears, 
That  also  with  them  goes  material  for  thinking.' 

GOETHE. 

A  DESCRIPTION  of  Professor  Bergson's  views 
must  be  a  matter  of  very  great  difficulty  to  an 
opponent.  Holding,  as  I  do,  that  Bergson's 
metaphysics  are  a  cloud  of  words,  carrying 
with  them  no  real  meaning,  it  will  be  necessary 
that  an  impartial  exposition  should  likewise  be 
verbose  and  cloudy.  Too  clear  a  lucidity,  too 
close  a  search  after  meanings  instead  of  words, 
would  precipitate  the  cloud  and  bring  the  theory 
to  ground  with  a  drenching  rainfall  of  verbiage 
on  the  reader's  head.  In  justice  to  the  reader, 
we  have  to  be  lucid :  in  justice  to  Professor 
Bergson,  we  have  to  be  obscure,  and  that,  too, 
although  I  am  deeply  imbued  with  the  spirit  in 
which  Byron  criticised  Coleridge : 

'  Explaining  metaphysics  to  the  nation  ; 
I  wish  he  would  explain  his  explanation.' 

16 


I  repudiate,  therefore,  all  responsibility  for  the 
views  and  reasoning  of  this  chapter,  and  for  any 
obscurity  in  the  mode  of  statement.  My  effort  will 
be  directed  solely  towards  reproducing  Bergson's 
principles  as  accurately  as  possible.  All  criticism 
upon  them  is  reserved  for  Chapter  in. 

The  basis  of  Professor  Bergson's  system  is  a 
new  mode  of  regarding  time.  According  to 
Kant,  time  and  space  are  forms  of  thought ;  but 
science,  and  the  mechanistic  philosophy  based 
upon  science,  has  given  all  its  attention  to  space, 
and  has  to  a  great  extent  neglected  time.  True, 
says  Bergson.time  is  assumed  during  which  events 
take  place  :  evolution  takes  long  stretches  of  time  : 
time  enters  largely  into  the  problems  of  physics  : 
but  it  is  abstract  time.  No  real  importance  is 
attached  to  it.  It  is  simply  a  condition  of  events 
happening,  and  no  further  attention  is  given  to 
it.  Moreover,  even  here,  time  is  commonly  ex- 
pressed and  conceived  in  terms  of  space.  A 
clock  indicates  time  by  hands  moving  in  space : 
a  physicist  compares  times  by  lines  of  various 
lengths  on  paper.  In  short,  our  science  is  a 
science  of  space  and  not  of  time. 

Now  consciousness  and  life  differ  from  material 
B  17 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

objects  in  their  non-occupancy  of  space.  To 
them,  only  time  is  applicable  :  one  conscious 
state  gives  rise  to  another  with  never-ceasing 
change  and  succession  :  they  exist  in  time,  and 
not  in  space.  And  the  time  is  concrete,  or  real, 
totally  different  from  the  abstract  time  postulated 
by  science  in  its  study  of  objective  phenomena. 
'  My  mental  state  as  it  advances  on  the  road  of 
time,  is  continually  swelling  with  the  duration 
which  it  accumulates  :  it  goes  on  increasing — 
rolling  upon  itself,  as  a  snowball  on  the  snow.' * 
So  constant  is  transition  that '  there  is  no  essential 
difference  between  passing  from  one  state  to 
another  and  persisting  in  the  same  state.'2  It 
is  a  mistake  to  tie  together  our  conscious  states 
as  manifestations  of  some  'ego.'  Time  is  all 
that  connects  them  :  indeed  they  are  time :  '  As 
regards  the  psychical  life  unfolding  beneath  the 
symbols  which  conceal  it,  we  readily  perceive 
that  time  is  just  the  stuff  it  is  made  of.' 

'  There  is,  moreover,  no  stuff  more  resistant 
nor  more  substantial.'3  This  concrete  time 
contains  within  itself  at  any  moment  its  whole 
past,  though  of  course  the  whole  does  not  appear 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  2.  2  Ibid.  3  Ibid.,  p.  4. 

18 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

in  every  idea.  '  We  think  with  only  a  small 
part  of  our  past,  but  it  is  with  our  entire  past, 
including  the  original  bent  of  our  soul,  that  we 
desire,  will  and  act.'1  Since  consciousness  con- 
tains the  entire  past  within  itself,  and  each 
moment  adds  something  new,  no  state  of  con- 
sciousness can  ever  be  repeated.  'Thus  our 
personality  shoots,  grows  and  ripens  without 
ceasing.  Each  of  its  moments  is  something 
new  added  to  what  was  before.  We  may  go 
further :  it  is  not  only  something  new,  but  some- 
thing unforeseeable.'2  'For  a  conscious  being, 
to  exist  is  to  change,  to  change  is  to  mature,  to 
mature  is  to  go  on  creating  one's  self  endlessly.'3 
The  organism,  says  Bergson,  is  distinguished 
from  inorganic  matter,  by  its  tendency  to  indi- 
viduation.  It  is,  therefore,  incomparable  with  any 
inorganic  cut-out  portion  of  the  universe.  The 
only  analogy  is  with  the  universe  as  a  whole. 
1  We  must  no  longer  speak  of  life  in  generates,  an 
abstraction,  or  as  a  mere  heading  under  which  all 
living  beings  are  inscribed.  At  a  certain  moment, 
in  certain  points  of  space,  a  visible  current  has 
taken  rise  ;  this  current  of  life,  traversing  the 

1  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  5,  6.       2  Ibid.,  p.  6.        3  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

19 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

bodies  it  has  organised  one  after  another,  pass- 
ing from  generation  to  generation,  has  become 
divided  amongst  species  and  distributed  amongst 
individuals  without  losing  anything  of  its  force, 
rather  intensifying  in  proportion  to  its  advance.'1 
1  Life  is  like  a  current  passing  from  germ  to  germ 
through  the  medium  of  a  developed  organism.'2 
'  Now,  the  more  we  fix  our  attention  on  this 
continuity  of  life,  the  more  we  see  that  organic 
evolution  resembles  the  evolution  of  a  conscious- 
ness, in  which  the  past  presses  against  the  present 
and  causes  the  upspringing  of  a  new  form  of 
consciousness,  incommensurable  with  its  ante- 
cedents.' 3  Since  each  moment  adds  something 
totally  new,  the  future  could  not  even  with 
infinite  knowledge  be  prophesied,  as  alleged  by 
the  mechanistic  hypothesis  of  science.  Physics 
and  chemistry  will  never  give  the  key  to  life  : 
chemical  synthesis  has  never  yet  succeeded  in 
reconstructing  anything  but  the  waste  products 
of  vital  activity.  The  only  refutation  of  the 
physico-chemical  theory  that  is  possible  is  drawn 
1  from  the  consideration  of  real  time.' 4  A  mathe- 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  27.  2  Ibid.,  p.  28. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  29.  4  Ibid.,  p.  39. 

20 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

matical  and  final  refutation  is,  in  the  opinion 
of  Professor  Bergson,  impossible.  Huxley's 
defence  fails,  he  says,  through  neglect  to  re- 
cognise the  concreteness  of  time.  In  Huxley's 
argument '  time  is  still  spoken  of :  one  pronounces 
the  word,  but  one  does  not  think  of  the  thing. 
For  time  is  here  deprived  of  efficacy,  and  if  it 
does  nothing,  it  is  nothing.  Radical  mechanism 
implies  a  metaphysic  in  which  the  totality  of  the 
real  is  postulated  complete  in  eternity,  and  in 
which  the  apparent  duration  of  things  expresses 
merely  the  infirmity  of  a  mind  that  cannot  know 
everything  at  once.  But  duration  is  something 
very  different  from  this  for  our  consciousness, 
that  is  to  say,  for  that  which  is  most  indisput- 
able in  our  experience.  We  perceive  duration 
as  a  stream  against  which  we  cannot  go.  It  is 
the  foundation  of  our  being,  and,  as  we  feel,  the 
very  substance  of  the  world  in  which  we  live. 
It  is  of  no  use  to  hold  up  before  our  eyes  the 
dazzling  prospect  of  a  universal  mathematic  ;  we 
cannot  sacrifice  experience  to  the  requirements 
of  a  system.  That  is  why  we  reject  radical 
mechanism.' l 


1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  41. 
21 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

The  Professor  then  goes  on  to  attack  '  radical 
finalism '  or  the  teleological  view,  with  which  we 
are  not  concerned  in  this  work.  He  affirms, 
however,  that  his  own  philosophy  is  closer  to  the 
teleological  than  to  the  mechanistic  standpoint. 
He  then  proceeds  to  a  proof  of  the  insufficiency 
of  the  mechanistic  theory  to  account  for  the 
evolution  of  life.  '  Pure  mechanism  would  be 
refutable,  and  finality,  in  the  special  sense  in 
which  we  understand  it,  would  be  demonstrable 
in  a  certain  aspect,  if  it  could  be  proved  that  life 
may  manufacture  the  like  apparatus,  by  unlike 
means,  on  divergent  lines  of  evolution  ;  and  the 
strength  of  the  proof  would  be  proportional  both 
to  the  divergency  between  the  lines  of  evolution 
thus  chosen  and  to  the  complexity  of  the  similar 
structures  found  in  them.'1  That  is  to  say,  if 
we  find  the  same  highly  complex  structure  on 
two  divergent  lines  of  evolution,  that  fact  will 
constitute  proof  that  these  structures  cannot  have 
been  evolved  by  the  mere  haphazard  operation 
of  physical  forces,  but  must  be  due  to  some 
primitive  impulse  of  life,  which  works  the  same 
effect  under  entirely  different  conditions.  Such 

1  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  57,  58. 
22 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

a  structure  we  have  in  the  eye  of  vertebrates  and 
molluscs,  such  as  Pecten.  '  We  find  the  same 
essential  parts  in  each,  composed  of  analogous 
elements.  The  eye  of  the  Pecten  presents  a  retina, 
a  cornea,  a  lens  of  cellular  structure  like  our  own. 
There  is  even  that  peculiar  inversion  of  retinal 
elements  which  is  not  met  with,  in  general,  in  the 
retina  of  the  invertebrates.  Now,  the  origin  of 
molluscs  may  be  a  debated  question,  but,  whatever 
opinion  we  hold,  all  are  agreed  that  molluscs 
and  vertebrates  separated  from  their  common 
parent  stem  long  before  the  appearance  of  an  eye 
so  complex  as  that  of  Pecten.  Whence,  then,  the 
structural  analogy  ?  ' l  The  accumulation  of 
insensible  variations,  according  to  Bergson,  is  far 
too  remote  a  probability  to  justify  our  credence. 
The  mutation  theory  of  de  Vries  is  at  least  as  in- 
adequate. For  any  improvement  in  vision  de- 
mands a  simultaneous  alteration  in  an  exceedingly 
large  number  of  different  elements  :  and  a  simul- 
taneous set  of  mutations  defies  probability  far 
more  than  a  simultaneous  set  of  small  variations. 
Correlation  cannot  be  invoked  :  it  is  a  practical 
abandonment  of  the  theory  of  accidental  varia- 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  66. 
23 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

tion.  The  only  hypothesis  in  the  field,  competent 
to  give  an  explanation,  is  that  which  affirms  the 
inheritance  of  characters  acquired  by  direct 
action  of  the  environment  upon  the  organism,  or 
by  reaction  of  the  organism  on  the  environment — 
neo-Lamarckism.  The  dogmatic  denial  of  this 
possibility bymodern  biologists  is  quite  unjustified; 
nevertheless  '  neo-Lamarckism  is  no  more  able 
than  any  other  form  of  evolutionism  to  solve  the 
problem.' l 

Each  of  these  views,  however,  '  being  sup- 
ported by  a  considerable  number  of  facts,  must 
be  true  in  its  way.'2  The  error  is  in  regarding 
the  origin  of  variations  as  accidental.  '  We  can- 
not help  believing  that  these  differences  are  the 
development  of  an  impulsion  which  passes  from 
germ  to  germ  across  the  individuals,  that  they 
are  therefore  not  pure  accidents,  and  that  they 
might  well  appear  at  the  same  time,  in  the  same 
form,  in  all  the  representatives  of  the  same 
species,  or  at  least  in  a  certain  number  of  them.'3 
Such  is  the  only  hypothesis  that  provides  escape 
from  the  impossible  assumption  of  chance  varia- 
tions :  the  example  of  the  eye  shows  that  '  a 

1  Creative  Evolution^  p.  89.        2  Ibid.        3  Ibid.,  p.  90. 
24 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

psychological  cause  intervenes ; ' l  and  the  most 
solid  ground  of  the  neo-Lamarckians  is  where 
they  postulate  as  the  cause  of  variation  an  effort 
of  psychical  character  on  the  part  of  the  varying 
organism.  Thus,  says  our  philosopher,  we  come 
back  to  an  original  impetus  of  life  which  is  the 
'fundamental  cause  of  variations.'2  Life  is  an 
original  psychical  impetus,  running  through  inert 
matter  like  a  stream:  wherever  it  flows,  the  matter 
becomes  organised  into  what  we  call  living  indi- 
viduals. The  impetus  is  of  the  nature  of  conscious 
effort :  wherever  that  effort  has  been  great,  the 
resulting  organisation  of  matter  will  be  advanced : 
wherever  it  has  been  small,  the  resulting  organisa- 
tion will  be  backward.  Thus,  to  return  to  vision, 
the  explanation  lies  in  one  branch  of  the  stream 
of  life  taking  the  form  of  vision.  Wherever  this 
branch  flows  it  organises  matter  into  the  form 
of  an  eye.  If  the  effort  has  been  great,  a  complex 
and  perfect  eye  results,  like  that  of  a  bird.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  small,  it  will  have 
wrought  a  structure  less  perfect,  but  on  a  similar 
plan.  Hence  in  the  most  diverse  species,  the 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  91. 

2  Ibid.)  p.  92. 

25 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

resemblance    between    these   most   complicated 
structures  is  explained. 

From  this  explanation  of  what  Life  ts,  Bergson 
turns  to  consider  what  are  the  main  channels 
into  which  it  has  divided.  Matter  offers  many 
impediments  and  obstacles  to  the  free  flow  of 
Life,  and  this  resistance  had  to  be  overcome. 
'  Life  seems  to  have  succeeded  in  this  by  dint 
of  humility,  by  making  itself  very  small  and  very 
insinuating,  bending  to  physical  and  chemical 
forces,  consenting  even  to  go  a  part  of  the  way 
with  them.' l  The  number  of  channels  into  which 
Life  divided  is  represented  by  the  number  of 
species,  or  of  individuals,  into  which  organisms 
are  grouped  :  and  the  true  causes  of  differentia- 
tion are  '  those  which  life  bore  within  its  bosom.' 2 
Life  began  with  the  tiny  specks  of  protoplasm 
'  possessed  of  the  tremendous  internal  push  that 
was  to  raise  them  even  to  the  highest  forms  of 
life.'3  'The  bifurcations  on  the  way  have  been 
numerous,  but  there  have  been  many  blind  alleys 
beside  the  two  or  three  highways ;  and  of  these 
highways  themselves,  only  one,  that  which  leads 

1  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  103,  104.  2  Ibid.)  p.  104. 

3  Ibid.)  p.  104. 

26 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

through  the  vertebrates  up  to  man,  has  been  wide 
enough  to  allow  free  passage  to  the  full  breath 
of  life.' l  In  so  far  as  there  is  an  impetus  towards 
social  life,  the  brunt  of  it  '  was  borne  along  the 
line  of  evolution  ending  at  man,  and  the  rest  of 
it  was  collected  on  the  road  leading  to  the  hymen- 
optera.'2  The  vital  impetus,  being  of  psychical 
character,  has  power  of  choice,  and  might,  if  it 
had  chosen,  have  saved  itself  the  effort  of  so 
great  a  progress,  and  rested  after  reaching  the 
rank  of  the  extinct  fossil  forms.  But  it  has  not 
done  so :  it  has  run  into  three  main  divisions : 
torpor,  intelligence  and  instinct :  which  therefore 
are  complementary  to  one  another.  In  plants, 
torpor  is  paramount.  Among  animals,  the  main 
directions  are,  as  already  stated,  towards  men 
and  hymenoptera,  with  intelligence  and  instinct 
respectively.  Yet  each  group  carries  with  it 
subordinate  elements  from  the  other  groups. 
'  When  a  tendency  splits  up  in  the  course  of  its 
development,  each  of  the  special  tendencies 
which  thus  arise  tries  to  preserve  and  develop 
everything  in  the  primitive  tendency  that  is 
not  incompatible  with  the  work  in  which  it  is 

1  Creative  Evolution^  p.  105.  a  Ibid.)  p.  106. 

27 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

specialised/  1  Thus  '  sexual  generation  is  perhaps 
only  a  luxury  for  the  plant,  but  to  the  animal  it 
was  a  necessity,  and  the  plant  must  have  been 
driven  to  it  by  the  same  impetus  which  impelled 
the  animal  thereto,  a  primitive,  original  impetus, 
anterior  to  the  separation  of  the  two  kingdoms.'2 
The  role  of  life  is  to  insert  indetermination  into 
matter  :  to  release  it  from  the  subjection  to 
physical  law.  The  nervous  system  among 
animals  is  the  organ  which  supplies  indetermina- 
tion. Accordingly  the  progress  of  life  has  been 
above  all  a  progress  of  the  nervous  system. 
Among  plants,  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been 
directed  mainly  towards  bending  the  energy 
of  solar  radiation  to  break  up  the  molecules  of 
carbon  dioxide  and  effect  a  synthesis  from 
inorganic  materials.  '  The  same  impetus  that 
has  led  the  animal  to  give  itself  nerves  and  nerve 
centres  must  have  ended,  in  the  plant,  in  the 
chlorophyllian  function.'3  'The  cardinal  error 
which,  from  Aristotle  onwards,  has  vitiated 
most  of  the  philosophies  of  nature,  is  to  see  in 
vegetative,  instinctive  and  rational  life,  three 
successive  degrees  of  the  development  of  one  and 


1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  125.        2  Ibid.        8  /&#.,  p.  120. 
28 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

the  same  tendency,  whereas  they  are  three 
divergent  directions  of  an  activity  that  has  split 
up  as  it  grew.'1 

The  Professor  now  passes  to  an  examination 
of  the  two  great  life-channels  of  intelligence  and 
instinct.  '  Intelligence,  considered  in  what  seems 
to  be  its  original  feature,  is  the  faculty  of  manu- 
facturing artificial  objects,  especially  tools  to 
make  tools,  and  of  indefinitely  varying  the 
manufacture.'2  Instinct  'is  a  faculty  of  using 
and  even  of  constructing  organised  instruments.' 
Intelligence  '  is  the  faculty  of  making  and  using 
unorganised  instruments.'3  Instinct  is  concerned 
mainly  with  matter  :  intelligence  with  forms.  It 
is  generally  agreed  by  psychologists  that  the 
intellect  works  by  establishing  relations.  Instinct 
plainly  deals  only  with  things  upon  which  it 
reacts.  In  the  attainment  of  knowledge,  these 
two  functions  occupy  therefore  altogether 
separate  provinces ;  the  one  seeking  out  the 
forms  of  things,  the  other  the  substance. 
'  There  are  things  that  intelligence  alone  is  able 
to  seek,  but  which,  by  itself,  it  will  never  find. 
These  things  instinct  alone  could  find,  but  it  will 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  142.        a  Ibid.,  p.  146.        3  Ibid.,  p.  147. 

29 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

never  seek  them.' l  It  becomes  important  now 
to  ascertain  what  class  of  questions  are  to  be 
solved  by  intelligence,  and  what  by  instinct. 
1  Our  intelligence,  as  it  leaves  the  hands  of 
nature,  has  for  its  chief  object  the  unorganised 
solid.'2  The  tendency  of  the  intellect  being  to 
fabricate,  it  can  only  deal  with  solids.  What- 
ever is  fluid  will  escape  it  in  part,  and  life  will 
escape  it  altogether. 

In  the  next  place,  intellect  cannot  grasp 
mobility,  but  can  only  conceive  it  as  a  succes- 
sion of  stationary  states.  *  Of  the  discontinuous 
alone  does  the  intellect  form  a  clear  idea.'3 
This  is  a  grave  drawback  to  the  intellect  as  an 
instrument  for  '  pure  theorising ' ;  for  '  move- 
ment is  reality  itself,  and  immobility  is  always 
only  apparent  or  relative.'4  And  the  intellect 
can  only  form  a  clear  idea  of  this  deceptive 
immobility.  Hence  it  '  always  behaves  as  if  it 
were  fascinated  by  the  contemplation  of  inert 
matter,'5  and  is  hopelessly  bewildered  when  it 
turns  to  the  living  and  is  confronted  with  organ- 
isation. In  such  cases  it  can  only  proceed  as  if 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  159.  2  Ibid.,  p.  162. 

3  Ibid,,  p.  163.  *  Ibid.  5  Ibid.,  p.  170. 

30 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

this  living  matter  were  dead  and  inert,  and  in 
consequence  it  necessarily  fails.  'The  intellect 
is  characterised  by  a  natural  inability  to  com- 
prehend life.'1 

Very  different  is  it  with  instinct.  '  While 
intelligence  treats  everything  mechanically, 
instinct  proceeds,  so  to  speak,  organically.'2 
The  cell  of  an  organic  body  is  endowed  with  an 
instinct,  indistinguishable  from  that  of  the  bee  in 
a  hive.  It  contains  within  itself  that  funda- 
mental vital  push  which  connects  it  with  all 
other  branches  of  life.  Life  here  is  exactly  like 
memory :  the  cell  has  bound  up  with  it  the 
knowledge  of  all  the  past.  The  wonderful 
instincts  of  animals  are  altogether  beyond  the 
explanations  of  science.  If  they  were  explicable 
for  animals,  they  would  not  be  so  for  plants,  for 
'  how  can  we  help  thinking '  that  the  movements 
of  orchids  to  procure  fertilisation,  of  the  tendrils 
of  climbing  plants,  are  other  than  manifestations 
of  instinct  ? 3  Instinct  is  sympathy,  and  to 
instinct  we  must  look  for  an  explanation  of  life. 
'  It  is  to  the  very  inwardness  of  life  that  intuition 
leads  us, — by  intuition  I  mean  instinct  that  has 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  174.  2  Ibid.  *  Ibid.,  p.  179. 

31 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

become  disinterested,  self-conscious,  capable  of 
reflecting  upon  its  object  and  of  enlarging  it 
indefinitely.' 3 

From  this  point  of  view,  then,  consciousness 
appears  as  the  motive  principle  of  evolution,  and 
man  occupies  a  privileged  position.  '  Life,  that 
is  to  say  consciousness  launched  into  matter, 
fixed  its  attention  either  on  its  own  movement  or 
on  the  matter  it  was  passing  through  ;  and  it  has 
thus  been  turned  either  in  the  direction  of  in- 
tuition, or  in  that  of  intellect.'2  With  the  aid  of 
the  conclusion  thus  reached,  we  are  able  to 
'  penetrate  the  most  obscure  regions  of  meta- 
physics.'3 

We  have  now  traversed  in  outline  those 
portions  of  L?  Evolution  Crdatrice  which  are 
not  purely  metaphysical.  Of  the  rest,  little 
need  be  said.  The  metaphysical  atmosphere 
becomes  so  rarified  as  to  approach  perilously 
near  being  a  vacuum.  The  reader  has  already 
probably  begun  to  suffer  from  shortage  of  breath  ; 
and  lest  he  should  be  totally  asphyxiated,  it  will 
suffice  to  give  the  barest  indication  of  the 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  186.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  191,  192. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  195. 

32 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

remainder  of  the  work.  The  Professor,  having 
reached  the  point  above  described,  proceeds  to 
trace  the  genesis  of  intellect,  and  finds  it  to  be 
cut  off  from  intuition.  '  Intuition  is  mind  itself, 
and,  in  a  certain  sense,  life  itself.'1  Philosophy 
has  always  failed  when  it  has  abandoned  in- 
tuition. On  intuition  alone  can  we  rely  in  deal- 
ing with  life.  The  vital  impetus  appears  to 
be  closely  allied  to  intuition.  'The  whole  of 
humanity,  in  space  and  in  time,  is  one  immense 
army  galloping  beside  and  before  and  behind 
each  of  us  in  an  overwhelming  charge,  able  to 
beat  down  every  resistance  and  clear  the  most 
formidable  obstacles,  perhaps  even  death.' 2  It  is 
again  insisted  that  time  is  a  concrete,  and  not  an 
abstract  quality.  Duration  is  '  the  very  stuff  of 
reality.'3  An  analysis  of  the  idea  of  'nothing' 
leads  to  the  result  that  'there  is  more,  and  not 
less,  in  the  idea  of  an  object  conceived  as  "not 
existing"  than  in  the  idea  of  this  same  object 
conceived  as  "  existing " ;  for  the  idea  of  the 
object  "not  existing"  is  necessarily  the  idea  of 
the  object  "  existing"  with,  in  addition,  the  repre- 
sentation of  an  exclusion  of  this  object  by  the 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  282.       2  Ibid.,  p.  286.       s  Ibid.,  p.  287. 

c  33 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

actual  reality  taken  in  block.' l  Motion  is  more 
than  a  mere  series  of  positions  through  which 
the  moving  body  passes.  Yet  this  is  the 
assumption  of  science  which  led  Zeno  to  pro- 
pound his  paradox.  The  reality  of  motion  in 
itself,  and  time  in  itself,  can  only  be  recognised 
by  philosophy.  The  book  terminates  with  a 
criticism  of  the  philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer 
on  the  ground  that  it  accepts  the  data  of  experi- 
ence as  a  true  reality.  Spencer  assumed  mind  and 
matter  to  be  what  they  appear  to  our  experience 
to  be :  he  tells  us  nothing  of  what  they  really 
are,  nothing  really,  therefore,  of  evolution.  His 
method  is  the  analysis  and  synthesis  of  matter  : 
the  splitting  up  and  re-compounding  of  it,  for- 
getting all  about  the  real  '  becoming.'  '  Philo- 
sophy is  not  only  the  turning  of  the  mind 
homeward,  the  coincidence  of  human  conscious- 
ness with  the  living  principle  whence  it  emanates, 
a  contact  with  the  creative  effort :  it  is  the  study 
of  becoming  in  genera],  it  is  true  evolutionism,  and, 
consequently,  the  true  continuation  of  Science — 
provided  that  we  understand  by  this  word  a  set 
of  truths  either  experienced  or  demonstrated, 

1  Creative  Evolution^  p.  302. 

34 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

and  not  a  certain  new  scholasticism  that  has 
grown  up  during  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century  around  the  physics  of  Galileo,  as  the  old 
scholasticism  grew  up  around  Aristotle.'1 

After  U  Evolution  Crdatrice,  Bergson's  most 
important  work  is  Matiere  et  Me'moire.  Indeed, 
these  are  the  only  two  among  his  philosophical 
works  which  have  scientific  pretensions,  and  are 
not  purely  metaphysics.  It  behoves  us,  therefore, 
to  give  a  brief  account  of  the  doctrines  of  this 
work.  Its  object  is  to  trace  the  relationship  of 
mind  and  body ;  and  in  particular  to  attack  the 
theory  of  psycho-physical  parallelism  which  has 
been  generally  adopted  by  physiologists  and 
psychologists,  and  which  I  shall  describe  in 
Chapter  v.  The  theory  is  also  attacked  in 
the  Bulletin  de  la  SocUt£  Franfaise  de  Philo- 
sophic for  June  1901  ;  but,  the  objections  there 
raised  being  professedly  metaphysical,  an  ex- 
amination of  them  does  not  come  within  our 
purview,  but  may  be  left  for  those  who  hold 
that  metaphysics  is  capable  of  reaching  true  con- 
clusions. 

Matiere  et  Me'moire  opens  with  a  novel  theory 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  391. 

35 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

of  perception,  in  which  the  Professor  intends  to  re- 
concile realism  with  idealism.  For  realists  and 
idealists  alike  have  postulated  the  existence  of  two 
quite  different  modes  of  experience,  which  in  com- 
mon language  are  termed  subjective  and  objective. 
The  difference  between  mind  and  matter  has 
appeared  to  be  a  gulf  which  cannot  be  bridged. 
Bergson  herewith  undertakes  to  bridge  it.  Phy- 
siologists have  discovered  that  whenever  we 
have  a  perception  of  some  external  object,  there 
takes  place  a  nervous  disturbance  in  sense-organ 
and  brain ;  and  that  the  cerebral  disturbance 
is  a  condition  of  the  existence  of  the  mental 
perception.  From  this  it  has  been  inferred  that 
'  perceptions '  are  localised  within  the  brain. 
But  Bergson  denies  the  inference  ;  he  affirms 
that  our  perceptions  of  objects  are  not  in  our- 
selves, but  are  actually  in  the  objects  perceived. 
Moreover,  there  is  no  qualitative  difference  be- 
tween perception  and  object.  The  perception 
is  actually  a  part  of  the  object,  differing  from  it 
only  in  the  fact  that  whereas  an  object  has  un- 
limited capacities  for  acting  on  other  objects, 
the  perception  selects  only  one  or  two  of  these 
capacities  for  action — those,  namely,  which  have 

36 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

an  interest  for  the  perceiving  individual.  The 
perception,  in  short,  is  apparently  the  object  itself, 
deprived  of  all  its  qualities,  save  the  few  that 
have  for  us  a  practical  interest. 

The  Professor  begins  by  deductively  showing 
that  mere  physical  cerebral  disturbances  cannot 
beget  images  of  an  external  world,  as  has  hitherto 
been  alleged  by  physiologists.  '  The  brain  is  a 
part  of  the  material  world  ;  the  material  world  is 
not  part  of  the  brain.  Eliminate  the  image 
which  bears  the  name  material  world,  and  you 
destroy  at  the  same  time  the  brain  and  the 
cerebral  disturbances  which  are  parts  of  it.  Sup- 
pose, on  the  contrary,  that  these  two  images,  the 
brain  and  the  cerebral  disturbance,  vanish  :  ex 
hypothesiyou  efface  only  these,  that  is  to  say,  very 
little,  an  insignificant  detail  from  an  immense 
picture.  The  picture  in  its  totality,  that  is  to  say 
the  whole  universe,  remains.  To  make  of  the 
brain  the  condition  on  which  the  whole  image 
depends  is  in  truth  a  contradiction  in  terms, 
since  the  brain  is  by  hypothesis  a  part  of  this 
image.  Neither  nerves  nor  nerve  centres  can, 
then,  condition  the  image  of  the  universe.'  * 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  4. 

37 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

Bergson  then  goes  on  to  argue  that  the  body 
cannot  give  rise  to  perceptions,  but  is  merely  an 
arrangement  for  the  transmission  of  movement. 
'  My  body,  an  object  destined  to  move  other 
objects,  is,  then,  a  centre  of  action  ;  it  cannot 
give  birth  to  a  representation.'1  The  purpose 
of  the  body  is  to  provide  a  centre  of  choice  as 
to  which  of  several  possible  reactions  to  a 
stimulus  shall  take  place.  The  brain  is  con- 
cerned only  with  motor  reactions  of  an  automatic 
character.  '  There  is  then  only  a  difference  of 
degree — there  can  be  no  difference  in  kind — 
between  what  is  called  the  perceptive  faculty  of 
the  brain  and  the  reflex  functions  of  the  spinal 
cord.  The  cord  transforms  into  movements  the 
stimulation  received  ;  the  brain  prolongs  it  into 
reactions  which  are  merely  nascent ;  but,  in  the 
one  case  as  in  the  other,  the  function  of  the  nerve 
substance  is  to  conduct,  to  coordinate  or  to  in- 
hibit movements.'2  It  is  to  be  observed  that 
Bergson  starts  his  discussion,  not  from  matter, 
as  is  always  done  in  physical  science,  but  from 
spiritual  'images'  which  constitute  the  data  of 
the  whole  argument.  The  images,  which  con- 

1  Matter  and  Memory^  p.  5.  2  Ibid.^  p.  10. 

38 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

stitute  for  each  of  us  the  material  world,  cannot 
be  created  by  the  brain,  which  is  itself  an  image. 
The  function  of  the  brain  is  that  of  a  '  central 
telephonic  exchange':1  its  special  purpose  being 
to  present  as  many  alternative  outlets  as  possible 
to  a  received  stimulus.  Perception  symbolises 
1  indetermination  '  in  the  means  of  outlet.  The 
richer  the  perception  the  greater  is  the  indi- 
vidual's power  of  choice  among  the  various 
possible  reactions  furnished  by  the  nervous 
system.  '  Here  is  the  image  which  I  call  a 
material  object ;  I  have  the  representation  of  it. 
How  comes  it  that  it  does  not  appear  to  be  in 
itself  that  which  it  is  for  me  ?  It  is  because, 
being  bound  up  with  all  other  images,  it  is  con- 
tinued in  those  which  follow  it,  just  as  it  pro- 
longed those  which  preceded  it.  To  transform 
its  existence  into  representation,  it  would  be 
enough  to  suppress  what  follows  it,  what  pre- 
cedes it,  and  also  all  that  fills  it.  ...  I  should 
convert  it  into  representation  if  I  could  isolate  it, 
especially  if  I  could  isolate  its  shell.  Represen- 
tation is  there,  but  always  virtual — being  neutral- 
ised at  the  very  moment  when  it  might  become 

1  Matter  and  Memoty,  p.  19. 

39 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

actual,  by  the  obligation  to  continue  itself  and  to 
lose  itself  in  something  else.  To  obtain  this 
conversion  from  the  virtual  to  the  actual  it  would 
be  necessary,  not  to  throw  more  light  on  the 
object,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  obscure  some  of 
its  aspects,  to  diminish  it  by  the  greater  part  of 
itself,  so  that  the  remainder,  instead  of  being 
encased  in  its  surroundings  as  a  thing,  should 
detach  itself  from  them  as  a  picture' l  Repre- 
sentation results  from  the  omission  from  the 
totality  of  matter  of  all  that  is  devoid  of  interest 
for  us.  Our  bodies  are  '  centres  of  indetermina- 
tion,' 2  introducing  a  wholly  new  element  into  the 
physico-chemical  sequences  of  matter  constituting 
causality.  The  higher  our  power  of  representa- 
tion, the  more  indetermination  are  we  able  to 
introduce  in  material  phenomena,  and  the  more 
are  we  able  to  restrict  ourselves  to  those  ac- 
tivities of  external  matter  which  are  especially 
serviceable  to  us. 

Bergson  regards  perception,  therefore,  as  in- 
dependent, theoretically  at  least,  of  nervous 
system  and  sense  organs.  He  now  has  to  ex- 
plain why  nerve  lesions  produce  abolition  of 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  27,  28.          2  Ibid.,  p.  28. 
40 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

perception.  If  perception  is  not  founded  upon 
cerebral  disturbances,  how  is  cerebral  injury 
capable  of  affecting  the  power  of  perception,  as 
we  know  it  does  ?  The  answer  is  that  cerebral 
injury,  by  breaking  the  automatic  circuit,  prevents 
the  motor  reaction,  determined  by  the  will,  from 
taking  place.  There  would,  therefore,  be  no 
purpose  for  a  perception :  it  would  no  longer 
have  any  interest  for  us.  '  The  office  of  the 
nervous  system  is  to  utilise  that  [nerve]  vibration, 
to  convert  it  into  practical  deeds,  really  or 
virtually  accomplished.  If,  for  one  reason  or 
other,  the  disturbance  cannot  pass  along,  it 
would  be  strange  if  the  corresponding  perception 
still  took  place,  since  this  perception  would  then 
connect  our  body  with  points  of  space  which  no 
longer  directly  invite  it  to  make  a  choice.'1 

Another  difficulty  to  be  met  is  this  :  percep- 
tion shades  gradually  into  affective  states.  '  We 
pass  insensibly  from  the  contact  with  a  pin  to  its 
prick.'2  Now  pain  is  apparently  a  non-spatial 
subjective  sensation  in  the  body.  If,  then, 
perception  is  spatial  and  in  the  object  outside 
the  body,  there  must  be  a  radical  difference,  not 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  39,  40.  2  Ibid.,  p.  53. 

41 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

only  of  degree,  but  of  kind,  between  perception 
and  affection.  To  settle  this  difficulty  Professor 
Bergson  affirms  that  pain  does  in  fact  exist 
in  the  spot  where  it  is  felt,  and  that  it  is  a  local 
effort  to  repair  damage.  Pain  '  is  nothing  but 
the  effort  of  the  damaged  element  to  set  things 
right, — a  kind  of  motor  tendency  in  a  sensory 
nerve.  Every  pain,  then,  must  consist  in  an 
effort, — an  effort  which  is  doomed  to  be  un- 
availing.' l  Now  in  practice,  perception  is  never 
obtained  in  a  pure  state  :  it  is  always  alloyed 
with  a  certain  amount  of  affection,  and  this 
affection  being  possessed  of  local  extensity,  is 
readily  transferable  into  perception.  Perception 
being  outside  the  body  is  not  destroyed,  like 
affective  sensations,  when  the  body  is  destroyed. 
'  The  totality  of  perceived  images  subsists,  even 
if  our  body  disappears,  whereas  we  know  that 
we  cannot  annihilate  our  body  without  destroy- 
ing our  sensations.' 2  This  is  the  more  obvious, 
since  between  '  perception  of  matter  and  matter 
itself  there  is  but  a  difference  of  degree  and  not 
of  kind,  pure  perception  standing  towards  matter 
in  the  relation  of  the  part  to  the  whole.' 3 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  56.        2  Ibid.,  p.  59.        3  Ibid.,  p.  78. 

42 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

If  perception  is  strictly  objective,  it  is  radically 
different  from  memory  which  is  purely  subjective. 
The  two,  moreover,  are  always  found  in  com- 
bination, rendering  the  confusion  very  difficult 
to  avoid.  '  The  proper  office  of  psychologists 
would  be  to  dissociate  them,  to  give  back  to  each 
its  natural  purity ;  in  this  way  many  difficulties 
raised  by  psychology,  and  perhaps  also  by  meta- 
physics, might  be  loosened.'1  Just  as  percep- 
tion throws  light  on  the  nature  of  matter,  so 
memory  is  of  cardinal  importance  in  the  study 
of  spirit.  Materialism  is  refuted  by  a  true 
theory  of  memory.  If  memory  is  purely  a 
function  of  cerebral  activity,  then  materialism 
would  be  justified.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
has  an  independent  existence,  that  discovery  is 
of  great  assistance  in  the  solution  of  metaphysical 
problems.  To  this  question  the  Professor  now 
addresses  himself.  I  must  warn  the  reader  again 
that  I  am  still  merely  citing  Bergson's  views, 
without  staying  to  criticise  or  contradict  them. 

The  first  fact  that  transpires  is  that  memory 
exists,  not  under  one  form,  as  the  uninitiated 
might  suppose,  but  under  two  wholly  different 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  72. 

43 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

forms.  From  the  foregoing  account  three 
hypotheses  are  deducible  : — 

'  I.  The  past  survives  under  two  distinct 
forms :  first,  in  motor  mechanisms ;  second,  in 
independent  recollections.' 

'II.  The  recognition  of  a  present  object  is 
effected  by  movements  when  it  proceeds  from 
the  object,  by  representations  when  it  issues 
from  the  subject.' 

'III.  We  pass,  by  imperceptible  stages,  from 
recollections  strung  out  along  the  course  of  time 
to  the  movements  which  indicate  their  nascent  or 
possible  action  in  space.  Lesions  of  the  brain 
may  affect  these  movements,  but  not  these 
recollections.'1 

The  character  of  the  two  forms  of  memory 
must  be  further  specified.  The  first  is  that 
already  known  to  psychologists — and  generally 
believed  by  them  to  be  the  sole  kind  of  memory 
— it  is  a  '  cerebral  mechanism '  or  '  habit  of  body.' 
When  an  impression  or  sensation  has  once  been 
experienced,  it  modifies  the  cerebral  substance 
in  such  way  that  the  same  experience  may  be 
recalled  or  reproduced  by  an  appropriate  stimulus 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  87  and  88. 

44 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

or  association.  Memory  in  this  sense  is  the 
same  as  habit.  It  is  exemplified  in  learning  a 
thing  by  heart.  Increased  facility  comes  with 
every  repetition :  the  explanation  is  wholly 
materialistic.  Speaking  figuratively,  the  passage 
once  adopted  through  the  brain  becomes  auto- 
matically more  permeable  every  time  it  is 
traversed.  Finally,  the  first  word  of  a  poem 
may  automatically  lead  to  rattling  off  all  the  rest, 
even  while  the  individual  is  thinking  of  some- 
thing else. 

The  other  form  of  memory  is  purely  psychical 
and  has  no  physiological  counterpart.  The 
actual  learning  by  heart  is  automatic  and  physio- 
logical :  the  recollection  of  each  individual  lesson 
is  a  function  of  the  independent  memory.  The 
first  only  acts  the  part :  the  second  remembers  it. 
The  one  is  an  action,  the  other  a  representation. 
The  first  is  the  only  form  of  memory  possessed 
by  the  lower  animals.  The  second  is  the  privilege 
of  man  alone,  though  even  with  him  it  is  apt  to 
be  thwarted  by  the  other. 

The  first  or  habit-memory  appears  to  be  sub- 
ject to  the  ordinary  laws  of  association  :  but  at 
times  it  calls  to  its  assistance  the  other  memory 

45 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

which  works  by  forming  images  of  the  past.  Life 
is  usually  carried  on  by  the  habit-memory  alone ; 
but  the  image-memory  is  waiting  in  the  back- 
ground in  case  it  is  called  upon  to  be  of  service. 
'  Suppose  an  accident  which  upsets  the  equili- 
brium maintained  by  the  brain  between  the 
external  stimulation  and  the  motor  reaction, 
relax  for  a  moment  the  tension  of  the  threads 
which  go  from  the  periphery  to  the  periphery  by 
way  of  the  centre,  and  immediately  these  darkened 
images  come  forward  into  the  full  light.' l  Berg- 
son  sums  up  his  sketch  of  the  two  memories  as 
follows : — '  The  past  appears  to  be  stored  up, 
as  we  had  surmised,  under  two  extreme  forms  : 
on  the  one  hand,  motor  mechanisms  which  make 
use  of  it ;  on  the  other,  personal  memory-images 
which  picture  all  past  events  with  their  outline, 
their  colour  and  their  place  in  time.  Of  these  two 
memories,  the  first  follows  the  direction  of  nature  ; 
the  second,  left  to  itself,  would  rather  go  the 
contrary  way.  The  first,  conquered  by  effort, 
remains  dependent  upon  our  will ;  the  second, 
entirely  spontaneous,  is  as  capricious  in  repro- 
ducing as  it  is  faithful  in  preserving.  The  only 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  97. 

46 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

regular  and  certain  service  which  the  record- 
memory  can  render  to  the  first  is  to  bring  before 
it  images  of  what  preceded  or  followed  situations 
similar  to  the  present  situation,  so  as  to  guide 
its  choice ;  in  this  consists  the  association  of 
ideas.  There  is  no  other  case  in  which  the 
memory  which  recalls  is  sure  to  obey  the  memory 
which  repeats.  Everywhere  else,  we  prefer  to 
construct  a  mechanism  which  allows  us  to  sketch 
the  image  again,  at  need,  because  we  are  well 
aware  that  we  cannot  count  upon  its  reappear- 
ance. These  are  the  two  extreme  forms  of  memory 
in  their  pure  state.' l  Though  distinct  in  kind, 
they  may,  however,  coalesce  in  life. 

The  point  really  important  to  grasp  in  the 
present  discussion  is  that  Bergson  postulates  a 
purely  psychical  memory,  independent  of  and 
in  addition  to  the  habit-memory  already  recog- 
nised by  science.  It  is  in  this  postulate  that  he 
parts  from  the  generally  received  scientific  view. 
He  proceeds  to  attack  the  theory  that  the  brain 
is  a  storehouse  of  mental  images,  from  a  variety 
of  points  of  view.  Taking  auditory  images  as 
an  example,  the  image  of  a  word  is  not  a  well- 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  102,  103. 

47 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

defined  and  fixed  thing,  but  varies  slightly  in 
pronunciation,  etc.,  every  time  it  is  heard.  On 
the  hypothesis  that  the  brain  stores  up  images, 
1  you  must  assume  that  there  are  as  many  audi- 
tory images  of  the  same  word  as  there  are 
pitches  of  sound  and  qualities  of  voice.  Do  you 
mean  that  all  these  images  are  treasured  up  in 
the  brain  ?  ' * 

Bergson  tells  us  that  sensory  aphasia  also 
throws  discredit  on  the  physiological  hypothesis. 
'If  memories  are  really  deposited  in  the  cortical 
cells,  we  should  find  in  sensory  aphasia,  for 
instance,  the  irreparable  loss  of  certain  deter- 
mined words,  the  integral  conservation  of 
others.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  things 
happen  quite  differently.'2  What  happens  is 
that  there  is  a  general  weakening  of  the 
function,  without  any  diminution  in  the  number 
of  recollections.  In  the  true  aphasias,  where  the 
memory  of  words  is  completely  lost,  the  failure 
begins  with  proper  nouns  and  ends  with  verbs. 
'  We  could  hardly  explain  it  if  the  verbal  images 
were  really  deposited  in  the  cells  of  the  cortex ; 
it  would  be  wonderful  indeed  that  disease  should 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  147.  2  Ibid.,  p.  149. 

48 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

always  attack  these  cells  in  the  same  order.  But 
the  fact  can  be  explained,  if  we  admit  that 
memories  need,  for  their  actualisation,  a  motor 
ally,  and  that  they  require  for  their  recall  a  kind 
of  mental  attitude  which  must  itself  be  engrafted 
upon  an  attitude  of  the  body.  If  such  be  the 
case,  verbs  in  general,  which  essentially  express 
imitable  actions,  are  precisely  the  words  that  a 
bodily  effort  might  enable  us  to  recapture  when 
the  function  of  language  has  all  but  escaped  us  ; 
proper  names,  on  the  other  hand,  being  of  all 
words  the  most  remote  from  those  impersonal 
actions  which  our  body  can  sketch  out,  are  those 
which  a  weakening  of  the  function  will  earliest 
affect.'1  Bergson  then  goes  on  to  argue  that 
introspection  gives  the  same  conclusion.  He 
sums  up  his  conclusions  as  follows  : — '  We  have 
distinguished  three  processes,  pure  memory, 
memory-image,  and  perception,  of  which  no  one 
in  fact  occurs  apart  from  the  others.  Perception 
is  never  a  mere  contact  of  the  mind  with  the 
object  present ;  it  is  impregnated  with  memory- 
images  which  complete  it  as  they  interpret  it. 
The  memory-image,  in  its  turn,  partakes  of  the 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  151,  152. 

D  49 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

"pure  memory,"  which  it  begins  to  materialise, 
and  of  the  perception  in  which  it  tends  to  em- 
body itself;  regarded  from  the  latter  point  of 
view  it  might  be  defined  as  a  nascent  perception. 
Lastly,  pure  memory,  though  independent  in 
theory,  manifests  itself  as  a  rule  only  in  the 
coloured  and  living  image  which  reveals  it.'1  It 
is  associationism  that  is  singled  out  by  Professor 
Bergson  for  special  attack.  He  condemns  it 
on  the  ground  that  it  splits  up  the  mind  into 
isolated  elements,  lying  inertly  beside  each  other, 
remote  indeed  from  the  living  reality  which  is  a 
'continuity  of  becoming.' 

While  arguing  that  pure  memory  is  essentially 
detached  from  life,  the  question  arises  where 
the  memories  are.  If  they  exist  qua  memories, 
and  if  the  theory  that  the  brain  contains  them  is 
false,  where  then  are  they  located  ?  A  fallacy 
is  involved  in  the  very  question.  '  Let  us 
admit  for  a  moment  that  the  past  survives  in 
the  form  of  a  memory  stored  in  the  brain ;  it 
is  then  necessary  that  the  brain,  in  order  to 
preserve  the  memory,  should  preserve  itself. 
But  the  brain,  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  image  ex- 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  170. 
50 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

tended  in  space,  never  occupies  more  than  the 
present  moment ;  it  constitutes  with  all  the  rest 
of  the  material  universe,  an  ever  renewed 
section  of  universal  becoming.  Either,  then,  you 
must  suppose  that  this  universe  dies  and  is 
born  again  miraculously  at  each  moment  of 
duration,  or  you  must  attribute  to  it  that  con- 
tinuity of  existence  which  you  deny  to  conscious- 
ness, and  make  of  its  past  a  reality  which 
endures  and  is  prolonged  into  its  present.'1 
Finally,  it  is  a  fallacy  to  suppose  that  the  past 
has  ceased  to  exist ;  it  still  exists.  The  pure 
present  consists  only  of  'the  invisible  progress 
of  the  past  gnawing  into  the  future.'2  The  past 
is  not  past  in  the  sense  of  having  ceased  to 
exist,  but  only  as  having  ceased  to  be  useful. 
4  All  the  facts  and  all  the  analogies  are  in  favour 
of  a  theory  which  regards  the  brain  as  only  an 
intermediary  between  sensation  and  movement, 
which  sees  in  this  aggregate  of  sensation  and 
movements  the  pointed  end  of  mental  life — a 
point  ever  pressed  forward  into  the  tissue  of 
events,  and,  attributing  thus  to  the  body  the 
sole  function  of  directing  memory  towards  the 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  192.  *  Ibid.,  p.  194. 

51 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

real  and  of  binding  it  to  the  present,  considers 
memory  itself  as  absolutely  independent  of 
matter.  In  this  sense,  the  brain  contributes  to 
the  recall  of  the  useful  recollection,  but  still 
more  to  the  provisional  banishment  of  all  the 
others.  We  cannot  see  how  memory  could 
settle  within  matter ;  but  we  do  clearly  under- 
stand how — according  to  the  profound  saying 
of  a  contemporary  philosopher  [Ravaisson] — 
materiality  begets  oblivion.' l 

No  more  need  be  said.  We  have  covered  all 
those  parts  of  Bergson's  philosophy  which  profess 
to  be  connected  with  science  :  all  therefore 
with  which  we  are  concerned  in  this  book.  It 
will  be  seen  that  both  in  Creative  Evolution  and 
in  Matter  and  Memory ',  the  brunt  of  Bergson's 
attack  falls  upon  the  so-called  materialistic  philo- 
sophy which  is  regarded  as  underlying  science. 
In  the  evolution  of  life  he  attacks  the  naturalistic 
interpretation  of  Darwin  and  his  successors. 
Their  efforts  were  and  are  directed  only  to  re- 
lating past  events  in  the  history  of  the  world 
with  careful  accuracy.  Bergson  holds  that  a 
far  more  fundamental  knowledge  is  possible  than 

1  Matter  and  Memory ',  p.  232. 
52 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

the  mere  recomposition  of  the  past.  So  also  he 
disputes  the  belief  that  mind  can  only  exist  in 
relation  to  matter,  and  that  its  laws  are  de- 
pendent upon  the  laws  of  matter.  He  con- 
tends for  an  absolute  and  independent  mind  or 
memory  of  purely  psychical  character,  and  with- 
out physical  counterpart.  To  what  extent  those 
opinions  are  tenable  will  be  the  object  of  our 
further  inquiry. 


53 


CHAPTER  III 

REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING  FROM  THE 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

'.  .  .  Because  thy  vision  goes 
Seeking  to  pierce  too  far  this  shadowy  air, 
In  thy  imagining  an  error  grows.' 

DANTE. 

I  HAVE  endeavoured  in  the  preceding  chapter 
to  present  an  impartial  description  of  the  theory, 
whose  merits  have  now  to  be  examined.  In  the 
succeeding  chapter,  I  shall  sketch  the  general 
tendencies  discernible  in  the  history  of  philo- 
sophy ;  for,  although  in  the  present  chapter 
I  confine  myself  wholly  to  Bergson's  doctrines, 
yet  many  of  the  objections  here  raised  to  them 
would  apply  mutatis  mutandis  to  the  doctrines 
and  methods  of  metaphysicians  at  large.  The 
misuse  of  words,  in  particular,  is  a  failing  not  at 
all  peculiar  to  Bergson.  It  was  characteristic 
of  Greek  philosophy,  and  was  criticised  by 
Demokritus,  one  of  the  greatest  of  the  ancients. 
It  was  common  everywhere  at  the  revival  of 

54 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

philosophy,  and  was  condemned  in  particular  by 
Hobbes  and  Locke.  In  recent  times,  Spencer 
has  attacked  it ;  and  it  is  still  the  mainstay  of 
German  metaphysics.  At  all  times,  English 
philosophy  has  been  freer  than  Continental 
philosophy  from  the  vice  of  misuse  of  language  : 
and  the  present  alliance  of  the  two  branches 
is  far  from  favourable  to  the  English. 

Let  me  commence  by  an  analysis  of  Bergson's 
method.  There  are  three  main  types  of  fallacy 
constantly  recurring  throughout  his  works.  The 
first  is  as  follows  :  a  certain  set  of  facts  requires 
to  be  explained,  and  there  exist  one  or  more 
rival  theories  for  explaining  them.  Bergson 
examines  these  theories,  and  rejects  them — 
often  giving  sound  reasons  for  their  rejection. 
Then  invariably  he  produces  his  own  theory, 
and  without  any  further  ado,  assumes  that  it  must 
be  true,  because  the  others  are  false.  In  future 
I  shall  refer  to  this  as  the  mannikin  fallacy.  Its 
constant  repetition  is  curious  and  interesting,  when 
once  it  has  been  noted.  Bergson  seldom  names 
a  fact  in  support  of  his  own  doctrine.  If  the 
reader  will  glance  at  the  facts  given  in  his  works, 
he  will  find  that  they  are  nearly  all  collected  for 

55 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

refuting  other  doctrines.  The  refutation  finished, 
the  reader  finds  on  the  next  page  that  Bergson's 
own  theory  is  in  possession  of  the  field.  It  is 
suddenly  there,  without  any  explanation  and 
without  any  suggestion  of  evidence.  It  has  risen 
like  a  phcenix  from  the  ashes  of  its  predecessors : 
and  thenceforward  it  is  treated  as  established 
truth.  Now  with  regard  to  this  method,  it  has 
to  be  observed  that  the  destruction  of  one  theory 
does  not  furnish  a  particle  of  evidence  in  favour 
of  any  other  theory.  There  are  various  possi- 
bilities :  the  facts  may  not  be  susceptible  of 
inclusion  under  any  theory  at  all,  in  the  present 
state  of  our  knowledge.  The  facts  dealt  with 
by  Bergson  are  for  the  most  part  concerned  with 
abstruse  subjects,  in  which  I  do  in  fact  believe 
that  very  often  no  theory  can  be  formed : 
ignorance  must  be  confessed  :  yet,  strangely 
enough,  I  can  recollect  no  passage  in  Bergson's 
works  in  which  there  is  a  suggestion  that  we 
have  reached  the  limits  of  knowledge.  In  the 
next  place,  supposing  that  the  facts  can  be 
covered  by  some  theory,  it  may  be  an  altogether 
different  theory  from  any  that  has  previously 
been  thought  of.  In  the  third  place,  Bergson's 

56 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

refutations  of  existing  theories  are  often  in- 
complete. The  only  way  in  which  a  theory  can 
be  established  is  by  definite  facts  in  its  favour. 
A  refutation  of  Buddhism  is  not  a  proof  of 
Mahommedanism :  for  there  are  Christianity 
and  sundry  other  religions  with  equal  or  greater 
claims  to  veracity. 

Besides  the  mannikin  fallacy,  another  that 
occurs  with  great  frequency,  is  that  of  the 
false  analogy.  Analogy  is  at  all  times  a 
dangerous  guide  :  it  is  employed  ad  nauseam 
throughout  Bergson's  works.  The  skeleton  of 
his  reasoning  is  as  follows  :  a  set  of  facts  is 
taken,  requiring  to  be  explained :  he  likens 
it  to  another  set  of  facts,  arbitrarily  chosen. 
But  about  this  new  set  of  facts,  some  law  holds 
good.  Therefore  it  also  holds  good  in  the  first 
set.  Let  me  take  an  example  of  this  paralogism 
from  the  Introduction  to  Matter  and  Memory. 
The  Professor  is  arguing  against  the  dependence 
of  the  mind  on  the  brain  ;  he  continues  : — 'That 
there  is  a  close  connection  between  a  state  of 
consciousness  and  the  brain  we  do  not  dispute. 
But  there  is  also  a  close  connection  between  a  coat 
and  the  nail  on  which  it  hangs,  for,  if  the  nail  is 

57 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

pulled  out,  the  coat  falls  to  the  ground.  Shall  we 
say,  then,  that  the  shape  of  the  nail  gives  us  the 
shape  of  the  coat,  or  in  any  way  corresponds  to  it  ? 
No  more  are  we  entitled  to  conclude,  because  the 
psychical  fact  is  hung  on  to  a  cerebral  state,  that 
there  is  any  parallelism  between  the  two  series, 
psychical  and  physiological.'1  The  analogy  begs 
the  whole  question.  In  what  does  the  connection 
between  mind  and  body  resemble  the  connection 
between  a  coat  and  a  nail  ?  The  connection  be- 
tween coat  and  nail  is  admittedly  contingent : 
the  very  fact  of  comparison  assumes  the  con- 
tingency of  the  connection  between  mind  and 
body,  which  is  just  what  he  wants  to  prove. 
Supposing  that  a  different  analogy  had  been 
taken,  namely,  the  connection  between  the  radius 
and  circumference  of  a  circle.  This  analogy 
would  prove  a  rigid  and  absolute  connection 
between  mind  and  body :  and  it  is  just  as  well 
suited  for  comparison,  as  is  the  coat-and-nail 
connection.  In  short,  if  we  resort  to  analogy  at 
all,  we  must  first  prove  the  resemblance  between 
the  facts  to  be  explained  and  their  suggested 
analogue.  If  analogues  are  chosen  at  random, 

1  Matter  and  Memory \  p.  xi. 

58 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

the  conclusions  arrived  at  will  also  be  random ; 
and  by  choosing  one's  analogies,  one  could  prove 
any  absurdity  one  wanted,  and  could  disprove  it 
with  equal  readiness. 

The  next  point,  to  which  we  shall  direct  our 
attention,  is  the  large  number  of  questionable 
statements  that  are  made  in  Bergson's  works 
without  any  evidence,  and  are  used  as  data  for 
deduction.  And  finally  there  is  his  hopeless  and 
irremediable  misuse  of  language  :  throughout 
large  sections  of  his  work,  the  words  are  mere 
forms  or  sounds  without  significance  behind 
them.  Bergson's  medium  of  expression  is  largely 
a  false  coinage  :  his  verbal  currency  is  heavily 
laden  with  counterfeits,  cunningly  made,  and 
demanding  careful  testing  before  we  let  them 
pass.  Of  this  I  shall  adduce  many  instances. 
With  this  preliminary  caution,  let  us  approach 
the  body  of  Bergson's  work. 

I  shall  first  deal  with  his  declared  belief  that 
instinct,  not  intellect,  is  the  appropriate  guide  for 
the  discovery  of  vital  phenomena.  The  proof 
of  this  remarkable  statement  involves  the  first 
of  the  fallacies  above  described.  The  intellect 
has  failed  in  this,  that,  and  the  other  department 

59 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

of  inquiry  into  vital  phenomena :  therefore  the 
intellect  is  an  erroneous  guide  :  therefore  instinct 
is  a  true  guide.  Now  supposing  I  admit,  as  I 
most  readily  do,  that  intellect  is  very  far  from 
having  explained  vital  phenomena,  is  it  not  a 
possibility  that  the  reason  lies  in  the  complexity 
of  such  phenomena  themselves — a  complexity 
that  may  remain  for  ever  beyond  the  reach  of 
intellect,  or  may  yield  to  fuller  knowledge  and 
wider  powers  ?  And  if  this  supposition  is  false 
— if  the  intellect  is  in  truth  by  its  very  nature 
incapable  before  the  facts  of  life — why  should  it 
follow  that  instinct  is  more  fortunate?  It  is  a 
case  of  the  mannikin  fallacy.  There  is  only 
one  way  of  showing  that  instinct  is  a  correct 
method  ;  and  that  way  is  to  supply  facts  which 
prove  it.  Not  one  such  fact  is  offered  us.  Take 
the  sciences  which  deal  with  life — biology  and 
medicine.  Every  step  in  the  progress  of  biology 
has  been  taken  by  intellect  moving  among  ascer- 
tained facts  :  instinct  has  discovered  nothing  in 
biology ;  it  is  unknown,  as  a  method,  to  the 
workers  in  that  science.  The  same,  and  more 
also,  may  be  said  of  medicine.  Which  of  us 
would  employ  a  doctor  who  had  abrogated 

60 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

science,  intelligence,  and  all  acquired  experience, 
and  proposed  to  treat  us  by  intuition  ?  The 
progress  of  medicine  has  been  a  history  of  the 
extrusion  of  a  priori  prejudices  or  intuitions  by  the 
results  of  science  and  experience.  Dr.  Stewart, 
in  his  Critical  Exposition  of  Bergsoris  Philosophy, 
has  attempted  to  defend  the  intuitive  method  by 
affirming  that  scientific  discoveries  are  them- 
selves instances  of  flashes  of  intuition.  It  is 
true,  in  spite  of  Newton's  Hypotheses  non  Jingo, 
that  scientific  progress  depends  upon  lucky 
guesses,  intuitions,  or  hypotheses.  But  no  one 
ever  attaches  the  slightest  weight  to  such  a 
guess,  until  it  has  been  tested  by  facts.  For  one 
hypothesis,  which  proves  to  be  correct,  there 
have  commonly  been  a  very  large  number  which 
have  been  found  incorrect.  Kepler  had  to 
abandon  numerous  hypotheses  before  he  found 
the  true  one,  giving  the  law  of  planetary  orbits. 
Ehrlich  is  said  to  have  formed  and  rejected  over 
six  hundred  hypotheses  before  he  -discovered 
'salvarsan/  which  at  last  was  found  to  meet  the  re- 
quirements. In  short,  the  correct  way  is  often  only 
found  after  trying  many  possible  incorrect  ways. 
When,  therefore,  a  philosopher  urges  upon  us 

61 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

the  method  of  intuition,  in  a  region  where  verifi- 
cation is  impossible  and  facts  unknown,  we  can 
only  reply  that  he  is  talking  arrant  rubbish,  and 
is  applying  a  method  which  would  speedily  ruin 
any  one  who  was  so  foolish  as  to  adopt  it  in 
practical  life.  But  the  doctrine  is  capable  of  a 
more  direct  refutation.  Bergson  sets  forth  a 
theory  of  life  supported  by  his  intuition  alone. 
Now  I  have  a  very  distinct  intuition  that  his 
theory  of  life  is  groundless  :  and,  on  the  intuitive 
method,  I  submit  that  the  fact  of  my  intuition 
is  a  disproof  of  Bergson's  philosophy.  For, 
otherwise,  Bergson  must  hold  that  his  intuition 
is  more  valuable  than  mine,  and  those  of  all 
others  who  disagree  with  him  :  and  he  has  not 
yet  made  any  such  claim. 

Now  let  us  deal  with  his  theory  of  time. 
When  a  philosopher  affirms  on  the  second  page 
of  his  chief  work  that  'there  is  no  essential 
difference  between  passing  from  one  state  to 
another  and  persisting  in  the  same  state,' l  we 
may  reply  that,  if  we  are  to  believe  that,  there  is 
simply  no  limit  to  the  absurdities  which  might 
be  founded  on  it.  If  it  takes  less  than  two  pages 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  2. 
62 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

to  establish  so  monstrous  a  doctrine,  surely  there 
is  nothing  imaginable  that  might  not  be  proved 
within  the  limits  of  four  hundred.  It  is  verbiage, 
and  nothing  more.  On  the  same  page  we  get 
another  instance  of  the  same  kind  :  where  the 
Professor  affirms  that  his  mental  state,  as  it 
advances  along  the  road  of  time,  swells  with 
the  duration  it  accumulates,  like  a  snowball 
rolling  on  itself.  Now,  here,  Bergson  has 
started  with  the  idea  of  a  snowball  rolling 
along  a  road  and  getting  bigger — a  conception 
true  to  nature.  He  then  makes  use  of  the 
false  analogy.  For  '  snowball '  he  substitutes 
'personality';  for  'snow'  he  substitutes  'time'; 
and  he  thinks  of  a  sort  of  round  personality 
rolling  along  getting  big  with  time.  But  un- 
fortunately it  is  no  longer  a  true  conception  : 
it  is  mere  words,  meaning  nothing.  Supposing, 
however,  we  concede  some  esoteric  meaning, 
the  analogy  would  still  be  false  ;  for  he  makes 
no  attempt  to  show  what  property  personality 
has  in  common  with  snowballs,  nor  what  com- 
mon property  have  time  and  snow.  The  analogy 
is  silently  assumed  :  I  deny  the  assumption,  and 
I  ask  for  proof  that  any  analogy  exists. 

63 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

A  little  farther  on  it  is  stated  that  '  we  readily 
perceive  ' l  that  psychical  life  is  made  of  time, 
which  is  a  stuff  both  resistant  and  substantial. 
I  perceive  nothing  of  the  kind,  readily  or  un- 
readily. If  time  is  a  substantial  stuff  possess- 
ing resistance,  it  should  be  possible  to  prick  it 
with  a  pin,  or  to  analyse  it  chemically,  or  put 
a  little  in  one's  pocket.  Again  we  see  the  use 
of  the  false  analogy :  facts  holding  true  about 
matter  are  transferred  to  'time,'  and  the  verbal 
analogy  is  so  obsessing,  that  Bergson  omits  to 
observe  that  his  words  are  false  coins,  bearing 
no  meaning.  Forthwith  we  are  introduced  to 
the  conception  that  life  is  a  current  running 
through  matter.  A  visible  current  has  taken 
rise  at  a  certain  time  and  place,  and  organises 
matter  as  it  advances.  Now  this  is  an  analogy 
which  may  or  may  not  be  useful.  It  is  assumed 
to  begin  with ;  and  throughout  the  rest  of  the 
chapter  Bergson  argues  as  if  it  were  the  facts 
themselves,  instead  of  being  merely  an  analogy. 
The  Professor  has  before  his  mind  the  image 
of  a  stream  running  along  the  surface  of  the 
Earth,  and  breaking  up  into  a  number  of  separate 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  4. 
64 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

channels.  For  the  stream  he  substitutes  life  ; 
for  the  separate  channels  he  substitutes  genera 
and  species.  The  analogy  is  purely  arbitrary  : 
any  other  would  have  done  as  well :  no  attempt 
is  made  to  prove  its  relevance  :  but  propositions 
founded  on  the  idea  of  streams  and  deltas  are 
thenceforward  shamelessly  transferred  to  life  and 
species.  But  now  comes  a  very  interesting 
illustration  of  Bergson's  methods.  We  are  told 
that  '  the  more  we  fix  our  attention '  on  this  con- 
tinuity of  life  (the  channels  being  all  integral 
parts  of  the  main  stream)  '  the  more  we  see ' 
that  it  resembles  the  evolution  of  a  conscious- 
ness, in  which  past  presses  against  present,  etc., 
etc.1  As  it  has  never  been  my  good  fortune  to 
witness  the  *  evolution  of  a  consciousness,'  I  am 
unable  to  judge  what  sort  of  a  process  that  may 
be  :  if  its  main  feature  is  the  hustling  of  the 
present  by  the  past,  it  must  be  curious  and  enter- 
taining to  watch.  But  the  important  point  is 
that  by  this  analogy  '  spirit '  is  made  the  basis 
of  the  Universe.  I  do  not  wish  at  present  to 
attack  that  belief:  I  merely  wish  to  point  out 
that  the  proof  upon  which  Bergson  rests  it,  is  that 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  29. 
E  65 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

the  more  we  fix  our  attention  on  it,  the  more 
shall  we  perceive  it.  This  is  a  substitute  for 
facts  which  cannot  be  admitted.  I  find,  on  the 
contrary,  that  the  more  I  fix  attention  on  it,  the 
less  I  perceive  it.  Bergson  affirms  that  life  is 
something  more  than  an  abstraction,  comprising 
all  living  creatures.  Well,  if  it  is  something 
more,  we  ought  to  have  facts  to  prove  it.  We 
know  of  life  only  as  implying  living  things  ;  and 
if  there  is  a  life  in  the  abstract,  we  should  be 
directed  how  to  find  it.  But  we  are  not.  All 
we  get  is  the  wretched  analogy  with  a  stream, 
begging  the  whole  question.  If  life  is  a  stream, 
then  of  course  there  is  a  '  life '  apart  from  living 
creatures.  But  the  whole  question  is,  whether  it 
is.  It  is  no  good  telling  us  to  think  hard  about 
it ;  facts  are  required  and  facts  alone  :  no  amount 
of  thinking  is  of  any  use  unless  we  have  material 
to  think  with.  Bergson  thinks  with  words,  but 
we  must  demand  solid  facts.  The  mediaeval 
realists  thought  that  a  general  term,  or  generic 
name,  was  an  actual  thing,  over  and  above  the 
units  it  comprised.  They  defined  a  hatchet  as 
the  union  of  the  raw  metal  with  the  principle 
of  '  hatchetness.'  Bergson  similarly  assumes  an 

66 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

independent  '  life';  and  explains  living  organisms 
by  affirming  that  they  are  merely  portions  of 
dead  matter  united  to  an  independent  vital  prin- 
ciple. Would  it  not  be  logical  to  go  the  whole 
way  like  Abelard  of  old,  and  say  that  just  as  man 
is  inert  matter  endowed  with  the  independent 
entity  '  life,'  so  individuals  are  simply  men  en- 
dowed with  a  further  and  still  more  particular 
entity  peculiar  to  themselves,  e.g.  that  Sokrates 
was  the  union  of  '  man  '  with  Sokratity,  and 
Plato  of  '  man  '  with  Platonity  ? 

Having  got  to  a  substantial  and  active  '  life ' 
and  '  time/  Bergson  uses  them  to  some  purpose 
for  the  refutation  of  the  physico-chemical  theory 
of  the  Universe.  That  theory,  he  freely  con- 
fesses,1 is  irrefutable  by  scientific  methods.  The 
only  mode  of  refuting  it  is  from  the  '  considera- 
tion of  real  time ' :  that  is,  not  the  mere  passage 
of  minutes  that  the  plain  man  understands  as 
time,  but  real  time, — the  strange  metaphysical 
substance  we  have  just  been  discussing,  and  the 
same  sort  of  thing  as  '  life.'  Granting  the  exist- 
ence of  '  real  time,'  we  are  fully  prepared  to 
believe  that  it  is  outside  the  laws  of  physics  and 

1  Creative  Evolution^  p.  39. 
67 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

chemistry.  But  where  is  this  real  time  upon 
whose  solid  corners  science  vainly  breaks  its 
head  ?  Huxley  was  the  most  famous  modern 
defender  of  the  scientific  position ;  but,  says 
Bergson,  there  was  one  flaw  in  Huxley's  argu- 
ment :  he  overlooked  '  real  time  ' :  the  time  he 
spoke  of  did  nothing.  Well,  as  soon  as  I  see 
time  doing  something,  I  shall  gladly  abandon 
Huxley's  position.  The  criticism,  which  I  can 
scarcely  believe  to  be  otherwise  than  frivolous,  is 
a  surrender  of  the  whole  position  of  metaphysics. 
Time  is  an  abstraction  :  no  doubt,  organisms 
grow  old,  and  we  speak  of  time  having  aged 
them.  But  we  do  not  mean  that  time  is  an 
actual  factor  in  the  process  :  all  that  we  mean 
is  that  their  natural  growth  has  carried  them 
towards  decay.  Natural  growth  is  an  affair  of 
time ;  and  we  speak,  by  analogy,  of  time  having 
wrought  the  change.  Probably  few  besides 
Bergson  would  ever  be  taken  in  by  such  a 
method  of  speaking.  Since,  by  Bergson's  ad- 
mission, this  is  the  only  argument  that  can  refute 
mechanism,  we  can  hope  for  nothing  better  in 
the  interests  of  the  mechanistic  theory,  than  a 
wide  circulation  of  Bergson's  works. 

68 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

Let  me  place  the  matter  a  little  differently. 
Huxley  was  referring  to  the  reconstruction  of 
past  events,  and  the  possibility  of  prophesying 
future  events.  He  stated,  in  brief,  that  with  a 
complete  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  physics, 
mechanics  and  chemistry,  and  with  an  infinite 
mathematic,  the  future  could  be  prophesied  in 
detail.  Bergson  replies  that  he  has  omitted  to 
reckon  with  'real  time.'  Now  prophecy  has 
already  reached  a  high  efficiency  in  astronomy. 
Do  astronomers  reckon  '  real  time,'  or  do  they 
rely  purely  on  mathematics  and  physics  ?  In 
chemistry  the  periodical  classification  has  enabled 
the  existence  and  properties  of  elements  to  be 
prophesied,  long  before  they  were  discovered. 
What  has  '  real  time  '  got  to  do  with  it  ?  In 
medicine,  a  doctor  can  prophesy  the  course  of 
a  disease  without  any  attention  to  the  vagaries 
of  '  real  time.'  In  all  the  affairs  of  practical  life, 
we  have  to  look  into  the  future  and  make  ar- 
rangements for  our  daily  needs :  in  all  these 
cases  we  assign  no  active  role  to  time  :  it  is 
nothing  but  a  name  for  the  succession  of  events : 
if  it  were  liable  to  upset  our  arrangements,  life 
would  become  impossible.  Now  the  facts  re- 

69 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

ferred  to  by  Huxley  are  just  such  ordinary  facts 
as  these,  though  not  so  completely  under  our 
noses.  If  '  real  time '  is  negligible  in  the 
one  case,  it  is  negligible  in  the  other.  If 
we  have  never  witnessed  '  real  time '  in  practi- 
cal life,  it  is  folly  to  assume  it  for  evolu- 
tion. Biologists  try  to  explain  evolution  by 
reference  to  forces  which  everybody  can  under- 
stand and  experience.  To  explain  it  by  refer- 
ence to  a  new  force  which  nobody  can  under- 
stand or  experience,  is  the  same  thing  as  not 
explaining  it  at  all.  But  to  allege  this  ghostly 
force  in  contradiction  to  the  operation  of  known 
laws  is  such  fantastic  folly,  as  to  demand  ridicule 
rather  than  serious  comment.  What  does  Berg- 
son  mean  by  saying  that  '  we  cannot  sacrifice 
experience  to  the  requirements  of  a  system '  ? l 
He  suggests  that  Huxley  has  done  so  :  being 
apparently  unaware  that  no  man  on  earth  would 
have  been  so  little  likely  to  make  such  a  mistake. 
What  experience  is  sacrificed  ?  What  system 
compelled  him  to  sacrifice  it?  The  habit  of 
using  words  without  any  significance  is  almost 
a  disease  with  Bergson ;  as  soon  as  a  phrase 

1  Creative  Evolution^  p.  41. 
70 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

comes  to  his  mind,  which  sounds  well,  it  all 
goes  down  into  his  philosophy  with  its  mean- 
ing never  once  considered.  I  need  hardly  add 
that  the  suggestion  as  to  Huxley's  attitude  is 
false :  for  Huxley  adhered  to  no  system,  and 
formed  his  views  solely  from  experience. 

Having  stated  that  mechanism  is  only  refut- 
able by  considerations  of  real  time,  the  Professor 
some  twenty  pages  farther  on,  proceeds  rather 
inconsistently  to  offer  a  refutation  of  it  on  quite 
other  grounds,  far  more  comprehensible.  It 
appears  that  he  holds  '  radical  mechanism '  in 
such  abhorrence  that  even  after  admitting  it 
cannot  be  refuted,  he  cannot  resist  the  attempt 
to  refute  it.  I  call  the  reader's  very  special  at- 
tention to  this  refutation :  for  once  we  are  free 
of  metaphysics,  the  argument  can  be  understood, 
the  words  bear  a  meaning.  We  can  at  last 
form  an  opinion  of  what  Bergson  looks  upon  as 
proof. 

We  are  told  that  if  it  can  be  shown  that  two 
divergent  lines  of  evolution  result  in  precisely 
similar  structures,  mechanism  will  be  refuted.  We 
are  given  a  concrete  instance  :  a  real  solid  fact,  of 
which  let  us  make  the  most.  We  are  asked  to  con- 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

sider  the  eye  of  Pecten,  which  is  a  mollusc,  and 
compare  it  with  vertebrate  eyes.  They  both 
possess  cornea,  lens,  and  structural  resemblances 
of  a  close  character.  If  we  go  far  enough  back 
we  doubtless  find  that  molluscs  and  vertebrates 
spring  from  a  common  stem ;  but  they  diverged 
long  before  eyes  of  complexity  were  developed. 
Hence  these  complex  organs  have  independently 
evolved  in  similarity  with  one  another.  Physical 
forces,  working  at  hazard,  could  never  produce 
so  remarkable  a  coincidence.  Therefore  me- 
chanism is  false !  Therefore  Bergsonism  is  true ! 
and  so  our  philosopher  goes  paralogising  off  into 
the  distance.  It  is  an  admirable  illustration  of 
the  mannikin  fallacy.  Let  me  criticise,  in  turn, 
each  step  in  the  argument. 

In  the  first  place,  is  it  so  very  wonderful  that 
similar  organs  should  have  been  reached  by 
divergent  lines  of  evolution?  After  all,  if  we 
go  far  enough  back,  molluscs  and  vertebrates  had 
a  common  ancestry,  even  though  it  was  before 
the  days  of  eyes.  The  protoplasm  from  which 
they  were  derived  possessed,  I  suppose,  capacities 
for  evolving  in  certain  directions,  and  has  been 
exposed  to  similar  environments.  Why  should 

72 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

they  not  develop  parallel  to  one  another  ?  It  is 
no  use  talking  of  the  strangeness  of  it ;  it  is  not 
more  strange  than  the  pattern  on  a  peacock's 
tail,  or  than  any  other  of  the  wonderful  facts  of 
biology.  I  see  no  more  difficulty  in  accounting 
for  it  by  natural  selection  than  in  accounting  for 
any  other  structure.  But  let  us  grant  Bergson's 
contention  for  the  sake  of  argument :  let  us  sup- 
pose that  it  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  Darwinism, 
or  by  mutations,  or  by  neo-Lamarckism,  or  by 
any  other  biological  theory.  What  then?  all 
we  can  do  is  to  say  that  there  it  is,  and  we  can- 
not at  present  account  for  it,  and  perhaps  never 
shall  be  able  to  account  for  it.  But  this  is  no 
comfort  to  metaphysics.  Bergson  makes  use  of 
the  first  fallacy  to  which  we  drew  attention. 
Alleging  that  this,  that,  and  the  other  mechan- 
istic hypothesis  fails,  he  assumes  that  all  me- 
chanism is  at  fault,  and  he  concludes  that  his  own 
doctrine  is  true.  But  there  may  be  many  other 
mechanistic  modes  of  evolution,  not  yet  dis- 
covered. Mechanism  is  not  condemned  because 
some  of  its  hypotheses  are  false.  If  that  were 
sound  logic,  metaphysics  indeed  would  be  in  a 
bad  strait ;  for  presumably  Bergson  condemns 

73 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

all  the  other  systems  but  his  own.  And  if  all 
possible  mechanistic  hypotheses  were  exhausted, 
so  that  we  were  thrown  back  on  metaphysics,  why 
should  it  follow  that  Bergson's  is  the  true  theory  ? 
Why  not  Spinoza's  ?  Why  not  Leibnitz's  ?  Why 
not  the  next  metaphysician  of  a  future  age  ?  No 
facts  are  given  for  Bergson's  explanation.  All  we 
get  is  this  :  '  We  cannot  help  believing  that  these 
differences  are  the  development  of  an  impulsion,' l 
etc. :  in  short,  it  is  the  stream  of  life,  with  which 
we  are  now  familiar,  once  again.  I  can  help 
believing  :  still  more,  I  can  by  no  effort  bring 
myself  to  believe  in  this  stream  of  life,  which  I 
have  endeavoured  to  show  is  a  hollow  verbalism. 
Still  more  interesting  a  light  on  Bergson's 
methods  is  thrown  by  the  next  step  in  his  argu- 
ment. The  simple  reader  has  perhaps  gulped 
down  the  stream  of  life  with  some  difficulty : 
before  getting  much  farther,  he  suddenly  finds 
the  word  '  psychological '  put  in,  in  an  entirely 
unobtrusive  manner.  The  Pecten's  eye  not  only 
proves  a  stream  of  life,  but  proves  that  that 
stream  is  of  psychological  character.  There  is 
not  a  solitary  word  of  justification  for  the  intro- 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  90. 

74 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

duction  of  the  psychical  character  :  no  attention 
is  paid  to  the  point  whatever :  but  the  reader 
slowly  becomes  aware  that  this  stream  has  be- 
come psychological.  At  first  he  did  not  know 
what  it  was  :  it  was  just  a  stream  of  life,  without 
thinking  too  hard  what  sort  of  thing  that  might 
be.  Now  it  is  a  psychological  stream,  all  of  a 
sudden — and  not  a  single  shadow  of  a  fact  to 
prove  it !  The  stream  is  making  conscious  efforts 
to  get  along :  it  struggles  against  matter :  it 
does  all  sorts  of  things  much  more  wonderful 
than  any  Pecten's  eye ;  and  the  proof  all  rests 
in  the  circumstance  that  Pecten  has  an  eye  like 
a  vertebrate.  Absurdity  upon  absurdity  is  piled 
high  on  the  unfortunate  Pecten. 

In  point  of  fact,  there  appears  to  be  nothing 
peculiarly  astonishing  about  the  resemblance  of 
eyes.  The  focusing  of  light  is  not  a  thing  that 
can  be  done  in  innumerable  different  ways  ;  I 
cannot  myself  think  of  more  than  three  possible 
methods :  a  lens,  a  mirror,  or  a  pinhole ;  and 
of  these  a  mirror  seems  hardly  practicable. 
Supposing  that  there  are  only  two  alternatives, 
it  is  mathematically  an  even  chance  whether 
molluscs  and  vertebrates  developed  the  same 

75 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

kind  of  eye,  or  different  kinds.  A  mathe- 
matician who  knew  what  a  vertebrate  eye  was 
like,  but  not  what  a  molluscan  eye  was  like, 
would  have  been  prepared  to  bet  as  readily  on  its 
being  the  same  as  being  different,  in  principle. 

I  understand  that  the  reason  why  the  stream 
of  life  is  competent  to  make  eyes,  is  that  it  has 
an  eye-making  branch.  Wherever  this  particular 
eye-runnel  from  the  main  stream  of  life  has 
pushed  far  through  matter,  the  resulting  eye  is 
complex  :  where  it  has  gone  but  a  short  distance, 
the  eye  is  simple.  But  the  runnel  makes  only 
one  kind  of  eye  wherever  it  goes  :  hence  in  such 
remote  animals  as  molluscs  and  vertebrates  we  find 
the  same  structure.  All  appears  to  be  explained. 
Yet  all  is  not  explained.  For  there  exists  a 
tiresome  animal  called  the  Pearly  Nautilus  which 
has  no  lens,  but  just  that  pin-hole-camera  eye, 
which,  excluding  mirrors,  appears  to  be  the  one 
possible  alternative.  It  is  essential  to  Bergson's 
theory  that  vision,  or  the  eye-runnel,  should 
only  make  one  sort  of  eye.  '  No  matter  how 
distant  two  animal  species  may  be  from  each 
other,  if  the  progress  towards  vision  has  gone 
equally  far  in  both,  there  is  the  same  visual 

76 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

organ  in  each  case.' l  Now  the  eye  of  the  Pearly 
Nautilus  endows  that  animal  with  vision  :  yet  is 
of  totally  different  structure  from  molluscan  or 
vertebrate  eyes  :  the  difference,  not  being  merely 
one  of  lesser  development,  but  of  kind.  Will 
Bergson  tell  us  that  there  is  another  runnel  from 
the  life-stream  whose  special  business  is  making 
eyes  for  Pearly  Nautiluses  ?  I  confess  I  see  no 
more  objection  to  that  hypothesis  than  to  any  of 
the  preceding  hypotheses.  But  the  matter  is 
worth  mentioning :  since  if,  as  the  Professor 
maintains,  '  Vision  '  is  a  single  elementary  '  life- 
tendency'  which  makes  a  certain  kind  of  eye 
wherever  it  goes,  there  must  either  be  two  kinds 
of  visions  and  two  separate  '  life-tendencies ' :  or 
else  the  Pearly  Nautilus  will  have  to  fall  back  on 
Darwinian  principles  for  the  evolution  of  his  eye, 
and  if  the  Pearly  Nautilus  can  grow  an  eye  on 
materialist  lines,  why  not  Pecten  ? 2 

1  Creative  Evolution^  p.  101. 

2  Before  leaving  this  part  of  the  subject,  we  may  draw  attention 
to  Bergson's  statement  that  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  truth  in 
the  evolution  theories  of  Darwin,  of  De  Vries,  and  of  Lamarck, 
since  each  of  them  is  'supported  by  a  considerable  number  of 
facts.'    The  assertion  that  each  is  'true  in  its  way'  is  a  meta- 
physical absurdity  :  for  the  theories  are  mutually  contradictory, 
and  therefore  not  more  than  one  of  them  can  be  true.    The  facts 

77 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

Having  now  established  his  vital  impetus  or 
life-current  on  a  foundation  of  security,  Bergson 
proceeds  to  trace  its  various  branches.  There 
is  nothing  very  novel  to  say  about  this  part  of 
his  work.  The  false  analogy  of  a  vital  stream 
is  carried  out  into  details  :  great  numbers  of 
propositions  are  made  concerning  it,  without  any 
evidence  whatever  being  offered  for  them.  We 
are  informed  ex  cathedra,  that  the  resistance  of 
inert  matter  was  the  obstacle  to  be  overcome  by 
the  vital  impetus.  We  ask  for  evidence  :  there 
is  none.  We  are  told  that  life  overcame  the 
obstacle  by  humility  and  making  itself  very 
small.  Again  we  ask  for  evidence  :  again  there 

on  which  the  others  are  based  are  deceptive,  and  must  be 
interpreted  by  some  new  explanation.  But  even  if  this  were  not 
so,  I  object  to  the  expression  '  true  in  its  way.'  There  is  in  science 
only  one  way  of  being  true,  and  that  is  when  the  theory  is  an 
accurate  statement  of  the  facts.  If,  for  instance,  the  experiments 
of  Brown-Sequard  appear  to  support  Lamarckism,  it  is  no 
solution  to  conclude  that  Lamarckism  is  '  true  in  its  way ' ; 
Lamarckism  is  either  true  or  not  true  :  if  (as  I  believe)  it  is 
not  true,  the  reason  is  that  Brown-Sequard's  facts  are  susceptible 
of  another  explanation,  or  else  that  they  are  insufficient  by  them- 
selves to  do  more  than  give  an  air  of  probability  or  possibility  to 
a  theory,  discredited  by  other  facts.  The  support  of  a  limited 
number  of  facts  does  not  imply  partial  truth  of  a  theory,  but 
probability  only.  As  the  number  of  facts  increases  the  probability 
may  rise  to  certainty ;  or  a  contradictory  fact  may  turn  up 
completely  destroying  the  probability  erected  by  the  others. 

78 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

is  none.  But  here  again  the  words  are  unin- 
telligible :  they  are  false  counters.  To  talk  of 
a  stream  being  humble,  or  making  itself  small 
is  in  practical  life  afafon  de  pcwler,  meaning  only 
that  it  is  a  tiny  current.  Again,  regarding  life 
as  an  effort,  we  do  certainly  speak  of  an  effort 
being  humble  :  and  by  this  we  mean  a  small 
effort,  not  aiming  at  any  great  results.  Now,  how 
are  obstacles  to  be  overcome  by  small  efforts, 
when  great  efforts  have  failed  ?  If  the  vital 
impetus  finds  obstacles  in  its  way,  I  cannot  see 
how  those  obstacles  can  be  overcome  by  reducing 
the  force  of  the  impetus.  Yet  that  is  the  only 
possible  meaning  that  the  Professor's  words  can 
carry.  We  are  of  course  here  in  the  presence 
of  another  of  his  elegant  analogies,  which  sound 
so  pretty  that  he  has  never  gone  down  to  the 
meaning  or  intelligibility  of  the  words. 

We  are  informed  that  the  true  causes  of 
differentiation  are  'those  which  life  bore  within 
its  bosom.'1  How  can  an  impetus  have  a 
bosom  ?  I  do  not  wish  to  be  captious,  but 
Bergson  moves  in  a  world  of  fancy  metaphors, 
which  must  be  torn  ruthlessly  away  when  the 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  104. 

79 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

discussion  purports  to  be  scientific.  The  poetic 
licence  which  we  might  pass  in  Omar  Kayyam 
becomes  in  science  superfluous  verbiage,  serving 
only  to  obscure  facts. 

The  vital  current  did  not  stop  when  it  had 
made  primitive  animals,  as  it  might  have  done. 
It  was  good  enough  to  work  on  in  three  main 
divisions  —  plants,  hymenoptera,  and  men; 
characterised  by  torpor,  instinct,  and  intelli- 
gence. Now  Bergson  would  doubtless  recognise 
that  this  tripartite  division  of  the  organic  world 
is  new  to  biology.  There  is  no  sign  that  these 
are  the  three  main  roads  of  evolution,  others 
being  merely  byways.  I  fail  to  see  why  there  is 
no  main  road  ending  in  birds,  with  the  character- 
istic of  mobility — especially  as  we  are  informed 
that  '  between  mobility  and  consciousness  there 
is  an  obvious  relationship.'1  We  see  here  the 
difference  between  the  methods  of  science  and 
metaphysics.  Science  examines  all  species  of 
organisms,  and  classifies  them  in  numerous  groups 
according  to  their  resemblances.  Metaphysics 
starts  with  a  priori  conceptions  of  the  main 
groups — in  this  case  groups  characterised  by 

1  Creative  Evolution^  p.  115. 
80 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

torpor,  instinct,  and  intelligence — and  then  looks 
at  the  organisms,  declaring  that  those  exhibiting 
these  characteristics  are  the  main  goals  of  evolu- 
tion. The  metaphysical  method  is  wholly  a 
priori :  the  scientific  method  almost  wholly 
a  posteriori.  Again,  the  suggestion  that  sexual 
reproduction  is  a  necessity  for  animals,  and  only 
a  '  luxury '  for  plants  is  wholly  a  priori,  set  forth 
because,  were  it  true,  it  would  be  convenient 
to  Bergson's  theory.  And  what  is  meant  by 
'  luxury '  here  ?  Are  we  meant  to  understand 
that  plants  enjoy  the  process  of  sexual  reproduc- 
tion, and  therefore  have  clung  on  to  the  habit 
in  spite  of  its  inutility  ?  Or  are  we  merely 
moving  among  phantom  words  without  a  body  ? 
Take  this  statement  again  :  that  animal  evolution, 
rather  than  plant  evolution,  indicates  '  the  funda- 
mental direction  of  life.'  What  does  he  mean 
by  '  fundamental '  ?  Evolution  has,  we  know, 
moved  in  the  two  main  directions  of  animal 
and  plant.  That  is  an  ultimate  fact,  learnt  by 
observation.  What  is  added  to  our  knowledge 
when  we  are  informed  that  one  direction  is  more 
'  fundamental '  than  the  other  ?  It  is  like  saying 
that  the  road  to  Kensington  is  more  fundamental 
F  81 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

than  the  road  to  Hampstead.  It  may  be  a 
broader  road,  or  a  better-made  road,  or  a  longer 
road,  but  how  can  it  be  a  more  '  fundamental ' 
road  ?  Probably  Bergson  means  that  the  Life- 
stream  has  endeavoured  to  travel  along  the 
animal  series,  and  that  the  plant  kingdom  is 
a  by-product  rather  than  a  conscious  result  of  its 
activities.  So  too,  among  animals,  it  is  man 
that  Life  has  been  aiming  at,  in  particular. 
Very  flattering  for  us,  no  doubt  :  but  where  are 
the  facts  which  redeem  the  doctrine  from  the 
charge  of  gross  anthropocentricity  ? 

I  now  reach  the  discussion  about  instinct  and 
intelligence  which  I  have  already  criticised,  and 
have  nothing  to  add  to  it  save  on  one  small 
point.  Bergson  asks  how  we  can  help  thinking 
that  the  movements  of  orchids  to  procure  fer- 
tilisation and  the  tendrils  of  climbing  plants  are 
other  than  manifestations  of  instinct.  This  is 
only  one  instance  among  a  very  large  number 
occurring  everywhere  throughout  his  works 
when  a  highly  dubious  proposition  is  ushered  in 
by  the  phrase  'we  cannot  help  thinking  that,'  or 
'  the  more  we  reflect  upon  it,  the  more  we  shall 
see  that.*  To  deal  with  the  statement  about 

82 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

orchids  and  climbing  plants,  we  should  first 
require  an  exact  definition  of  instinct.  Exact 
definitions  being  in  no  demand  in  metaphysics, 
I  really  do  not  know  what  the  sentence  means. 
If  by  '  instinct '  is  meant  mere  automatic  reaction 
to  stimulus,  we  might  accept  it.  If  anything 
psychical  is  intended,  we  emphatically  reject  it. 
Not  only  can  we  very  easily  '  help  believing  it,' 
but  we  cannot  by  any  effort  bring  ourselves  to 
believe  in  it :  for  we  only  know  of  consciousness 
in  relation  to  a  nervous  system,  and  there  are  no 
signs  of  a  nervous  system  in  orchids  or  in  climb- 
ing plants. 

I  have  attempted  to  criticise  the  principles  of 
Bergson's  philosophy.  If  my  criticisms  have 
been  just,  it  is  but  little  use  carrying  the  process 
any  further,  for  the  utter  demolition  of  the  basis 
destroys  the  superstructure  at  the  same  time. 
I  shall  therefore  not  systematically  follow  the 
philosophy  further,  but  only  draw  attention 
seriatim  to  a  number  of  isolated  doctrines  which 
throw  further  light  on  Bergson's  method. 

'  Life  in  general  is  mobility  itself/ l  I  disagree  ; 
life  is  an  abstract  term,  generalising  the  peculiar 

1  Creative  Evolution^  p.  134. 

83 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

attributes  of  living  organisms ;  mobility  is 
another  abstract  term,  generalised  from  moving 
bodies. 

Maternal  love  '  may  possibly  deliver  us  life's 
secret.  It  shows  us  each  generation  leaning 
over  the  generation  that  shall  follow.  It  allows 
us  a  glimpse  of  the  fact  that  the  living  being  is  a 
thoroughfare.'1  False  analogy:  a  mother  leans 
over  her  baby,  giving  rise  to  the  conception  of  one 
generation  leaning  over  another  ;  this  latter  con- 
ception is  like  saying  that  the  figure  4  leans  over 
the  figure  5.  Moreover,  a  living  being  is  not  a 
thoroughfare,  but  a  living  being.  The  analogy 
is  likely  to  appeal  to  many  people  on  account  of 
its  aesthetic  beauty.  We  are  here,  however,  dis- 
coursing about  facts,  and  beauty  is  merely  a 
distraction. 

Bergson's  attempt  to  establish  the  pre- 
eminence of  men  and  hymenoptera  takes,  in  one 
place,  the  following  form:  —  'It  is  unquestion- 
able that  success  is  the  most  general  criterion  of 
superiority,  the  two  terms  being,  up  to  a  certain 
point,  synonymous.  By  success  must  be  under- 
stood, so  far  as  the  living  being  is  concerned,  an 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  135. 

84 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

aptitude  to  develop  in  the  most  diverse  environ- 
ments through  the  greatest  possible  variety  of 
obstacles  so  as  to  cover  the  widest  possible 
extent  of  ground.  A  species  which  claims  the 
entire  earth  for  its  domain  is  truly  a  dominating 
and,  consequently,  superior  species.  Such  is  the 
human  species,  which  represents  the  culminating 
point  of  the  evolution  of  the  vertebrates.  But 
such  also  are,  in  the  series  of  the  articulate,  the 
insects,  and,  in  particular,  certain  Hymenoptera. 
It  has  been  said  of  the  ants  that,  as  man  is  lord 
of  the  soil,  they  are  lords  of  the  subsoil.' l 

Under  this  definition,  birds  ought  to  be 
a  dominating  group,  for  their  distribution  is 
wider  than  that  of  men.  And  the  most  pre- 
eminent species  of  all  would  not  be  men,  or 
insects,  or  even  birds,  but  those  simple  uni- 
cellular creatures  like  amoeba,  which  are  found 
everywhere  all  over  the  earth. 

4  If  the  intellect  were  meant  for  pure  theorising, 
it  would  take  its  place  within  movement,  for 
movement  is  reality  itself,  and  immobility  is 
always  only  apparent  or  relative.'2  This  is 
an  extreme  instance  of  word -juggling.  The 

1  Creative  Evolution^  pp.  140,  141.  2  Ibid.,  p.  163. 

85 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

obscurity  of  the  verbiage  envelops  the  main 
proposition  in  such  a  fog  that  the  critic  can  see 
nothing  at  all.  Movement  and  immobility,  or 
motion  and  rest,  are  relative  terms  :  it  is  im- 
proper to  call  one  real  and  the  other  relative. 
Nor  do  I  understand  how  the  intellect  is  '  meant 
for '  anything,  except  on  the  hypothesis  of  current 
theology,  which  is  not  what  Bergson  means. 
Again,  intellect  taking  its  place  within  move- 
ment is  a  conception  I  am  unable  to  frame. 

'Insect  societies  probably  have  a  language.'1 
No  evidence  is  offered  for  a  supposition  which 
is  highly  improbable. 

'  Instinct  is  knowledge  at  a  distance.  It  has 
the  same  relation  to  intelligence  that  vision  has 
to  touch.' 2  Why,  then,  do  we  owe  our  know- 
ledge of  the  stars  to  intelligence,  and  not  to 
instinct  ?  Why  has  Astronomy  advanced  by 
the  gradual  triumph  of  intelligence  over  bigoted 
superstition  ? 

The  theory  of  the  neo-Darwinians  is  con- 
demned on  the  ground  that  natural  selection  of 
minute  variations  is  'absolutely  incapable  of 
explaining  instincts.'3  Instincts  are  no  harder 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  166.      2  Ibid.,  p.  177.      3  Ibid.,  p.  178. 

86 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

to  explain  than  structure.  Indeed,  instinct  is 
rigidly  dependent  upon  structure.  If  an  animal 
instinctively  performs  an  action,  the  reason  is 
that  its  nervous  system  is  so  constructed  that 
certain  stimuli  produce  certain  appropriate 
reactions.  Instinct  is  based  on  nerve  structure  : 
if  natural  selection  can  mould  the  shape  of  an 
animal's  limbs,  it  can  also  mould  its  nervous 
system,  comprising  instinct  therein. 

In  the  evolution  of  instinct  '  no  one  will  main- 
tain that  chance  could  perform  such  a  miracle ; 
in  one  form  or  another  we  shall  appeal  to  in- 
telligence. We  shall  suppose  that  it  is  by  an 
effort,  more  or  less  conscious,  that  the  living 
being  develops  a  higher  instinct.'1  That  evolu- 
tion proceeds  by  selection  of  favourable  chance 
variations  is,  in  opposition  to  Bergson's  state- 
ment, the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  those  com- 
petent to  judge.  But  supposing  it  to  be 
erroneous,  that  fact  affords  no  evidence  what- 
ever in  favour  of  '  intelligence '  having  created 
instinct :  still  less  that  the  living  being  made  an 
effort :  and  still  less  again  that  that  effort  was 
conscious.  The  instance  is  a  good  one  of  the 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  179. 

87 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

mannikin  fallacy  :  where  Bergson,  after  a  fancied 
refutation  of  a  hostile  theory,  assumes  that  his 
own  is  thereby  established  in  the  full  details  of 
its  manifold  absurdity. 

The  well-known  case  01  the  Ammophila  wasp 
is  taken  from  Fabre's  Souvenirs  entomologiques. 
This  wasp  is  in  the  habit  of  stinging  caterpillars 
over  certain  nerve-centres,  in  such  a  way  as  to 
paralyse  them  without  killing  them,  in  order  that 
they  may  furnish  food  for  the  wasp  larvae  when 
they  are  hatched.     The  purpose  of  this  operation 
is  to  prevent  their  escape,  on  the  one  hand,  and, 
on  the  other,  to  prevent  their  putrescence,  which 
would  take  place  if  they  were  killed.     The  Am- 
mophila shows  the  knowledge  of  an  experienced 
entomologist  in  selecting  exactly  the  right  spots 
to  sting.     How  is  it  done?     Bergson  appears  to 
think  that  this  undoubtedly  marvellous  instinct 
is  more  marvellous  than  other  products  of  evolu- 
tion.    I  venture  to  think  differently :  it  appears 
to  us  more  marvellous  than  other  developments, 
partly  because  it  is  less  familiar,  partly  because 
it   happens   to   have  a   resemblance   to   human 
activities.      The   natural    selection    which    can 
account  for  an  insect's  leg  can  account  as  easily 

88 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

for  the  most  astonishing  instinct.  However, 
let  that  pass.  Bergson  proceeds  to  'suppose  a 
sympathy  (in  the  etymological  sense  of  the  word) 
between  the  Ammophila  and  its  victim,  which 
teaches  it  from  within,  so  to  say,  concerning  the 
vulnerability  of  the  caterpillar.' l  Now  this  is 
one  of  those  purely  verbal  explanations  which 
explain  nothing.  For  it  is  just  as  hard  to  explain 
how  the  sympathy  got  there,  as  how  the  instinct  got 
there.  By  calling  it  a  '  sympathy '  a  supernatural 
origin  is  dragged  in  :  '  spirit '  is  a  deus  ex  machina 
for  metaphysics,  but  in  science  it  only  removes 
the  difficulty  a  step  farther  off,  and  makes  it  the 
harder  to  grapple  with.  But  even  admitting  the 
possibility  of  a  sympathy,  where  is  the  evidence 
for  it  ?  As  usual,  the  statement  is  founded  upon 
the  supposed  inadequacy  of  other  explanations. 
Bergson  never  will  admit  the  possibility  of 
ignorance.  He  will  make  any  absurd  suggestion 
rather  than  confess  himself  at  a  loss  :  and  here 
we  see  a  trait  widely  separating  him  from  natural 
science.  For  instance,  he  affirms  that  '  it  is  better 
to  go  back  to  [the  Aristotelian  theory  of  nature] 
than  to  stop  short  before  instinct  as  before  an 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  183. 
89 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

unfathomable    mystery.'1     This    is    indeed    an 
amazing    statement.       The    Aristotelian   theory 
of  nature  is  on  all  hands  agreed  to  be  untenable  ; 
it  is  better  then  to  adopt  an  untenable  theory 
than  no  theory  at  all !     And  this  is  the  philo- 
sopher   who    accuses    Huxley    of    abandoning 
experience   for   the   requirements   of  a  system  ! 
After   this,  any  further  instances  would   be  an 
anti-climax,  and  we  will   leave  Creative  Evolu- 
tion for  good.    We  cannot  help,  however,  making 
an  observation  on  the  last  lines  of  the  whole 
book,  in  which  Bergson  alleges  that,  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  a  new  Scholasticism 
has  grown  up  round  the  Physics  of  Galileo,  as 
the  old  Scholasticism  grew  up  round  Aristotle. 
This   is   nothing  more   or   less   than   the  well- 
known  ruse  of  discrediting  an  opponent  by  com- 
paring him  to  previously  discredited  individuals. 
For  the  comparison  itself  is  utterly  unfounded. 
Modern  science  and  mediaeval  scholasticism  are 
so    remotely    sundered    in     every    conceivable 
respect,    that    in    truth   we    should    be   lacking 
humour    if   we    attempted     to     repudiate     the 
comparison. 

1  Creative  Evolution^  p.  184. 
90 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

Criticism  upon  Matter  and  Memory  must  follow 
a  course  very  similar  to  that  on  Creative  Evolu- 
tion. It  seems  to  me  that  a  great  part  of  this 
work  is  vitiated  by  the  assumption  made  in  the 
opening  sentences  of  the  book.  '  We  will  assume 
for  the  moment  that  we  know  nothing  of  theories 
of  matter  and  theories  of  spirit,  nothing  of  the 
discussions  as  to  the  reality  or  ideality  of  the 
external  world.  Here  I  am  in  the  presence  of 
images,  in  the  vaguest  sense  of  the  word  ;  images 
perceived  when  my  senses  are  opened  to  them, 
unperceived  when  they  are  closed.'1  In  the 
first  sentence  Bergson  repudiates  all  theories ; 
in  the  second  sentence  he  espouses  Idealism.  It 
is  perfectly  certain  that  no  one  who  knows  no- 
thing of  theories,  will  accept  straight  away  the 
belief  that  the  external  world  is  nothing  more 
than  a  system  of  images.  On  the  contrary,  if 
we  eschew  theories,  we  must  assume  that  the 
external  world  is  just  what  it  appears  to  be ; 
not  images,  nor  ideas,  but  solid  reality.  The 
assumption  of  its  reality  is  at  the  basis  of  every 
step  in  the  progress  of  science  and  increase  of 
knowledge.  No  advance  has  ever  been  made 

1  Matter  and  Memory ^  p.  i. 
91 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

by  assuming  that  it  is  '  spirit '  or  mental  image. 
I  grant  that  Psycho-physics  has  to  be  approached 
either  from  the  side  of  matter  or  from  the  side  of 
spirit.  Bergson  approaches  from  the  side  of 
spirit  :  I  cannot  go  with  him  :  we  will  approach 
only  from  the  side  of  matter,  where  at  least 
we  know  from  the  progress  of  physical  science, 
that  we  are  on  firm  ground.1  The  attempt  to 
get  rid  of  theories  only  shows  how  impossible 
it  is  to  start  on  these  inquiries  without  making 
some  sort  of  assumption  ;  either  the  reality  of 
matter,  or  the  reality  of  spirit,  with  its  images 
of  matter.  Metaphysics  always  assumes  the 
latter,  science  assumes  the  former.  From  our 
naturalistic  standpoint,  it  is  difficult  to  assail 
in  detail  many  of  Bergson's  doctrines  in  Matter 
and  Memory.  We  can  only  say  that  they  rest 
on  false  foundations  ;  that  if  we  begin  with  spirit 
as  a  foundation,  we  might  just  as  well  reach  the 

1  This  may  possibly  be  denied,  on  the  ground  that  physical 
science  in  recent  years  has  suggested  that  matter  may  be  com- 
pletely resolved  into  an  aggregate  of  centres  of  force.  That, 
however,  has  no  bearings  on  the  present  discussion.  Force  is 
just  as  objective  as  matter  ;  and  has  always  figured  in  materialist 
history.  No  one  supposes  that  touch  and  vision  can  show  us  all 
the  attributes  of  matter  :  and  further  analysis  of  atoms  cannot 
reduce  them  to  '  spirit' 

92 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

conclusions  of  Spinoza,  or  of  Leibnitz,  or  of 
Fichte,  or  of  Hegel,  as  of  Bergson.  Beginning 
with  spirit,  we  have  plenty  of  systems  to  choose 
from.  Beginning  with  matter,  we  have  but  one  ; 
the  collection  of  theories  embraced  under  the 
heading  of  science.  For  no  one  has  ever 
suggested  that  there  can  be  more  than  one 
system  of  science,  while  there  can  be  as  many 
systems  of  metaphysics  as  there  are  meta- 
physicians to  invent  them. 

Bergson's  ingenious  a  priori  refutation  of 
psycho-physical  parallelism  fails  on  this  ground. 
'  To  make  of  the  brain  the  condition  on  which 
the  whole  image  [of  the  Universe]  depends  is  in 
truth  a  contradiction  in  terms,  since  the  brain  is 
by  hypothesis  a  part  of  this  image.' *  I  can  con- 
ceive no  possible  metaphysical  answer  to  this 
criticism.  But  the  objection  cuts  two  ways.  If 
we  start  with  spirit,  then  parallelism  is  doomed. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  start  with  parallelism, 
then  the  idealist  method  is  doomed.  Let  us  eluci- 
date this  statement  more  fully. 

We  will  assume  the  reality  and  objectivity  of 
matter.    Parallelism  affirms  that  sensations,  feel- 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  4. 

93 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

ings,  and  all  psychical  manifestations  are  passive 
accompaniments  of  nervous  activity.  Whenever 
a  particular  nervous  tract  functions  in  a  parti- 
cular way,  a  particular  sensation  arises.  True, 
the  outside  observer  never  becomes  aware  of 
those  sensations,  the  symptoms  of  which  he  sees 
in  another ;  all  he  can  become  personally  aware 
of  are  certain  nervous  changes  proceeding  in 
that  other :  which  nervous  changes,  the  subject 
only  is  aware  of  as  sensations.  Now  there  is  no 
sort  of  contradiction  here,  as  implied  by  Bergson. 
If  we  begin  with  matter,  and  not  with  spirit, 
parallelism  becomes  wholly  intelligible.  There  is 
nothing  contradictory  in  saying  (to  take  Huxley's 
example)  that  if  we  prick  a  pin  into  somebody, 
that  pin  will  set  up  certain  nervous  and  physical 
changes  which  we  are  able  to  witness,  and  will 
also  produce  something  altogether  different,  which 
the  subject  will  call  pain,  but  which  cannot  be 
directly  revealed  to  any  one  else,  and  may  have 
no  objective  reality.  I  challenge  any  one  to 
affirm  that  that  at  least  contains  any  contradic- 
tion. Now  if  we  begin  with  the  absolute  exist- 
ence of  the  pain  caused  by  the  image  of  the  pin, 
as  Bergson  does,  and  work  outwards  from  there, 

94 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

we  do  at  once  get  involved  in  contradictions. 
The  point  is  abstruse  :  and  I  need  only  repeat 
that,  from  the  materialist  standpoint  of  science, 
the  whole  argument  of  Bergson  becomes  irrele- 
vant :  the  soundness  of  his  logic  itself  constitutes 
a  condemnation  of  his  premisses. 

This  fundamental  error  appears  to  vitiate  most 
of  the  doctrines  of  Matter  and  Memory.  Let 
us  make  further  observations  on  various  points 
of  the  book. 

That  perception  does  not  reside  in  the  brain 
of  the  perceiver,  but  in  the  object  perceived,  is 
a  startling  statement.  For  by  hallucination,  a 
perception  may  arise  without  any  object  at  all. 
Moreover,  the  only  sure  way  of  destroying  a 
perception  is  to  destroy  the  brain  which  perceives 
it.  If  we  clout  the  subject  over  the  head,  the 
object  (for  him)  promptly  vanishes.  If  we  fill 
the  subject  with  whisky  the  object  appears  in  dup- 
licate. These  facts  are  circumvented  by  lengthy 
but  unconvincing  postulates  of  interaction  be- 
tween subject  and  object.  Of  all  this  argumenta- 
tion, I  have  only  to  say  that  it  has  not  a  fact  to 
support  it.  It  is  pure  guesswork,  in  which  the 
author  proceeds  as  usual  by  wonderful  analogies, 

95 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

which  are  no  sooner  made  than  they  are  taken 
for  truth.  We  are  assured  that  it  is  not  theo- 
retically inconceivable  that  matter  should  be 
perceived  without  sense-organs.1  To  me  it  is 
altogether  inconceivable :  that  is  to  say,  I  am 
wholly  unable  to  conceive  it.  It  is  just  as  in- 
conceivable as  that  gravitation  should  cease  to 
act,  and  houses  totter  upwards  into  the  sky.  In 
a  sense,  that  perhaps  is  not  inconceivable  :  we 
can  imagine  the  thing  happening,  but  what  should 
we  think  of  an  astronomy  which  based  its  prin- 
ciples on  its  not  being  theoretically  inconceiv- 
able ?  Either  the  statement  is  pointless,  or  else 
it  is  made  to  assist  a  theory  :  the  theory  which 
needs  such  assistance  need  not  detain  us  longer. 

Further  curiosities  are  that  perception  is  a 
'  query  '  or  *  demand ' 2  :  pain  is  an  '  effort  to 
repair  damage.' 3  These  things  bear  their  absur- 
dity on  the  face  of  them  :  they  mean  nothing  at 
all.  Pain  may  very  possibly  be  accompanied  by 
an  effort  to  repair  damage,  or  it  may  be  analo- 
gised  to  such  an  effort ;  but  to  say  that  it  is  the 
effort  becomes  ridiculous  as  soon  as  we  demand 
concrete  significance  to  the  words.  We  might 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  40.        2  Ibid.,  p.  42.        3  Ibid.,  p.  56. 

96 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

as  reasonably  affirm  that  the  smell  of  onions  is 
the  same  thing  as  kicking  footballs. 

Just  as  perception  is  located  in  the  perceived 
object,  so  Bergson  alleges  that  pain  is  located  in 
that  part  of  the  body  where  it  appears  to  be  felt. 
This  is  of  course  in  opposition  to  the  belief  of 
physiologists,  who  affirm  that  the  pain  is  really 
located  in  the  brain,  not  at  the  nerve  endings ; 
and  who  support  their  contention  by  pointing,  for 
instance,  to  the  pain  which  a  patient  feels  and 
refers  to  his  foot  after  it  has  for  years  been  ampu- 
tated. I  am  not,  however,  concerned  to  defend 
a  well-established  fact :  I  wish  only  to  point  out 
Bergson's  mode  of  refuting  it.  'If  [the  pain]  is 
not  at  the  point  where  it  appears  to  rise,  neither 
can  it  be  anywhere  else  :  if  it  is  not  in  the  nerve, 
neither  is  it  in  the  brain ;  for  to  explain  its  pro- 
jection from  the  centre  to  the  periphery  a  certain 
force  is  necessary,  which  must  be  attributed  to 
a  consciousness  that  is  to  some  extent  active. 
Therefore,  he  must  go  further.  .  .  . ' *  Here  we 
get  a  chain  of  deductions,  every  link  of  which 
appears  to  be  false.  Why  should  any  force  be 
necessary  ?  Why  should  that  force  be  attributed 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  62,  63. 

G  97 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

to  a  consciousness  ?  Why  should  that  conscious- 
ness be  active  ?  It  was  one  of  Huxley's  chief 
gifts  to  biology  to  have  largely  banished  deduc- 
tion from  that  science,  by  strongly  insisting  on 
the  danger  of  travelling  outside  ascertained  facts. 
A  succession  of  deductions  like  this,  in  a  physio- 
logical inquiry,  is  a  priori  almost  certain  to  be 
erroneous.  To  me  a  posteriori  there  seems  not 
even  prima  facie  evidence  in  favour  of  any  of 
them :  and  they  are  set  against  a  fact  experi- 
mentally arrived  at ! 

The  doctrine  of  the  two  kinds  of  memory  is  a 
complication  of  natural  facts  that  will  not  appeal 
to  anybody.  But  the  fundamental  objec- 
tion to  it  is  that  so  often  raised  already  :  that 
there  are  no  facts  to  support  it.  The  Professor 
attacks  the  physiological  view  of  memory  :  he 
adduces  a  number  of  facts,  such  as  those  of 
sensory  aphasia,  in  opposition  to  it ;  and  having 
destroyed  it  to  his  own  satisfaction,  forthwith 
we  are  presented  with  a  new  theory  which  is 
assumed  to  be  true.  This  new  theory  is  worked 
out  in  extreme  detail ;  it  is  unaffected  by  sensory 
aphasia,  but  otherwise  the  only  credentials  it  can 
produce  are  those  of  extreme  uninteliigibility. 

98 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

We  have  already  had  occasion  to  observe  that  a 
doctrine  is  safest  from  criticism  when  it  is  most 
difficult  to  understand.  The  fog  is  so  thick  that 
the  critic  is  disarmed.  I  therefore  make  no 
specific  attack  upon  it,  beyond  insisting  upon  the 
complete  absence  of  evidence.  Moreover,  the 
attack  on  the  physiological  theory  could  scarcely 
convince  any  one  but  a  metaphysician.  '  If 
memories  are  really  deposited  in  the  cortical 
cells,  we  should  find  in  sensory  aphasia  the 
irreparable  loss  of  certain  determined  words,  the 
integral  conservation  of  others.'1  But  it  is  not 
so.  Now,  what  would  a  man  of  science  consider 
himself  entitled  to  deduce  from  this?  Nothing 
further  than  that  words  are  not  represented  in 
the  brain  in  minute  specific  areas  for  each  word, 
but  that  they  are,  or  may  be,  represented  in  some 
other  way,  possibly  still  undiscovered.  But 
what  does  Bergson  infer?  That  the  memories 
of  words  are  not  stored  in  the  brain  at  all.  He 
refutes  a  crude  physiological  hypothesis ;  he  then 
assumes  that  the  refutation  applies  to  all  possible 
physiological  hypotheses,  and  thence  jumps  to 
his  own  theory.  It  would  have  been  just  as 

1  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  149. 

99 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

reasonable  to  found  his  own  theory  upon  a 
refutation  of  Gall's  phrenology.  For  phren- 
ology was  a  thoroughly  materialistic  hypothesis  ; 
it  assumed  absolute  connection  between  mind 
and  brain,  and  definite  localisation  of  mental 
faculties  in  the  brain.  Phrenology  has  long  been 
exploded,  but  no  one  (except  a  metaphysician)  in- 
fers from  that  that  there  is  no  connection  between 
mind  and  brain.  A  belief  in  that  connection  is 
in  no  wise  shaken  by  the  exposure  of  phrenology  ; 
nor  is  it  shaken  by  the  criticism  of  other  crude 
attempts  to  localise  mental  qualities.  These 
criticisms  are  effective  only  for  the  particular 
theories  against  which  they  are  levelled.  Hence 
we  see  that  Bergson's  theory  of  mind  and  matter 
is  founded  upon  the  same  fallacy  as  that  of  the 
vital  impetus — the  fallacy  which  we  stigmatised 
as  the  mannikin  fallacy  at  the  beginning  of 
the  chapter.  In  bald  outline  it  is  like  refut- 
ing Mahommedanism,  and  then  arguing:  (i) 
Mahommedanism  is  untrue ;  (2)  therefore  all 
religion  is  untrue  ;  (3)  therefore  all  morality 
is  a  superstition.  We  have  only  to  point 
out  that  (2)  does  not  follow  from  (i),  nor 
does  (3)  follow  from  (2).  In  Bergson's  works 

100 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

the  second  step  (2)  is  invariably  taken  silently 
immediately  (i)  has  been  established.  The 
great  show  of  facts  in  his  works  are  all  connected 
with  step  (i),  the  criticism  of  adverse  theories. 
Step  (2)  is  then  slurred  over  without  a  word  of 
discussion,  and  the  rest  of  the  philosophy  is 
taken  up  with  step  (3),  which  is  just  a  hypothesis 
or  guess,  or  intuition,  having  no  connection  with 
foregoing  facts,  but  set  out  with  such  a  wealth 
of  words  and  analogies  that  the  unwary  reader 
quickly  loses  his  way  and  is  totally  lost.  In 
alliance  with  the  main  paralogism  is  the  copious 
misuse  of  analogies  and  of  words,  the  latter 
especially  in  the  form  of  materialising  abstrac- 
tions such  as  time,  life,  motion,  memory.  The 
mediaeval  realists  could  scarcely  have  gone 
farther. 

The  tendency  to  attribute  substantial  reality 
to  abstractions  is  conspicuous  not  only  in  meta- 
physics, but  in  the  thinking  of  all  primitive  races. 
Thus  a  Basuto  will  not  walk  by  a  river  lest  his 
shadow  falling  on  the  water  should  be  seized 
and  devoured  by  a  crocodile.  Nearly  all  children 
at  one  time  or  another  attempt  to  evade  their 
shadows  by  jumping  or  running.  Names  like- 

101 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

wise  are  looked  upon  as  material  things :  as 
among  the  Chinooks,  one  of  whom  thought  that 
Kane's  desire  to  know  his  name  proceeded  from 
a  wish  to  steal  it.1  Here,  as  elsewhere,  Bergson 
does  nothing  more  than  systematise  and  magnify, 
on  an  enormous  scale,  almost  universal  vices  of 
thought. 

I  have  finished.  It  remains  only  to  meet 
some  rejoinders  of  a  general  character,  which 
may  be  made.  I  am  likely,  nay  certain,  to  be 
told  that  I  have  misunderstood  Bergson's  theory. 
Well,  I  shall  ask  in  reply,  what  is  meant  by 
misunderstanding?  Is  it  not  attaching  to  the 
words  of  an  author  a  meaning  he  did  not 
intend?  Now,  it  has  been  my  contention  all 
along  that  Bergson's  words  are  counters,  devoid 
of  meaning. 

Nevertheless,  I  have  proceeded  in  my  argu- 
ment as  though  they  had  a  meaning.  I  shall 
therefore  almost  necessarily  be  accused  of  mis- 
understanding. I  can  only  answer  that  I  am 
not  disposed  to  limit  a  controversy  to  simple 
bandying  of  words.  I  assign  to  my  adversary's 
words  those  meanings  that  they  bear  in  ordinary 

1  Spencer's  Principles  of  Sociology. 
IO2 


REASONS  FOR  DISSENTING 

parlance ;  I  assume  them  to  be  true  money, 
and  it  is  not  my  fault  if  they  land  us  in  ridiculous 
conclusions.  The  only  other  method  open 
would  have  been  to  meet  his  words  with  other 
words  equally  meaningless  :  and  embark  upon  a 
windy  warfare  that  never  could  be  brought  to 
the  touchstone  of  reality.  I  repudiate  that 
method. 

If  Bergson's  philosophy  can  only  be  under- 
stood, in  its  author's  sense,  by  deliberately 
avoiding  the  attempt  to  pass  behind  his  words 
to  the  things  they  stand  for :  then  I  can  only 
describe  his  system  as  a  monument  of  misdirected 
and  useless  ingenuity.  I  appeal  to  the  public  not 
to  be  misled  by  the  brilliance  of  his  analogies, 
the  pyramids  of  words  upon  words.  Truth  does 
not  need  to  be  decked  out  with  gaudy  raiment. 
A  showy  exterior  is  no  index  to  the  soul  within. 
Knowledge  can  be  attained  only  by  painfully 
crawling  along  the  dull  material  path  of  facts, 
not  by  the  ambitious  soaring  of  speculative 
intuition. 


103 


CHAPTER    IV 


'  Stern  necessity,  to  others  dim 
With  night  and  terror,  has  no  fears  for  him.' 

SCHILLER. 

F.  SCHLEGEL  said  that  every  man  is  born  either 
a  Platonist  or  an  Aristotelian.  And  we  do  in 
fact  find  throughout  philosophy  two  deeply 
opposed  tendencies,  which  are  as  well  indicated 
by  Schlegel's  terms  as  by  any  other.  The  one  is 
subjective  in  method,  the  other  objective  ;  the 
one  derives  knowledge  from  inward  intuition,  the 
other  solely  from  outward  experience :  the  one 
starts  from  spirit,  the  other  from  matter  :  the  one 
culminates  in  metaphysics,  the  other  in  science. 
At  the  dawn  of  philosophy,  the  differentiation 
between  the  two  methods  was  incomplete.  Greek 

1  For  the  facts  comprised  in  this  chapter  I  have  drawn  largely  on 
Lewes's  History  oj 'Philosophy and  Lange's  History  of  Materialism. 
Part  of  the  chapter  has  been  already  published  in  the  Edinburgh 
Review,  and  I  am  indebted  to  the  editor  and  publishers  for  kind 
permission  to  reprint  it. 

IO4 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

hylozoism  represents  a  fusion  of  the  tendencies, 
rendering  their  separate  outlines  barely  discern- 
ible. I  n  modern  times  the  antagonism  has  become 
excessively  acute.  On  the  one  hand,  we  have 
the  '  absolute  idealism  '  of  Hegel,  and  the  whole 
school  of  German  metaphysics ;  on  the  other 
hand,  we  have  the  thorough  materialism  which 
underlies  modern  science — a  materialism  which 
may  indeed  be  repudiated  as  a  philosophy  by 
men  of  science  themselves,  but  which  neverthe- 
less lies  at  the  basis  of  all  their  efforts.  So  great 
is  this  gulf  between  science  and  metaphysics  at 
the  present  day,  that,  in  fact,  it  is  only  with  diffi- 
culty that  the  logical  weapons  of  the  one  can  be 
brought  into  action  against  the  other.  I  propose 
to  run  rapidly  over  the  history  of  philosophy, 
with  the  view  of  illustrating  the  antinomy  stated 
by  Schlegel.  On  the  one  hand,  we  shall  find 
the  Platonisers :  the  philosophers  who  derive  from 
the  depths  of  their  own  souls  all  their  knowledge 
about  the  Universe.  Of  these,  I  shall  boldly 
affirm  my  belief  that  they  have  never  contributed, 
qua  philosophers,  one  particle  of  useful  or  reliable 
knowledge  to  the  acquirements  of  humanity,  nor 
one  solitary  principle  that  is  destined  to  hold  its 

105 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

own  against  the  advancing  enlightenment.  But 
only  qua  philosophers  be  it  noted.  The  meta- 
physicians, however  mistaken  their  systems,  have 
often  been  men  of  great  intellectual  power  and 
consummate  ingenuity.  It  is  natural  that  they 
should  frequently  let  drop  in  the  course  of  their 
works  some  idea  of  great  suggestiveness,  or 
some  fact  of  special  interest.  Plato's  philosophy 
may  not  be  worth  a  farthing,  but  many  of  Plato's 
obiter  dicta  are  full  of  value,  and  make  his  works 
perennially  interesting  to  read.  So  that,  although 
we  may  condemn  their  metaphysics  root  and 
branch,  we  are  far  from  denying  value  to  their 
writings  as  able  and  cultivated  men. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  shall  find  the  Aristo- 
telians of  philosophy.  And  here  it  may  be 
remarked  that  few  even  of  the  Aristotelians 
have  been  free  from  the  Platonising  method. 
Aristotle  himself  was  sodden  with  it:  the  method 
pursued  in  his  metaphysics  is  altogether  opposed 
to  that  suggested  in  his  scientific  works.  Never- 
theless, the  evil  element  of  Platonism  is  modified 
by  the  appearance  of  a  real  positive  method ;  and 
among  many  philosophers,  both  of  the  ancient 
and  modern  world,  the  positive  method  actually 

1 06 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

obscures  the  metaphysical.  From  the  Aristo- 
telian tendency,  we  shall  isolate  two  elements 
of  value.  In  the  first  place,  we  shall  find  real 
and  important  additions  to  knowledge.  In 
the  second  place,  we  shall  find  the  dissipation 
of  superstitions.  The  first  sphere  has  now 
been  appropriated  by  science  :  all  positive 
results  of  value  in  the  history  of  philosophy 
belong  more  properly  to  science  than  to  philo- 
sophy. The  second  sphere  has  not  been  appro- 
priated by  any  special  set  of  people.  At  the 
commencement  of  civilisation  men's  beliefs 
formed  a  hotch-potch  of  truth  and  falsity  in 
hopeless  confusion.  Undisciplined  ignorance  is 
not  characterised  by  a  negation  or  paucity  of 
beliefs ;  on  the  contrary,  it  revels  luxuriously 
in  pseudo-explanations  ;  it  leaves  nothing  un- 
explained in  its  narrow  conception  of  the 
Universe.  To  abandon  anything  as  inexplicable, 
or  to  confess  ignorance,  is  only  reached  after 
long  discipline  and  by  highly  cultivated  intelli- 
gence. Hence  one  of  the  most  important  tasks 
of  philosophy  has  been  the  dissipation  of  error. 
Accompanying  the  ever-widening  sphere  of  true 
knowledge,  there  has  gone  an  ever-narrowing 

107 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

sphere  of  false  knowledge.  The  discovery  of 
real  explanations  has  proceeded  pari  passu  by  a 
delimitation  of  the  class  of  questions  which  are 
capable  of  being  explained.  We  shall  look, 
therefore,  only  for  two  elements  of  value  in 
philosophy :  the  one  creating  knowledge,  which 
is  not  philosophy  at  all,  but  science  taught  by 
men  called  philosophers ;  the  other  destroying 
pseudo-knowledge. 

In  the  earliest  efforts  of  Greek  philosophy,  we 
see  nothing  but  an  attempt  to  '  explain '  the 
Universe  by  naming  as  its  cause  any  idea  that 
happened  to  be  handy.  Thales  regarded  water 
as  the  origin  of  all  things  :  Anaximenes  deposed 
water  in  favour  of  air.  Diogenes  of  Apollonia 
followed  Anaximenes,  but  identified  air  with  soul 
(tyvxn)  or  intelligence,  thus  sowing  the  germs  of 
a  more  spiritualistic  theory.  These  early  philo- 
sophers, bracketed  together  as  the  Ionian  school, 
were  content  with  taking  these  concrete  objects 
and  calling  them  the  origin  of  the  Universe.  The 
Ionian  school  was  succeeded  by  the  mathe- 
matical school,  in  which  ideas  somewhat  more 
abstract  begin  to  appear.  Anaximander  of 
Miletus  hit  upon  infinity  as  the  origin  of  all 

108 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

things  :  for,  he  asked,  how  can  any  single  finite 
thing  be  the  origin  of  all  things?  Pythagoras 
went  farther,  and  looked  upon  number  in  the 
abstract  as  being  the  goal  of  their  search  :  he 
erected  into  special  favour  the  primary  number 
one.  And  here  let  us  pause  to  warn  the  reader, 
lest  he  should  think  Greek  philosophy  somewhat 
abstruse,  not  to  seek  too  closely  into  the  mean- 
ing of  these  grotesque  speculations.  People  are 
apt  to  miss  the  point  of  primitive  speculation  by 
supposing  it  to  have  a  meaning  much  deeper 
than  appears  on  the  surface  ;  and  they  are  apt 
also  to  deliver  themselves  of  profound  interpre- 
tations which  would  have  greatly  startled  the 
founders  of  the  theory,  and  been  far  beyond  their 
comprehension.  The  Pythagorean  apotheosis  of 
number  has  in  it  nothing  more  abstruse  than  the 
Ionic  apotheoses  of  air  and  water ;  save  only  that 
number  being  abstract,  the  theory  is  not  quite 
such  an  obvious  contradiction  of  sense-impres- 
sions. It  is  an  example  of  the  way  in  which,  as 
the  previously-assigned  causes  are  seen  to  be 
more  and  more  untenable,  they  are  gradually 
made  more  misty  and  abstract ;  and  by  ever- 
increasing  unintelligibility  endeavour  to  keep 

109 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

without  the  growing  sphere  of  intelligence.  In 
precisely  the  same  way  Bergson  assigns  '  time ' 
as  the  origin  of  life  and  consciousness  :  time 
being  a  still  more  abstract  conception  than  num- 
ber. In  this  particular  respect  Bergson  stands 
in  much  the  same  relation  to  Pythagoras  as 
Pythagoras  to  Thales.  Increased  vagueness, 
subtlety,  and  incomprehensibility  are  combined 
in  a  consummate  effort  to  remove  the  theory  from 
the  shafts  of  intellectual  analysis. 

A  further  advance  was  made  by  the  Eleatic 
school,  which  combined  the  more  reasonable 
elements  in  the  Ionian  and  mathematical. 
Xenophanes,  inheriting  the  doctrine  of  the  One 
from  Pythagoras,  amplified  it,  as  Aristotle  tells 
us :  '  Casting  his  eyes  upwards  at  the  immensity 
of  heaven,  he  declared  that  the  One  is  God.' 
He  thus  founded  philosophic  monotheism  or 
pantheism.  Parmenides  followed  in  the  foot- 
steps of  Xenophanes,  though  he  was  perturbed 
by  the  question  whether  there  could  exist  such 
a  thing  as  non-existence  :  a  pretty  question  for 
metaphysicians,  reminding  us  of  Bergson's  analy- 
sis of  the  idea  of  nothing.  Zeno  of  Elea  further 
elaborated  the  doctrine  of  the  One  :  he  was  a 

no 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

zealous  disciple  of  Parmenides,  and  devoted 
himself  mainly  to  spreading  the  views  of  the 
latter.  At  this  time  cosmological  speculation 
was  getting  rather  into  difficulties.  Zeno  was 
propounding  the  famous  paradox  of  Achilles  and 
the  tortoise ;  and  he  was  likewise  proving  for  the 
benefit  of  his  contemporaries  that  motion  was 
impossible.  For  those  who  disliked  metaphysi- 
cal subtleties,  it  must  have  been  a  relief  to  turn 
to  Heraklitus's  new  gospel  that  fire  was  the  origin 
of  all  things. 

Here,  however,  we  enter  upon  a  new  epoch  in 
Greek  philosophy.  For  a  century  and  a  half 
speculation  had  been  rife  as  to  the  origin  of  the 
Universe,  and  it  was  felt  that  the  explanation  was 
not  much  nearer  than  before.  The  attention  of 
philosophers  was  therefore  naturally  directed  to 
problems  of  the  limitation  of  knowledge,  and 
whether  the  explanation  sought  for  was,  after 
all,  one  that  could  be  brought  within  the  confines 
of  human  understanding.  Ontological  inquiry 
gave  place  to  epistemological  inquiry.  But 
before  following  it  into  this  new  phase,  let  us 
note  what  character  the  ontological  theories  have 
in  common.  It  is  clear  that  all  these  philosophers 

in 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

were  animated  by  one  common  emotion  or  senti- 
ment— the  strong  desire  to  ascertain  the  ultimate 
cause.  In  Chapter  vi.  I  shall  exhibit  more 
fully  the  affiliation  of  belief  upon  sentiment. 
I  must  here  anticipate  the  conclusion  of  that 
chapter  by  remarking  that  wherever  sentiment 
is  strong,  critical  judgment  is  weak  :  sentiment 
by  itself  is  sufficient  to  maintain  belief  in  any- 
thing that  gratifies  it,  so  long  as  the  most  outrt 
opposition  to  experience  is  avoided.  So  we  see 
that  some  of  these  philosophers  invoked  water, 
some  air,  some  infinity,  some  number,  some  fire, 
as  the  goal  of  their  desire.  In  short,  the  pre- 
valent desire  seized  upon  any  handy  object  and 
erected  it  forthwith  into  the  desiderated  eminence. 
It  would  be  chasing  a  will-o'-the-wisp  to  seek 
how  they  came  by  these  particular  concepts. 
The  adequate  explanation  is  afforded  by  the 
desire  for  a  first  cause  appropriating  to  itself 
whatever  it  required  for  its  own  gratification. 
To  the  logical  inquirer  their  beliefs  are  unin- 
telligible :  to  the  psychological  inquirer,  they 
bear  their  explanation  on  the  surface. 

Hastening  on  now  to  our  next  epoch,  we  find 
philosophers   dilating   upon   the  uncertainty   of 

112 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

knowledge  derived  from  the  senses.  This 
doubtless  represents  a  true  intellectual  advance 
—the  gradually  strengthening  discrimination 
between  the  objective  and  the  subjective.  It 
made  possible  great  progress  in  the  efforts  to 
interpret  natural  phenomena ;  but  it  lent  itself 
unfortunately  to  the  wildest  speculation,  on  the 
principle  that  the  obvious  contradiction  afforded  by 
the  senses  was  no  true  criterion.  Of  Heraklitus, 
we  need  say  but  little.  His  sobriquet  of  'the 
obscure '  shows  plainly  enough  that  he  availed 
himself  of  the  privilege  still  extensively  utilised 
by  metaphysicians — to  shroud  absurd  hypotheses 
beneath  inscrutable  obscurity  of  language.  He 
taught,  among  other  things,  that  individual  things 
are  strictly  not  at  all,  but  become.  He  resembled 
Bergson  in  fact,  in  the  ridiculous  and  supernatural 
importance  which  he  attached  to  flux,  or  change, 
for  its  own  sake.  Anaxagoras  was  a  far  more 
interesting  thinker.  He  denied  (before  Demo- 
kritus)  that  there  was  any  such  thing  as  chance, 
thus  curiously  anticipating  modern  science : 
but  he  was  not  afraid  of  paradox.  His  attempt 
to  prove  that  snow  was  black  shows  that  at  all 
events  he  was  no  bigoted  believer  in  sense- 
H  113 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

impressions,  and  dimly  reminds  us  of  the  gro- 
tesque proposition  which  Hegel  laid  down  for 
the  delectation  of  his  disciples  past  and  present 
— Sein  und  Nichtsein  ist  dasselbe. 

Empedokles  greatly  improved  the  cosmology 
of  the  Ionian  school  by  affirming  that,  instead  of 
one  primary  element,  there  were  four — earth, 
air,  fire  and  water.  Whether  this  achievement 
induced  in  him  the  complaint  known  to  moderns 
by  the  irreverent  title  of  'swelled  head,'  I  can- 
not say ;  but  he  proclaimed  himself  a  god,  and 
appears  to  have  been  treated  as  such  by  his 
adherents. 

Demokritus  was  an  immense  advance  upon 
his  predecessors.  We  should  perhaps  be  justified 
in  regarding  him  as  the  greatest  of  Greek  philo- 
sophers prior  to  Aristotle,  and  in  many  ways  far 
more  profound  even  than  the  great  Stagirite 
Demokritus  specifically  affirmed  that  '  nothing 
happens  by  chance,  but  everything  through  a 
cause  and  of  necessity.'  That  is  to  say,  he 
affirmed  the  universality  of  law  :  and  he  is  re- 
peatedly attacked  by  Aristotle  for  his  abandon- 
ment of  teleology.  Though,  naturally,  his  views 
are  crude  if  compared  with  modern  knowledge, 

114 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

yet  for  his  own  times  they  were  marvellously 
advanced.  His  anticipation  of  modern  science 
was  not  merely  general  in  character,  but  special  ; 
for  his  propositions  concerning  motion  are  de- 
cidedly suggestive  of  Newton.  He  deduced  the 
Universe  from  atoms  in  motion ;  affirming  that 
all  else  was  'only  opinion.'  Of  course,  however, 
he  could  not  entirely  escape  the  error  of  pass- 
ing beyond  the  teachings  of  experience.  He 
was  the  founder  of  materialism,  saying  that  '  the 
soul  consists  of  fine,  smooth,  round  atoms,  like 
those  of  fire.'  In  Demokritus,  with  all  his 
errors,  we  recognise  the  first  great  apostle  of 
positive  methods.  The  Aristotelian  element  in 
him  far  outweighs  the  Platonic.  He  recognised 
even  that  misuse  of  words  is  at  the  bottom  of 
metaphysical  errors.  '  He  who  is  fond  of  con- 
tradiction and  makes  many  words  is  incapable  of 
learning  anything  that  is  right.'  Demokritus 
has  been  handed  down  to  posterity  as  the  '  laugh- 
ing philosopher'  in  contrast  with  his  contem- 
porary Heraklitus,  the  obscure,  who  was  known 
as  the  '  weeping  philosopher.'  May  we  not  see 
even  in  this  slight  indication,  the  contrast  be- 
tween a  true  and  a  false  philosophy  of  life  ? 

"5 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

We  come  now  to  Protagoras  and  the  Sophists. 
The  rise  of  the  Sophists  marks  a  period  when 
general  discontent  with  the  methods  and  con- 
clusions of  philosophy  was  rife.  Disgusted  with 
the  failure  of  all  attempts  at  the  acquisition  of 
positive  knowledge,  they  took  refuge  in  a  scepti- 
cism that  was  scarcely  less  injurious  to  the  ultimate 
discovery  of  truth.  For  their  scepticism  did  not 
take  the  form  of  a  wholesome  distrust  of  untried 
hypotheses :  it  led  them  to  doubt  the  very 
existence  of  truth  itself.  Thus  they  used  to 
boast  that  they  could  '  make  the  worse  appear 
the  better  cause.'  They  recognised  neither 
absolute  right  nor  absolute  truth,  and  fell  back 
upon  expediency  as  the  proper  test  of  action 
and  belief.  Protagoras  affirmed  that  man  was 
the  measure  of  all  things,  and  emphatically  in- 
sisted on  the  relativity  of  knowledge.  In  many 
ways  the  Sophists  resemble  the  Pragmatists  of 
the  present  day.  In  each  case  the  new  scepticism 
originates  as  a  protest  against  the  failure  of 
pre-existing  philosophy  :  in  each  case  the  possi- 
bility of  absolute  truth  is  denied :  in  each  case 
the  opinion  of  mankind  is  taken  as  the  criterion 
of  relative  truth  and  the  proper  guide  to  action. 

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THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

But  whatever  there  may  be  of  truth  in  this  way 
of  looking  at  things,  it  is  of  no  greater  value  to 
the  philosopher  than  it  would  be  to  the  states- 
man to  know  the  number  of  inches  between 
London  and  Berlin.  Scepticism  is  heuristically 
barren :  to  erect  it  into  a  philosophic  dogma  is 
to  confound  the  means  with  the  end :  the  pre- 
liminary attitude  of  doubt  with  the  final  attitude 
of  knowledge  assured.  Such  an  assertion  as 
that  made  by  the  Sophists,  that  contradictory 
propositions  are  equally  true,  is  sufficient  to  con- 
demn them  in  itself.  I  deny  that  a  thing  can 
both  be  true  and  not  true.  There  is  either  a 
planet  of  our  solar  system  more  distant  than 
Neptune,  or  there  is  no  such  planet.  I  do  not 
know  which  of  these  statements  is  true :  but  I 
am  perfectly  certain  that  they  are  not  both  true. 
If  I  am  asked  to  justify  this  conviction,  I  decline 
to  do  so.  If  I  am  confronted  with  a  flawless 
metaphysics  to  prove  I  am  wrong,  I  remain 
unmoved.  If  we  are  going  to  admit  that  ab- 
surdity, there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  stop 
anywhere.  The  certainty  of  the  conclusion  is 
not  affected  by  our  capacity  to  analyse  the 
method  by  which  it  is  reached :  for  it  will  always 

117 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

remain  inherently  more  probable  that  an  error 
has  arisen  in  an  abstruse  analysis,  than  in  a 
plain  dictum  of  experience.  All  who  reason 
thus  are  destined  before  long  to  be  swept  away 
before  a  more  intelligible  system. 

This  at  all  events  was  the  fate  which  befell 
the  Sophists  in  the  progressive  Greek  com- 
munities of  the  fifth  century  B.C.  In  the  height 
of  their  wealth  and  power,  there  arose  from 
among  the  poorer  classes  a  mind  of  Gargantuan 
force,  which  with  no  sort  of  fuss  or  display  pro- 
ceeded to  knock  them  down  like  ninepins  one 
after  the  other.  The  rise  of  Sokrates  marks  an 
epoch  in  the  intellectual  history  of  the  world. 
He  brings  us  out  once  more  from  the  misty 
obscurity  that  had  again  overtaken  philosophy 
into  a  land  of  plain  and  comprehensible  proposi- 
tions— propositions  indeed  with  which  I  cordially 
disagree,  propositions  which  the  Athenians  looked 
upon  as  immoral,  but  which  have  an  honest  and 
unmistakable  meaning,  with  no  cloudy  diction 
to  envelop  their  weaknesses.  His  title  to  fame 
rests  not  upon  his  constructive  philosophy,  but 
upon  his  giving  definiteness  to  thought,  his 
mortal  hatred  of  obscurity,  his  determination  that 

n3 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

any  one  who  held  a  belief  should  be  compelled  to 
recognise  all  the  implications  of  his  belief.  He 
came  as  an  innovator  in  method.  Against  the 
rhetoric  of  the  Sophists  he  brought  with  deadly 
effect  the  weapon  of  dialectics.  Professing 
himself  to  know  nothing,  he  would  approach  one 
of  the  Sophist  teachers  and  commence  to  cross- 
examine  him,  as  though  for  his  own  information. 
With  relentless  certainty,  the  adversary  was 
driven  by  corollaries  from  his  own  theories  into 
some  self-contradictory  or  absurd  position,  where 
Sokrates  would  leave  him  in  impotent  fury. 
Opposition  to  the  leading  men  of  his  day  brought 
with  it  the  inevitable  unpopularity  and  accusa- 
tions :  he  died  as  philosophic  martyrs  always 
have,  with  less  trepidation  than  was  felt  by  his 
judges. 

Sokrates'  philosophy  was  altogether  retrogres- 
sive, when  it  abandoned  the  destructive  attitude. 
He  believed  that  knowledge  was  identical  with 
virtue :  that  morality  was  the  only  science :  that 
every  other  study  was  futile  and  absurd.  In  short, 
he  was  the  originator  of  that  hopeless  confusion 
between  science  and  ethics,  which  has  never 
since  ceased  to  vitiate  the  conclusions  of  philo- 

119 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

sophers.  A  strong  prepossession  as  to  what 
ought  to  be — that  is  to  say,  of  what  we  should  like 
to  believe — is  perhaps  the  most  dangerous  of  all 
sentiments  in  those  who  set  out  to  ascertain  what 
is.  Nature  does  not  conform  to  our  ideas  of 
morality  :  were  the  notion  of  morality  applicable 
to  nature  at  all,  we  should  have  to  stigmatise 
many  of  its  workings  as  foully  immoral  and 
infinitely  wicked.  But  of  this  more  in  a  future 
chapter.  Sokrates  again  set  up  the  banner  of 
teleology,  which  Demokritus  had  assailed.  In 
short,  Sokrates  in  his  positive  beliefs  started  a 
reaction  whose  influence  is  still  unexpired. 

Sokrates  having  turned  the  thoughts  of  men  to 
morals,  we  find  all  sorts  of  extreme  views  of 
morality  carried  out  into  practice.  On  the  one 
hand,  there  was  the  gay  Aristippus  :  a  confirmed 
materialist,  a  philosopher  of  far  greater  insight 
than  Sokrates :  rightly  anticipating  the  great 
discovery  of  Epikurus  that  life  is  for  happiness, 
but  wrongly  applying  that  doctrine  into  a  justi- 
fication for  sensuality  and  the  grosser  pleasures. 
Against  Aristippus  might  justly  be  advanced  all 
those  gibes  which  ignorant  moralists  are  ac- 
customed ineptly  to  fling  at  Epikurus.  On  the 

1 20 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

other  hand,  there  were  the  Cynics,  Antisthenes 
and  Diogenes,  whose  savage  ill-temper  gave 
origin  to  an  equally  savage  philosophy  in  which 
the  Sokratic  search  for  virtue  took  on  the  most 
austere  and  forbidding  character.  Antisthenes 
'  The  dog,'  and  Diogenes  with  his  tub,  are  the 
classical  examples  of  men  whose  naturally  un- 
amiable  feelings  find  expression  in  vehement 
moral  indignation  against  humanity,  and  in  vain 
and  ostentatious  assumptions  of  superior  good- 
ness. The  habits  of  Diogenes  also  illustrate  the 
close  conjunction  that  often  subsists  between 
asceticism  and  sensuality. 

A  new  epoch  in  philosophy  now  opens  with  the 
famous  name  of  Plato.  I  have  already  adopted 
him  as  the  type  of  all  that  is  bad  in  metaphysics  : 
I  have  now  only  to  express  that  opinion  in  more 
emphatic  form.  True,  he  relieved  philosophy 
from  the  shackles  set  upon*  it  by  Sokrates :  he 
did  not  pretend  that  virtue  was  synonymous  with 
truth :  but  he  did  what  was  every  whit  as  foolish, 
in  assuming  that  outward  facts  must  harmonise 
with  his  own  notions  of  what  was  beautiful  or 
poetical  or  religious.  Grote  has  remarked  that 
his  theories  are  altogether  a  priori :  '  They 

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SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

enunciate  preconceptions  or  hypotheses  which 
derive  their  hold  upon  his  belief  not  from  any 
aptitude  for  solving  the  objections  he  has  raised  ; 
but  from  deep  and  solemn  sentiment  of  some 
kind  or  other — religious,  ethical,  aesthetical, 
poetical,  etc.,  the  worship  of  numerical  symmetry 
or  exactness,  etc.'  In  short,  he  decided  what  was 
true  by  appealing  to  his  own  sense  of  what  was 
beautiful  or  good,  and  therefore  ought  to  be  true  ; 
and  he  proceeded  then  to  apply  his  hypothesis 
to  the  facts,  which  had  to  be  twisted  about  until 
they  fitted  the  preconceptions.  He  deified  the 
subjective  method ;  can  we  wonder  at  the  many 
absurdities  into  which  he  fell,  as,  for  instance, 
proving  that  the  world  is  an  animal  ?  And  he 
adopted  the  subjective  method  in  full  conscious- 
ness of  its  meaning,  affirming  and  believing  that 
this  was  the  real  way  to  arrive  at  truth. 

Aristotle,  on  the  other  hand,  I  have  taken  as 
the  example  of  the  righteous  tendency  in  Philo- 
sophy. I  have  done  so  because  he  insisted  on 
the  empirical  method  :  the  necessity  of  proceeding 
to  the  unknown  through  generalisations  from  the 
known,  and  not,  like  Plato,  vice  versa.  But,  as 
Lewes  observes,  there  was  really  so  very  little 

122 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

'  known '  to  generalise  from,  that  he  was  precluded 
from  carrying  out  his  own  method.  His  four 
first  principles  included  that  of  \hzjinal  cause,  viz. 
that  there  is  a  benevolent  purpose  running 
through  every  event  in  the  universe,  that  nothing 
happens  without  an  ultimate  aim.  Not  only  did 
he  abandon  experience  in  his  metaphysics ;  but 
in  a  variety  of  small  details,  as  Eucken  has 
pointed  out,  he  made  remarks  that  observation 
would  at  once  have  overthrown.  Such  are  that 
women  do  not  have  palpitation  of  the  heart,  that 
they  have  fewer  teeth  than  men,  that  men  have 
eight  ribs,  that  eggs  float  in  strong  brine,  that 
cows  do  not  cough,  and  many  others. 

Lange  points  out  that  throughout  philosophic 
history,  belief  in  materialism  has  waxed  and 
waned  periodically.  The  materialism  of  Demo- 
kritus  was  replaced  by  the  spiritualism  of  Sokrates, 
Plato,  and  Aristotle :  and  it  was  not  till  a  century 
or  more  had  elapsed  that  materialism  once  more 
came  to  the  fore.  The  interval  was  filled  by 
Pyrrho  and  his  followers,  who  carried  their 
scepticism  so  far  as  not  only  to  assert  nothing,  but 
to  refuse  even  to  assert  that  they  asserted  nothing. 
We  are  not  therefore  obliged  to  consider  their 

123 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

additions  to  positive  knowledge,  but  proceed  at 
once  to  Epikurus,  who  reached  perhaps  the 
highest  philosophic  position  of  all  the  ancients. 
Until  quite  recent  times,  it  has  always  been  the 
case  that  thinkers  in  advance  of  their  age  have 
been  misunderstood,  and  falsely  charged  with  the 
various  deductions,  which  sciolists  at  large  have 
drawn  from  their  pronouncements.  Few  philoso- 
phers have  suffered  as  much  from  this  cause  as 
Epikurus.  The  doctrine  that  human  happiness 
and  welfare  is  the  end  of  morality  lends  itself  with 
singular  facility  to  misapprehension  by  that  large 
class  of  people  whose  notion  of  happiness  is 
limited  to  sordid  pleasures  and  gross  sensuality. 
The  misapprehension  has  survived  even  to  our 
own  day  in  the  opprobrious  connotations  which 
we  attach  to  the  English  words  derived  from  the 
name  of  Epikurus.  Yet  it  was  very  differently 
that  the  great  philosopher  interpreted  his  own 
doctrines.  That  happiness  is  the  object  of  life 
is  a  self-evident  proposition :  it  is  followed 
by  every  one,  including  those  who  would  most 
strenuously  deny  it.  The  only  question  is 
how  that  happiness  shall  be  attained  :  and  to 
this  question  Epikurus  gave  the  answer  that  it 

124 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

was  to  be  attained  by  equable  and  calm  living, 
by  a  virtuous  life,  by  temperance,  by  pleasures 
of  the  soul  rather  than  of  the  body  :  and  not,  as 
among  common  men,  by  pursuit  of  immediate 
gratification.  Epikurus  was  the  founder  of  hed- 
onism, and  regarded  philosophy  as  the  art  of 
living,  rather  than  the  art  of  truth.  In  the  latter 
art  he  was  a  sceptic,  though  he  taught  that  every- 
thing was  governed  by  eternal  law  and  order. 
He  defended  the  latter  proposition  on  ethical 
grounds.  Saying  that  fear  and  superstition  were 
important  causes  of  unhappiness,  he  showed  that 
they  would  be  banished  by  a  belief  in  the  uni- 
versal mechanism  of  Nature.  If  everything  was 
explained  or  explainable  by  natural  laws  of  cause 
and  effect,  a  great  part  of  the  anxieties  of  mankind 
would  be  removed.  Thus  the  greatest  moralist 
of  antiquity  gave  his  adhesion  to  materialism. 

Epikurus  was  the  last  of  the  great  Greek 
philosophers.  And  what  is  the  net  result  of 
philosophy  up  to  that  time  ?  In  ethics,  the 
principle  of  happiness.  In  science,  the  principle 
of  universal  law — a  principle,  however,  which 
cannot  be  regarded  in  that  age  as  more  than 
mere  speculation.  The  facts  at  their  disposal 

125 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

were  scarcely  sufficient  to  found  a  theory  de- 
serving the  name  of  scientific.  But  beyond  this, 
philosophy  had  achieved  nothing  whatever,  ex- 
cept in  the  removal  of  superstitions.  Instead  of 
accepting  as  true  anything  that  we  find  in  our 
minds,  Aristotle  had  set  forth  the  principle  that 
experience  with  facts  must  be  our  main  guide 
to  truth.  But  in  the  sphere  of  positive  con- 
struction, philosophy  had  failed  absolutely  and 
completely.  Much  rubbish  had  been  cleared 
away :  the  ground  had  been  prepared  for  science, 
but  science  had  not  yet  been  reached.  The 
Greek  civilisation  was  merely  a  preface  to  the 
intellectual  progress  of  mankind.  Without  that 
clearance  of  the  way,  science  could  never  have 
developed  ;  so  heavy  were  the  obstacles  to  be 
removed,  so  gigantic  the  task,  that  the  greatest 
race  of  antiquity  exhausted  their  powers  in  the 
effort,  and  expired  before  its  accomplishment. 

The  ground  did  not  for  long  lie  fallow.  Even 
among  the  Greeks,  there  were  certain  begin- 
nings of  true  science  :  Aristotle's  De  partibus 
animalium,  for  instance,  is  a  work  showing  re- 
markable powers  of  observation,  and  exemplify- 
ing true  methods  of  research.  But  it  was  in 

126 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Alexandria  that  the  scientific  methods  took  most 
root.  Philology  was  represented  by  Aristarchus 
of  Samothrace  ;  history  by  Polybius  ;  geometry 
by  Euclid  ;  mechanics  by  Archimedes ;  astron- 
omy by  Hipparchus ;  anatomy  by  Herophilus 
and  Erasistratus.  Experiment  was  first  em- 
ployed in  Alexandria :  there,  too,  induction  took 
its  origin.  These  wonderful  achievements  were 
rendered  possible  only  by  the  preceding  clear- 
ance of  Greek  philosophy.  But  they  rest  upon 
the  conclusions  of  Demokritus  and  the  principle 
of  the  universality  of  mechanical  law :  for  there 
can  be  no  induction  without  the  assumption 
that  the  laws  of  nature  are  necessary  and  un- 
changeable. They  rest,  too,  upon  Aristotle, 
who  announced  that  the  way  to  obtain  know- 
ledge of  nature  was  to  look  at  nature  and  see, 
instead  of  looking  into  one's  own  soul,  as  had 
previously  been  done,  and  was  systematised  by 
Plato.  And  even  Plato,  though  he  piled  many 
obstacles  in  the  road,  taught  men  the  use  of 
deduction.  It  was  only  through  such  prelimin- 
ary work  that  Aristarchus  of  Samos  could  fore- 
shadow the  theory  of  Copernicus,  that  Ptolemy 
could  be  of  use  to  Christopher  Columbus,  that 

127 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

Galen  could  lay  the  foundations  of  medicine. 
The  theory  of  the  independence  of  mind  and 
body  was  first  shaken  when  Galen  cured  nervous 
complaints  by  physical  methods. 

While  science  went  forward,  philosophy  lan- 
guished. The  Stoicism  of  Zeno  and  his  fol- 
lowers was  the  philosophy  most  in  harmony 
with  the  austerity  of  Roman  manners ;  it  uncon- 
ditionally posited  virtue  as  the  object  of  exist- 
ence— virtue  of  so  harsh  a  character  as  soon  to 
produce  the  natural  reaction.  In  the  poem  of 
Lucretius,  De  rerum  Naturae,  we  find,  perhaps, 
the  highest  as  well  as  the  latest  effort  of  ancient 
philosophy.  Not  only  did  Lucretius  accept  the 
universality  of  law,  but  he  even  included  the 
phenomena  of  life  as  explicable  on  purely  natural 
and  physical  principles.  Lucretius  did  much  to 
spread  the  doctrines  of  the  Epikureans  among 
the  Romans.  But  when  the  moral  degeneration 
of  Rome  took  place,  Epikureanism  was  less 
useful  than  Stoicism  in  the  attempt  to  stem  the 
tide,  and  both  finally  were  overwhelmed. 

In  Alexandria,  Plotinus  announced  that  the 
*  One '  was  the  origin  of  all  things.  Proclus 
identified  science  with  theology.  The  old  rule 

128 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  metaphysics  is  still  maintained :  to  save 
itself  from  the  dissolving  contact  of  positive 
knowledge,  by  making  its  '  causes '  and  '  ex- 
planations' ever  more  abstract  and  intangible. 
Mysticism  and  ecstasy  reigned  supreme  :  while 
men  of  science  were  laying  the  foundations 
of  a  materialistic  physiology,  philosophers  were 
preaching  the  complete  dissociation  of  soul  from 
body.  The  intellectual  degradation  of  the  Middle 
Ages  is  foreshadowed  by  the  unnatural  mysticism 
of  Plotinus,  who  blushed  to  think  he  had  a  body. 
Finally  reason  gave  way  to  faith,  and  philosophy 
flickered  out  altogether.  For  more  than  a  thou- 
sand years  religion  took  the  place  of  science  and 
philosophy,  and  enthralled  the  intellect  of  men. 
The  blackest  barbarism  and  superstition  had  to 
be  passed  through,  before  humanity  once  again 
stirred  uneasily  beneath  the  heavy  chains  which 
bound  them ;  this  time  to  reach  an  enlighten- 
ment far  transcending  the  wildest  dreams  of  the 
ancients. 

The  predominant  philosophy  of  the   Middle 

Ages  was  Scholasticism.     Aristotle  was  taken  as 

the  fountain  of  all  wisdom  :  and  the  questions 

discussed  were  largely  as  to  the  interpretations 

I  129 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

to  be  placed  upon  his  writings.  Not  only  were 
their  speculations  feeble,  but  the  subjects  which 
they  selected  to  speculate  about  were  no  less  so. 
What  can  be  more  futile  or  uninteresting  than 
the  great  dispute  between  nominalism  and  real- 
ism ?  Are  general  terms  actual  objective  things, 
or  are  they  merely  names  to  signify  a  group  ? 
When  we  speak  of  a  gemis  or  a  species,  do  we 
mean  anything  beyond  the  individuals  comprised 
under  the  heading  ?  In  these  days,  few  could 
ask  such  questions,  and  scarcely  any  one  could 
hesitate  about  the  answer.  But  even  here,  we 
can  see  an  intimate  relationship  to  Bergson's 
metaphysics.  These  mediaeval  realists  did  not 
confound  words  with  things  more  egregiously 
than  our  French  philosopher.  If  they  thought 
that  a  genus  was  a  real,  positive,  existing  thing, 
independent  altogether  of  the  individuals  com- 
posing it,  the  error  is  scarcely  more  absurd  than 
the  attribution  of  substantiality  to  life,  time,  and 
motion.  Materialising  abstractions  is  a  vice  of 
thought,  not  at  all  confined  to  the  scholastics ; 
probably  no  system  has  so  industriously  em- 
ployed this  method  of  procedure  as  the  philo- 
sophy of  Bergson. 

130 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Arabic  writers  filled  an  important  task  in 
assisting  to  carry  on  the  dim  light  of  ancient 
learning ;  but  with  them,  too,  there  was  scarcely 
energy  for  more  than  a  slavish  adherence  to 
Aristotle.  Abubacer,  for  instance,  attacked 
Ptolemy's  views  of  celestial  motions,  not  on  the 
ground  of  observation,  but  because  they  could 
not  be  harmonised  with  the  theories  of  Aristotle. 
Alpetragius,  indeed,  ventured  upon  a  new 
hypothesis  of  his  own ;  but  he  was  careful  to 
repudiate  the  allegation  that  he  had  been  led  to 
it  by  observation  :  it  had  been  disclosed  to  him, 
he  said,  by  inspiration !  Thus  even  among  the 
Arabians  do  we  find  a  conscious  employment  of 
the  method  of  intuition,  now  vigorously  defended 
by  Bergson.  So  low  had  fallen  original  thought, 
that  for  centuries  Isidore  of  Seville's  Encyclo- 
pedia was  accepted  as  a  text-book,  in  which 
were  contained  such  absurdities  as  the  deriva- 
tion of  homo  from  '  quia  ex  humo  factus  est.' 

During  these  long  centuries  of  darkness, 
materialism  seems  to  have  disappeared  alto- 
gether. It  has,  indeed,  been  alleged  by  their 
enemies  that  the  murderous  sect  of  the  Assassins 
espoused  a  materialistic  philosophy.  There  is 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

little  evidence  in  favour  of  the  statement ;  but, 
as  Lange  remarks,  if  it  were  true,  *  the  Assassins 
would  be  the  solitary  example  of  a  combination 
of  materialistic  philosophy  with  cruelty,  lust  of 
power,  and  systematic  crime.'  It  would  indeed 
be  surprising  if  mediaeval  materialists  had 
altogether  escaped  the  abominations  so  system- 
atically practised  by  the  Church.  A  more 
authentic  case  is  that  of  Nicolaus  de  Autricuria, 
who  in  1348  was  compelled  to  recant  material- 
istic doctrines  at  Paris.  Evidently  he  was  a 
man  of  the  highest  ability,  who  would  have 
shone  like  a  first-magnitude  star  in  a  more 
happy  environment :  for  even  in  those  dark 
ages,  he  taught  that  the  road  to  knowledge  was 
not  through  Aristotle  or  Averroes,  but  through 
personal  examination  of  things  themselves. 

It  was  not  till  the  renaissance  that  materialism 
once  more  came  to  the  fore.  Distrust  of 
authority,  together  with  positive  materialism, 
were  the  two  most  conspicuous  characteristics 
of  the  Revival  of  Learning.  In  science,  they 
were  exemplified  by  Galileo  and  Kepler ;  in 
philosophy,  by  Francis  Bacon  and  Descartes. 
Great  were  the  obstacles  with  which  they  had  to 

132 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

contend.  When  Galileo  discovered  the  satellites 
of  Jupiter,  Cremonini  would  never  again  look 
through  a  telescope;  for  Aristotle  would  have 
been  falsified,  had  he  seen  them.  While  Galileo 
was  teaching  geometry  for  a  pittance,  Cremonini 
was  expounding  Aristotle  for  a  huge  salary. 
But  it  was  in  England,  the  classic  land  of 
materialism,  that  the  first  sign  of  light  appeared. 
Roger  Bacon  launched  the  first  thunderbolt 
against  the  blind  adherence  to  authority. 
William  of  Occam  gave  the  deathblow  to 
Scholasticism.  Bacon  remained  an  obscure 
Franciscan  friar,  deprived  of  money,  persecuted 
and  imprisoned  for  disobedience  to  his  superiors, 
forbidden  to  publish  the  works,  for  which  he 
had  prepared  by  many  years  of  excessive  study 
and  the  attainment  of  marvellous  erudition. 
Meanwhile  Albertus  Magnus  the  '  Ape  of  Aris- 
totle' was  f£ted  by  the  dignitaries  of  Church 
and  State  ;  showing  his  hatred  of  materialism  by 
his  protest  against  the  introduction  of  mathe- 
matics into  physics. 

Copernicus,  indeed,  had  been  allowed  to 
develop  his  new  astronomy  without  molestation  ; 
partly  no  doubt  because  he  died  at  the  publica- 

133 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

tion  of  his  book  ;  partly  because  his  theory  of 
the  Universe  was  so  revolutionary,  and  so 
scientifically  stated,  that  its  contradiction  of 
Aristotle  and  the  Church  was  not  immediately 
realised.  Not  so  Giordano  Bruno,  who  made  it 
his  business  to  spread  the  doctrines  of  Copernicus. 
Long  imprisonment  and  a  martyr's  death  were 
the  rewards  of  this  powerful  friend  of  human 
enlightenment.  Bruno,  to  whom  the  Revival  of 
Learning  owes  perhaps  more  than  to  any  one 
else,  was  specially  influenced  by  Lucretius  and 
Epikurus.  His  materialism,  his  hatred  of 
authority,  are  everywhere  apparent ;  and  he 
died  while  firmly  establishing  astronomy  on  the 
materialistic  principles,  which  have  ever  since 
been  recognised. 

Just  as  we  find  spiritualism  growing  luxuriously 
with  Plotinus  at  the  decadence  of  ancient  philo- 
sophy, so  we  find  it  still  paramount  at  the  break- 
up of  the  Middle  Ages.  In  antiquity,  even 
Galen  had  assumed  'animal  spirits,'  an  idea 
which  was  seized  upon  as  thoroughly  harmoni- 
ous with  Scholasticism ;  and  Paracelsus  had  de- 
veloped it  into  an  extravagant  philosophy  which 
saw  spirits  and  demons  at  work  in  every  event 

134 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

that  happened.  All  these  spirits  were  swept 
away  before  Harvey's  great  discovery  of  the 
circulation  of  the  blood.  The  introduction  of 
materialist  principles  into  physiology  was  one 
of  the  most  serious  blows  that  spiritualism 
suffered. 

In  philosophy,  the  materialist  awakening  was 
no  less  conspicuous  than  in  science.  With 
Bacon  and  Descartes,  philosophy  advanced  for 
the  first  time  to  a  point  higher  than  had  ever 
been  achieved  in  antiquity.  By  philosophy,  I 
here  mean  of  course  the  destruction  of  supersti- 
tions which  has  to  precede  and  accompany  the 
increase  of  positive  knowledge.  Bacon  placed 
the  inductive  method  upon  a  rational  basis ; 
Descartes  performed  the  same  task  for  the 
deductive  method.  That  Bacon  gave  anything 
more  than  a  very  imperfect  view  of  induction 
cannot  of  course  be  gainsaid  ;  nor  can  it  be 
denied  that  his  scientific  judgment  was  singularly 
unfortunate,  and  his  own  deliverance  from 
spiritualist  absurdities  very  incomplete.  Never- 
theless he  concentrated  attention  on  the  necessity 
of  observation  and  experiment  as  the  means  of 
acquiring  knowledge.  To  us,  in  these  days,  that 

135 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

means  appears  so  obvious  that  it  is  easy  to 
underestimate  the  difficulty  of  the  discovery ; 
an  occasional  Bergson  is  required  to  remind  us 
of  the  omnipotence  of  '  intuition '  in  the  pre- 
Baconian  era.  Bacon's  list  of  fallacies  might  still 
be  studied  with  advantage  by  metaphysicians  ; 
especially  the  Idola  Fori,  or  those  fallacies  which 
arise  from  allowing  words  to  govern  thoughts, 
instead  of  thoughts  governing  words. 

Descartes'  system  was  less  materialistic  than 
Bacon's  ;  indeed,  it  is  looked  upon  as  the  spiritual 
father  of  the  succeeding  idealistic  systems. 
Nevertheless  he  carried  the  mechanical  theory 
of  the  Universe  to  more  bold  applications  than 
had  ever  before  been  attempted.  The  foundation 
of  his  system  is  a  true  metaphysicality  ;  Cogito, 
ergo  sum.  It  neems  difficult  to  understand,  how 
Descartes  can  have  imagined  that  his  existence 
was  in  any  way  rendered  more  certain,  by  being 
deduced  from  the  fact  of  his  thinking.  The 
deduction  of  one  obvious  fact,  from  another 
equally  obvious,  appears  to  be  a  mere  waste  of 
words,  though  posterity  have  regarded  it  as 
a  saying  of  deep  profundity.  Thus,  though 
Descartes  only  partially  derived  his  system  from 

136 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

study  of  the  Universe,  he  appeared  to  have  had 
a  natural  bent  towards  mechanical  explanations 
of  phenomena  which  led  him  to  many  results, 
incorrect  indeed,  but  adumbrating  in  a  remark- 
able way  the  future  discoveries  of  science.  Such, 
for  instance,  was  the  theory  of  vortices,  by  which 
he  endeavoured  to  explain  the  workings  of  the 
world  purely  from  matter  and  motion.  The 
theory  failed ;  but  the  attempt  at  a  mechanical 
explanation  gave  the  path,  along  which  subse- 
quent discoveries  have  travelled.  Had  there 
been  a  Bergson  in  those  days,  his  opportunity 
would  have  been  unrivalled.  He  would  have 
splendidly  demolished  the  theory  of  vortices, 
then  pointed  triumphantly  to  the  failure  of 
mechanical  explanations,  and  to  the  resulting 
metaphysical  system  which  he  would  have  reared 
out  of  nothing  to  satisfy  all  inquirers. 

Yet  the  metaphysics  of  those  days  are  dead  : 
the  possibility  of  mechanical  explanations  is  more 
alive  than  at  any  previous  period  in  the  history 
of  philosophy.  Three  centuries  after  the  death 
of  Descartes,  a  philosopher  arose  in  England, 
whose  system  and  mode  of  thought  closely 
resembled  those  of  the  illustrious  Frenchman. 

137 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

Herbert  Spencer,  like  Descartes,  had  strong 
mathematical  and  deductive  tendencies :  like 
Descartes,  he  was  animated  strongly  with  the 
principles  of  mechanism,  and  established  a  philo- 
sophy based  solely  upon  matter  and  motion. 
But  like  Descartes  once  more,  his  method  was 
deductive,  or  synthetic  as  he  called  it :  it  arose 
from  happy  subjective  intuitions  rather  than 
from  a  deep  knowledge  of  objective  facts.  And 
for  that  reason,  Spencer's  philosophy  was 
destined  to  fail,  just  in  the  same  way  as 
Descartes' ;  but  the  failure  of  neither  one  nor 
the  other  is  in  the  least  prejudicial  to  mechanical 
explanations  at  large. 

It  was  in  the  region  of  physiology  that  Des- 
cartes pushed  mechanism  to  its  most  extreme 
development ;  and  it  is  just  in  this  very  region 
that  modern  science,  in  the  person  of  Huxley, 
has  pronounced  him  to  be  a  physiologist  of  the 
highest  calibre.  He  affirmed  that  animals  were 
mere  machines,  or  automata,  actuated  solely  by 
physical  and  chemical  forces,  and  devoid  of  any 
subjective  correlate.  It  can  never  be  formally 
proved  that  he  was  wrong.  That  animals 
possess  a  consciousness  is  a  thing  which  we  can 

138 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

never  become  directly  aware  of.  We  only  know 
that  we  are  conscious,  and  the  so-called  law  of 
continuity  forcibly  suggests  that  animals  are  too. 
But  that  law  of  continuity  is  not  a  certainty  : 
it  can  carry  us,  at  the  best,  only  to  a  very  high 
degree  of  probability.  It  is  not,  however,  in 
the  denial  of  consciousness  to  animals  that 
Descartes  demands  our  admiration  :  it  is  in  the 
conception  of  them  as  highly  complex  machines 
or  automata — a  conception  which  in  all  proba- 
bility is  absolutely  correct ;  though,  far  from 
being  limited  to  the  lower  animals,  it  must  be 
extended  to  include  also  the  human  species. 
Thus,  while  mechanistic  materialism  was  on  all 
sides  driving  out  spiritualism  from  the  arena  of 
explanations,  with  Descartes  the  tendency  was 
carried  so  far  as  to  stop  only  one  point  short  of 
the  final  stronghold  of  spiritualistic  metaphysics. 
From  Bacon  and  Descartes  sprang  the  two 
divergent  lines  of  philosophy,  which,  roughly 
speaking,  culminate  respectively  in  science  and 
metaphysics.  On  the  scientific  side,  Gas- 
sendi  and  Hobbes  were  the  earliest  products. 
Gassendi  revived  the  materialistic  system  of 
Epikurus :  he  attacked  the  Cartesian  meta- 

139 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

physics,  and  contributed  powerfully  to  the  ad- 
vance of  the  empirical  methods  of  science. 
While  admitting  the  existence  of  '  spirit,'  he 
assigned  to  it  no  role  whatever  in  his  system, 
but  regarded  the  soul  as  composed  of  material 
atoms. 

Hobbes  strongly  impressed  on  English  philo- 
sophy that  materialistic  leaning  which  it  has 
never  since  altogether  lost.  He  advocated  the 
doctrines  of  Copernicus  ;  and  referred  to  earlier 
astronomy  as  having  been  strangled  by  philo- 
sophers with  the  snares  of  words.  Unlike  the 
metaphysicians,  Hobbes  writes  with  perfect 
lucidity  and  freedom  from  obscurity.  He  knew, 
too,  why  obscurity  is  a  vice  of  all  metaphysics. 
1  Words,'  he  said,  '  are  wise 'men's  counters  ;  they 
do  but  reckon  by  them  ;  but  they  are  the  money 
of  fools/  He  affirmed  that  man,  alone  among 
living  creatures,  was  capable  of  absurdity ;  and 
that  those  most  subject  to  it  were  philosophers. 
On  prejudices  he  was  equally  severe  : — '  When 
men  have  once  acquiesced  in  untrue  opinions, 
and  registered  them  as  authenticated  records  in 
their  minds,  it  is  no  less  impossible  to  speak 
intelligibly  to  such  men  than  to  write  legibly  on 

140 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

a  paper  already  scribbled  over.'  Few  men  have 
done  so  much  as  Hobbes  in  the  performance  of 
the  chief  function  of  philosophy,  the  clearance 
of  the  superstitions  and  mental  rubbish  that  litter 
the  path  of  progress.  He  illustrates,  further,  the 
immense  contrast  between  the  materialism  of  the 
Renaissance  and  the  spiritualism  of  the  Middle 
Ages. 

Locke  carried  out  on  the  psychical  side  the 
doctrine  which  Bacon  had  put  forward  on  the 
physical  side.  Locke  is  chiefly  known  to  fame 
as  protagonist  of  the  view  that  experience  is 
the  sole  origin  of  knowledge :  he  attacked  the 
theory  of  innate  ideas.  Bacon  had  affirmed  that 
the  means  to  knowledge  were  observation  and 
experiment.  The  truth  which  Bacon  introduced 
into  logic  was  the  same  as  that  which  Locke 
introduced  into  psychology.  Though  Locke's 
work  was  of  great  value,  it  is  necessarily  very 
imperfect  when  viewed  from  a  modern  stand- 
point. Like  all  the  psychologists  of  early  times, 
he  appeared  to  look  upon  an  idea  or  conception 
as  a  thing  in  the  brain.  The  question  whether 
it  was  there  originally,  or  acquired  during  life, 
was  therefore  intelligible.  But  when  we  come 

141 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

to  look  upon  ideas  as  processes  rather  than  things, 
the  question  itself  loses  much  of  its  meaning. 
The  nature  of  a  mental  '  idea  '  is  given,  in  one 
sense,  wholly  by  the  cerebral  conformation.  In 
that  sense,  therefore,  innate  ideas  are  true.  They 
would  now  be  called  instinct.  The  physiologi- 
cal way  of  looking  at  things  brings  to  view  the 
irrelevance  of  the  ancient  questions,  as  much  as 
the  erroneousness  of  their  answers.  But  how- 
ever imperfect  Locke's  theory  may  have  been, 
it  has  in  practice  been  wholly  beneficial.  The 
old  notion  was  that,  if  it  was  required  to  obtain 
knowledge  of  some  objective  fact,  a  suitable 
method  was  to  burrow  into  one's  mind  with  the 
hope  of  finding  there  the  desiderated  informa- 
tion. Locke  denied  the  validity  of  that  method  : 
he  affirmed  that,  if  the  burrowing  led  to  any 
information  whatever,  there  was  no  ground  for 
supposing  that  the  information  was  true.  Only 
that  information  could  be  relied  upon  which  was 
derived  from  objective  experience.  Here  Locke's 
influence  was  admirable  and  unalloyed  :  he  might 
with  great  advantage  have  given  lessons  to 
Bergson.  He  had  an  incurable  suspicion  of  all 
'great  volumes  swollen  with  ambiguous  words.' 

142 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

How  can  we  help  thinking  of  Bergson  when  we 
read  Locke's  attack  on  Scholasticism.  '  Vague 
and  insignificant  forms  of  speech  and  abuse  of 
language  have  for  so  long  passed  for  mysteries 
of  science  ;  and  hard  and  misapplied  words,  with 
little  or  no  meaning,  have,  by  prescription,  such 
a  right  to  be  mistaken  for  deep  learning  and 
height  of  speculation,  that  it  will  not  be  easy  to 
persuade  either  those  who  speak  or  those  who 
hear  them  that  they  are  but  the  covers  of  ignor- 
ance and  hindrance  of  true  knowledge.  To 
break  in  upon  this  sanctuary  of  vanity  and  ignor- 
ance will  be,  I  suppose,  some  service  to  the 
human  understanding.'  No  more  need  be  said 
to  show  Locke's  position  as  one  of  the  great 
rubbish-clearers,  nor  that  a  chief  ingredient  in 
the  rubbish  removed  was  words. 

The  age  of  Charles  n.,  although  the  most  im- 
moral, was  perhaps  the  most  progressive  in 
English  history.  The  monarch,  who  is  respon- 
sible for  the  first  appearance  of  females  on  the 
stage  (then  a  centre  of  immorality),  was  the  same 
monarch  who  founded  the  Royal  Society  and 
made  science  a  popular  pursuit  among  the  higher 
classes.  The  dissipation  of  ignorance  was  bear- 

H3 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

ing  fruit  in  a  rapid  extension  of  experimental 
inquiry.  Newton,  Boyle,  and  Huyghens  all 
expressly  adopted  a  mechanical  view  of  the 
Universe.  Huyghens  declared  that  all  natural 
effects  must  be  explained  '  per  rationes  mechani- 
cas.'  Boyle  and  Newton  derived  much  from 
Epikurus  and  Gassendi.  Boyle  even  affirmed 
that  the  human  body  was  a  '  curious  and  elaborate 
machine ' :  a  considerable  advance  upon  Des- 
cartes. He  attacked  the  truly  Bergsonian  theory 
of  that  day,  to  the  effect  that  the  deleterious 
results  of  swallowing  pounded  glass  were  due  to 
a  'facultas  deleteria.'  Later,  John  Toland  ener- 
getically upheld  the  mechanical  view  of  life  :  he 
took  the  example  of  a  dog  pursuing  a  hare,  '  the 
bulk  of  the  external  object  acting  by  its  whole 
force  of  impulse  or  attaction  on  the  nerves,  which 
are  so  disposed  with  the  muscles,  joints,  and 
other  parts  as  to  produce  various  motions  in  the 
animal  machine.' 

But  the  highest  flight  of  mechanistic  materi- 
alism was  reached  by  the  French  philosophers  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  The  galaxy  of  brilliant 
writers  who  flourished  in  the  latter  half  of  that 
century  appear  to  have  received  their  stimulus 

144 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

largely  from    the    Dictionnaire     Historique    et 
Critique  of  Pierre  Bayle. 

The  most  interesting  individuals  of  the  period, 
from  our  standpoint,  were  De  Lamettrie  and 
D'Holbach.  By  the  former,  the  mechanical 
theory  was  pushed  to  its  extreme  conclusion. 
With  the  latter,  crude  materialism  reached  its 
ultimate  development.  Lamettrie  was  a  material- 
ist who  stoutly  defended  the  scientific  methods  of 
experiment  and  observation.  He  proved  by  in- 
numerable instances  the  close  connection  between 
mind  and  body :  and  the  bold  title  of  his  chief 
work  LHomme  Machine  indicates  sufficiently 
the  trend  of  his  speculation.  In  those  days,  the 
connection  between  mental  and  bodily  manifesta- 
tions was  a  comparatively  new  doctrine.  It  was 
opposed  by  the  metaphysicians  with  the  same 
animosity  that  they  now  oppose  the  notion  of 
the  connection  being  complete  and  absolute. 
The  spiritualism  which  in  those  days  could 
venture  to  deny  all  connection,  can  in  these  days 
do  no  more  than  look  hopefully  to  those  obscurer 
parts  of  the  mind,  where  the  proof  of  connection 
is  the  most  difficult  to  set  forth.  Lamettrie  also 
seems  to  have  been  the  first  to  perceive  that 

K  145 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

we  can  never  be  absolutely  certain  of  the  exist- 
ence of  any  other  consciousness  but  our  own. 
He  attacked  the  theory,  then  prevalent,  that 
religious  ideas  were  a  universal  instinct,  by  the 
instance  of  the  deaf-mute  of  Chartres,  who,  when 
he  suddenly  recovered  his  speech  and  hearing, 
was  found  to  be  destitute  of  any  religious  senti- 
ment. Finally  he  ventured  to  publish  a  defence 
of  atheism,  not  as  emanating  from  himself,  but 
as  the  type  of  argument  which  an  '  abominable ' 
man  had  employed  to  him ! 

D'Holbach's  Systeme  de  la  Nature  has  ac- 
quired the  reputation  of  being  the  '  Bible '  of 
materialism.  D'Holbach  himself  is  famous  as 
the  centre  of  the  little  group  of  atheists  who 
were  then  intent  upon  the  propaganda  of  ration- 
alism. Diderot  and  D'Alembert  were  urging 
their  views  through  the  Encyclopedia  ;  Voltaire 
introduced  Newton's  philosophy  into  France. 
As  a  philosopher  he  was  less  extreme  than  many 
of  his  contemporaries,  and  decidedly  opposed  to 
atheism  ;  yet  the  immense  extent  of  his  influence 
dealt  a  blow  to  French  orthodoxy  from  which  it 
never  afterwards  recovered.  He  was  a  deter- 
minist,  and  inclined  to  materialism,  though  little 

146 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

disposed  to  any  dogmatic  '  isms.'  Doubtless  his 
philosophic  leanings  were  strongly  emphasised 
by  residence  in  our  own  country  of  progressive 
opinions.  With  the  help  of  Locke,  he  saw 
through  the  free-will  paradox ;  both  he  and 
Robinet  pointed  out  that  the  problem  was  not 
whether  we  can  do  what  we  want  to  do,  but 
whether  we  can  will  what  we  want  to  will. 

Since  the  French  illumination  the  defence  of 
materialism  has  passed  from  the  sphere  of  philo- 
sophy to  that  of  science.  In  Germany  indeed, 
in  the  middle  of  last  century,  there  was  an  out- 
break of  philosophic  materialism  with  Feuer- 
bach,  Vogt,  Moleschott,  and  Biichner.  But 
these,  or  the  latter  of  them,  founded  their  doc- 
trines professedly  on  natural  science.  They 
were  guilty  of  not  a  few  crudities,  such  as  that 
the  brain  secretes  thought  as  the  liver  secretes 
bile  and  the  kidneys  urine.  If  these  statements 
had  been  made  by  the  earlier  materialists,  we 
should  have  passed  them  over  as  natural  out- 
comes of  the  vagueness  of  philosophic  analogies. 
But  they  cannot  be  so  easily  pardoned  when  they 
profess  to  aim  at  scientific  accuracy.  Biichner, 
whose  Kraft  und  Stoff,  despite  its  imperfections, 

»47 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

is  a  brilliantly-written  polemic,  resembles  nearly 
all  the  materialists  in  his  hatred  of  obscurity. 
He  affirmed  that  philosophy  should  be  intelli- 
gible to  every  educated  man,  that  any  philo- 
sophy not  so  intelligible  was  not  worth  the  ink 
it  was  printed  with ;  that  clear  conceptions  fall 
into  lucid  language. 

The  founder  of  scientific  materialism  was 
Cabanis,  the  distinguished  physiologist.  By  him 
the  dependence  of  mental  function  upon  nervous 
organisation  was  established  as  the  basis  of 
psychology.  Since  his  time  the  most  famous 
protagonists  have  been  Huxley  and  Du  Bois- 
Reymond.  The  great  discoveries  of  last 
century  told  heavily  in  favour  of  materialism. 
In  physics,  the  correlation  of  Physical  Forces 
gave  a  great  impetus  to  the  idea  of  universal 
mechanism.  In  biology,  natural  selection  was 
established  as  a  materialist  and  physical  explana- 
tion in  a  region  which  hitherto  had  been  aban- 
doned to  all  the  dogmas  of  metaphysics.  Science 
is  completely,  and  without  exception,  material- 
istic. The  progress  of  science  therefore  neces- 
sarily means  the  progress  of  materialism.  The 
larger  the  sphere  of  natural  facts  that  can  be 

148 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

reclaimed  for  science,  the  smaller  the  sphere 
which  remains  for  spiritualism.  Auguste  Comte 
in  France,  and  Herbert  Spencer  in  England, 
have  both  founded  philosophies  on  a  materialistic 
basis.  In  recent  years,  it  is  true,  there  has  been 
some  talk  of  a  reaction  :  it  is  alleged  that  science 
justifies  a  belief  in  '  spirit,'  nay,  even  that  science 
compels  such  a  belief.  We  should  not  take  this 
claim  too  seriously.  Materialism,  as  Lange  has 
so  well  proved,  has  never  had  a  steady  progress  : 
periods  of  advance  have  invariably  alternated 
with  periods  of  delay.  Last  century  the  great 
discoveries  suggested  materialism  so  forcibly  as 
to  produce  a  great  wave,  certain  to  be  succeeded 
by  a  trough.  This  century,  the  discoveries  have 
not  been  such  as  to  force  materialism  so  promi- 
nently forward  :  on  the  contrary,  the  possible 
resolution  of  matter  into  force  is  an  abstruse 
conception,  whose  obscurity  is  favourable  to  the 
demons  of  metaphysics.  Nevertheless  the  fact 
still  remains,  that  no  single  scientific  step  has 
been  made  that  assigns  any  active  role  to  'spirit.' 
That  spiritualism  should  be  defended  in  the  name 
of  science  means  nothing :  for  men  always  en- 
deavour to  strengthen  their  views  by  referring 

149 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

them  to  an  authoritative  source.  Even  the  great 
Diderot,  in  his  immaturity,  argued  that  material- 
ism and  atheism  were  condemned  by  modern 
science.  Yet  how  great  has  been  the  advance 
of  both,  in  company  with  the  later  developments 
of  science !  Some  very  ignorant  people  (especi- 
ally metaphysicians)  have  even  thought  that 
materialism  was  dead.  As  though  a  doctrine, 
originating  among  the  Greeks,  and  for  the  last 
three  hundred  years  gradually  advancing,  were 
likely  to  die  in  a  decade !  The  only  period  in 
which  materialism  vanished  was  in  the  barbarism 
of  the  Middle  Ages.  One  might  almost  say 
that  the  progressiveness  and  intellectual  civilisa- 
tion of  any  community  in  history  could  be  accur- 
ately gauged  by  the  extent  of  its  adherence  to 
materialistic  views. 

The  line  of  descent  that  we  have  followed 
from  the  period  of  Bacon  and  Descartes  termin- 
ates in  science  and  materialism.  We  now  have 
to  follow  the  other  line  which  terminates  in 
metaphysics  and  idealism.  I  have  already 
observed  that  we  must  begin  by  assuming  the 
reality  either  of  matter  or  mind.  The  scientific 
series  has  tended  strongly  to  assume  the  reality 

150 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  matter.  The  more  enlightened  among  them, 
indeed,  have  assumed  the  reality  of  mind  with 
equal  readiness  ;  but  they  have  not  invoked  it  for 
assistance  in  the  interpretation  of  natural  pheno- 
mena. Very  different  has  been  the  aim  of  the 
metaphysicians.  They  have  always  assumed  the 
reality  of  mind,  and  very  generally  the  non- 
reality  of  matter.  Their  explanations  are  ex- 
pressed in  terms  of  mind,  not  in  terms  of  matter. 
How  far  they  have  got  we  shall  now  be  able  to 
observe.  We  first  come  upon  Spinoza.  There 
is  nothing  particular  to  say  about  him,  save  that 
he  evolved  his  system  from  the  depths  of  his 
own  mind,  explaining  the  Universe  as  manifesta- 
tions of  an  infinite  impersonal  substance.  His 
system  has  just  as  strong  a  claim  on  our  belief 
as  that  of  Bergson  or  any  other  metaphysician. 
That  Spinoza  was  a  brilliant  genius,  demanding 
high  admiration  both  morally  and  intellectually, 
is  no  sort  of  guarantee  for  a  system  which  is  not 
based  on  objective  facts.  That  he  should  have 
held  many  views  greatly  in  advance  of  his  time, 
only  brings  into  greater  prominence  the  fact  that 
no  genius,  however  exalted,  can  dispense  with  a 
literal  adherence  to  the  order  of  external  facts. 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

Spinoza's  system  is  in  many  ways  superior  to 
Bergson's.  He  was  a  firm  believer  in  the  univer- 
sality of  causation  :  his  exposure  in  his  Ethics  of 
the  origin  of  the  fallacies  of  teleology,  makes  that 
work  still  worthy  of  general  study.  That  he  un- 
fortunately did  not  confine  himself  to  the  evi- 
dence of  ascertained  facts,  is  the  more  pardonable 
that  in  those  days  the  range  of  positive  know- 
ledge was  still  closely  cramped. 

Leibnitz  was  a  later  development  of  the  meta- 
physical school.  With  him  the  errors  of  sub- 
jectivism were  beginning  to  move  towards  that 
ultimate  contempt  of  facts  which  has  brought 
metaphysics  into  such  deserved  disrepute.  He 
hopelessly  confused  truth  with  morals.  He 
affirmed  that  whatever  existed  was  for  the  best : 
that  everything  was  due  to  a  final  cause :  that 
perfection  and  harmony  were  universal.  He 
alleged  a  '  pre-established  harmony  '  between  the 
inner  and  the  outer  worlds.  He  was  the  great 
rival  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  and  was  looked  upon 
by  the  spiritual-minded  as  their  last  resource  and 
protection  from  the  abominable  materialism  of 
Newtonian  physics.  Leibnitz  furnishes  an  in- 
stance of  the  unreliability  of  the  purely  mathe- 

152 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

matical  type  of  mind  when  thrown  among  real 
facts :  the  deductive  method,  suitable  to  mathe- 
matics, where  the  data  are  few  and  simple,  is 
altogether  misleading  when  applied  in  cases 
where  the  data  are  too  numerous  or  complex  to 
be  accurately  defined.  Leibnitz  was  a  great 
mathematician  :  for  although  his  discovery  of 
the  Differential  Calculus  was  probably  pirated 
from  Newton,  yet  he  invented  the  notation 
which  has  survived  to  the  present  day.  At 
inventing  harmonious  systems,  he  was  much 
more  happily  occupied  than  in  moving  among 
facts,  multitudinous  and  inharmonious. 

The  next  great  thinker  on  metaphysical  lines 
was  Berkeley,  the  founder  of  idealism.  He 
pointed  out  that  it  is  only  through  consciousness 
that  we  become  cognisant  of  the  Universe.  Our 
consciousness  is  immaterial,  psychical,  subjective 
and  therefore  must  be  totally  different  from 
outward  facts,  material,  physical,  and  objective. 
We  know  of  nothing  except  our  consciousness  : 
the  whole  Universe  is  expressed  in  terms  of  our 
consciousness :  we  have  no  experience  of  any- 
thing else.  Therefore,  said  Berkeley,  only 
consciousness  exists,  and  the  rest  is  but  a  mode 

153 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

of  its  working.     He  assigned  a  spiritual  cause 
of  the  Universe,  in  place  of  a  material  existence. 

Now  the  popular  attempts  to  refute  Berkeley 
are  one  and  all  founded  upon  a  misunderstanding 
of  his  doctrine.  Dr.  Johnson  thought  that  he 
disproved  Berkeley  by  kicking  a  stone.  But 
Berkeley  never  denied  that  there  exists  some- 
thing called  a  stone  which  gives  rise  to  all  the 
sensations  that  we  understand  by  that  name. 
All  he  denied  was,  that  there  was  anything  else 
in  addition  to  these  sensations.  And  in  so  far 
as  he  keeps  to  this  attitude,  he  is  wholly  irrefut- 
able. We  have  in  fact  no  knowledge  of  a  stone 
beyond  the  sensations  which  it  gives  us  :  and  by 
keeping  wholly  within  our  experience  we  are  not 
entitled  to  say  that  anything  exists  beyond  these 
sensations.  Anything  further  is  an  inference, 
which  cannot  be  rigidly  proved.  Berkeley 
therefore  furnished  an  adequate  refutation  of 
positive  materialism.  Berkeley  himself,  how- 
ever, in  the  assumption  of  a  spiritual  first  cause, 
went  beyond  experience ;  and  idealism  is  best 
considered  in  connection  with  the  more  perfect 
formulation  of  Hume. 

Hume  pointed  out  that  Berkeley's  refutation 
154 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  reality  of  matter  was  equally  applicable  to 
the  reality  of  mind.  We  have  no  more  ex- 
perience of  a  spiritual  substratum  of  the  Universe 
than  of  a  material  substratum.  All  we  can 
immediately  speak  to  from  experience  is  a 
succession  of  impressions  and  ideas.  The 
sensations  produced  on  us  by  external  facts  are 
'  impressions.'  The  recollections  of  these,  and 
the  thoughts  of  the  mind,  are  '  ideas,'  somewhat 
fainter  than  impressions.  Our  Universe  consists 
wholly  of  impressions  and  ideas.  Spirit,  matter, 
everything  else  are  but  inferences,  of  which 
there  can  be  no  certainty.  Hence  Hume  landed 
in  complete  scepticism,  the  only  possible  con- 
clusion for  metaphysics. 

Once  that  conclusion  has  been  reached,  there 
is  nothing  further  to  be  said  or  done.  The 
conclusion  itself  is  a  blind  alley  :  it  is  heuristically 
barren,  and  leads  no  further.  So  clearly  did 
Hume  recognise  this  fact  that  he  thereupon 
abandoned  philosophy,  and,  like  Voltaire,  took 
to  writing  history  as  a  more  useful  and  practical 
occupation.  Scepticism,  while  it  undermines  the 
theory  that  materialism  and  realism  are  absolutely 
true,  nevertheless  leaves  them  both  established 

155 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

more  securely  than  ever  as  working  hypotheses. 
Matter  may  be  ultimately,  as  Mill  said,  nothing 
but  a  permanent  possibility  of  sensation  :  it  may 
be  only  '  impression  ' :  physicists  in  recent  years 
similarly  suggest  that  it  may  be  only  '  force ' ; 
but  whatever  it  may  be  ultimately  resolved  into, 
for  us  it  remains  matter  undergoing  changes 
that  are  generalised  in  the  laws  of  physics  and 
chemistry.  That  we  cannot  reach  an  ultimate 
explanation  is  little  astonishing :  for  on  every 
side  we  are  surrounded,  not  merely  with  in- 
explicables,  but  inconceivables.  Consider,  for 
instance,  the  boundaries  of  space.  We  cannot 
conceive  infinite  space :  suppose  we  were  to 
travel  beyond  the  most  remote  of  the  visible 
stars,  can  it  be  that  we  are  no  nearer  a  boundary 
than  when  we  started?  We  travel  a  myriad 
miles  into  space,  and  then  another  myriad,  and 
so  on  to  myriads  of  such  myriads,  and  myriads 
of  these  again  without  being  able  to  conceive  a 
limit  to  space  any  more  easily.  And  the  same 
with  time.  We  cannot  conceive  that  the  matter 
composing  our  earth  has  existed  for  ever  without 
commencement,  and  will  continue  for  ever  without 
termination  :  that  the  atoms  of  our  bodies  will 

156 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

hereafter  come  to  be  separated  by  infinite 
stretches  of  space,  yet  will  survive  eternally  into 
the  future  as  they  have  descended  eternally  out 
of  the  past.  Yet  we  are  equally  little  able  to 
conceive  any  alternative.  Since  therefore  we 
find  ourselves  suspended  in  isolation,  surrounded 
on  all  sides  by  infinite  inconceivabilities,  why 
are  we  to  be  surprised  that  the  ultimate  nature 
of  matter  is  also  incomprehensible?  The 
scepticism  of  idealism  is  merely  another  such 
incomprehensibility ;  it  leads  no  further  than 
does  the  scepticism  forced  upon  us  by  space  and 
time.  As  far  as  we  are  concerned,  matter  is 
matter,  force  is  force  :  the  materialism  of  science 
is  a  sound  hypothesis,  and  no  other  hypothesis 
has  yet  been  shown  to  be  sound.  The  spiritual- 
ists think  that  things  are  cleared  up  by  dragging 
in  'spirit'  ;  Bergson  clears  things  up  with  'time.' 
When  some  of  them  have  been  able  to  discover  a 
verifiable  fact  with  their  organon  we  may  begin 
to  believe  them  :  but  at  present  no  weapon  of 
discovery  has  ever  proved  its  value,  save  those 
that  are  based  upon  the  objective  reality  of 
matter  and  force,  without  any  question  of  '  spirit,' 
'real  time,'  or  any  of  the  other  metaphysical 

157 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

ghosts  and  hobgoblins.  Indeed,  the  invocation 
of  these  aids  appears  to  show  nothing  more  than 
a  lamentable  inappreciation  of  the  magnitude  of 
the  problems  they  are  supposed  to  solve. 

With  Hume,  metaphysics  dwindled  to  a  mathe- 
matical point  and  vanished  into  scepticism. 
After  Hume  there  need  never  have  been  any 
further  discussion  of  metaphysics,  nor  any  further 
attention  paid  to  it.  Fichte,  Schelling,  and 
Hegel  made  great  reputations.  We  can  only 
regard  them  as  having  piled  new  obstacles  in  the 
path  of  true  knowledge.  Their  systems  are 
fully  as  rarified  and  unintelligible  as  that  of 
Bergson.  Fichte,  like  Bergson,  appears  to  have 
believed  in  a  vital  impetus.  I  gather,  at  least, 
that  his  Anstoss  must  be  the  same  kind  of  thing 
as  an  tlan  vitale.  From  what  has  been  said  in 
the  previous  chapter,  it  will  be  manifest  that  this 
explanation  of  life  is  purely  verbal,  making  the 
difficulty  no  clearer  than  before. 

As  for  Hegel,  his  object  appeared  to  be  to 
carry  metaphysics  to  its  own  destruction.  Any 
one  who  founds  his  system  on  the  proposition 
that  everything  is  the  contrary  of  that  which  it 
is,  may  arrive  at  any  conclusion  he  likes.  In- 

158 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

deed,  I  should  accept  most  of  Hegel's  conclusions 
more  readily  than  his  premisses.  He  was  a 
violent  opponent  of  Newtonian  science  :  Newton 
himself  he  called  a  barbarian  in  thought ;  and  he 
despised  the  empirical  school  as  'trivial.'  His 
contempt  for  experience,  and  hatred  of  science, 
did  not  prevent  him  from  wandering  into  that 
despised  region.  He  argued  on  a  priori  grounds 
that  there  could  not  be  more  than  six  planets. 
It  is  true  that  there  are  now  known  to  be  at  least 
eight  major  planets,  and  over  six  hundred  minor 
planets :  but  that  of  course  is  a  mere  vulgar 
fact,  and  quite  indifferent  to  the  philosopher 
who  affirms  that  existence  is  the  same  as  non- 
existence. 

Between  Hegel  and  Bergson  sundry  analogies 
may  be  pointed  out.  Hegel  says  that '  Philosophy 
dwells  in  the  region  of  self-produced  ideas,  with- 
out reference  to  actuality.'  Bergson  similarly 
affirms  that  'we  must  break  with  scientific  habits 
which  are  adapted  to  the  fundamental  require- 
ments of  thought,  we  must  do  violence  to  the  mind, 
go  counter  to  the  natural  bent  of  the  intellect. 
But  that  is  just  the  function  of  philosophy.'1 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  31. 
159 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

Hegel  would  doubtless  have  subscribed  to 
Bergson's  dictum  that  philosophy  'is  not  con- 
strained to  scientific  precision ' : l  a  maxim  of 
which  both  philosophers  make  liberal  use  in 
their  works.  Hegel,  like  Bergson,  affirmed  that 
creation  is  ever  in  progress,  instead  of  having 
been  a  single  act  as  in  the  old  theology.  He 
does  not  appear  to  have  identified  creation  with 
time,  but  to  an  outside  observer  the  two  views 
are  very  similar.  A  final  analogy  is  in  the 
incomprehensibility  of  the  two  thinkers :  for 
Hegel  is  one  of  the  obscurest  of  philosophers. 
It  is  not  merely  chance  that  the  philosophers 
whom  men  are  most  ready  to  follow  are  those 
whom  they  find  the  greatest  difficulty  in  under- 
standing. Let  us  not  forget  the  profound  saying 
of  Boileau,  '  Ce  que  Ton  co^oit  bien  s'enonce 
clairement.' 

Even  Kant,  the  greatest  of  all  metaphysicians, 
cannot  be  excluded  from  our  condemnation  of 
metaphysics.  If  the  metaphysical  method  were 
capable  of  ever  adding  a  single  particle  to  our 
real  knowledge,  it  would  assuredly  have  been 
compelled  to  do  so  by  the  powerful  intellect  of 

1  Creative  Evolution,  p.  89. 
1 60 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Kant.      Yet  Kant  failed  just  as  completely  as 
his  predecessors  and  successors  have  failed.     He 
assumed  a  world  of  noumena  of  which  we  can 
know  absolutely  nothing,  except  in  the  appear- 
ances which  they  present  to  us,  and  called  by  him 
phenomena.       The    relativity    of    all    possible 
knowledge  was  stoutly  defended  by  him.     Her- 
bert Spencer,  in  spite  of  his  boast  that  he  had 
never   read   Kant,  formulated   a   not    dissimilar 
theory.     Both    assumed    that    things    in    their 
reality   were    totally  different    from  what    they 
appeared  to  us  to  be.      Both  regarded  the  ob- 
jective  world  as   merely  appearances,   implying 
some  deep  underlying  substratum  which   Kant 
called  'Dinge  an  sick '  and  Spencer  called  '  The 
Unknowable.'      We    cannot    but    regard    both 
these  theories  as  rank  metaphysics.     What  title 
have  we  to  assume  that  there  is  a  reality  under- 
lying our  visible  and  tangible  Universe  ?     Only 
this,  that  '  we  cannot  help  thinking  so ' — a  pre- 
cious  expression,   which    has   been   utilised    to 
defend    every   metaphysical    doctrine    ever   in- 
vented.    Supposing  I  affirm,  in  contradiction  to 
metaphysics,   that   there  is   no  ultimate   reality 
underlying  the  Universe,  nor  any  explanation  of 
L  161 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

the  Universe,  even  to  infinite  intelligence :  how 
could  I  be  refuted  ?  how  even  could  my  theory 
be  shown  to  be  less  plausible  than  the  opposite 
theory?  If  I  maintain  that  the  Universe  has  no 
explanation  anywhere  existing,  and  no  possibility 
of  any  explanation,  I  merely  add  one  more  in- 
comprehensibility to  those  which,  as  already 
shown,  meet  us  in  every  direction  when  we  try 
to  pass  beyond  matter  and  energy.  And  this 
particular  incomprehensibility  is  no  worse  than 
those  of  Kant  and  Spencer.  For,  if  Dinge  an 
sick  and  the  Unknowable  can  explain  the 
Knowable,  what  shall  explain  the  Dinge  an 
sick  ?  The  moment  we  travel  beyond  our 
working  hypothesis  of  materialism,  we  are  irre- 
trievably lost  in  a  maze  of  inconceivabilities. 
The  attempt  to  explain,  even  in  the  vaguest  of 
fashions,  merely  displays  inadequate  apprecia- 
tion of  the  problem  presented. 

At  length  we  reach  the  end  of  this  cursory 
survey  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  and  are 
brought  back  to  the  conclusion  outlined  in 
chapter  one.  We  may  take  our  choice  between 
scepticism  and  materialism.  But  scepticism  is 
purely  negative :  having  reached  it  we  get  no 

162 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

farther.  Hence  we  are  forced  back  upon  a  sort 
of  materialism  which  we  must  recognise,  not  as 
true,  but  as  a  sound  working  hypothesis  :  true, 
that  is,  in  the  same  sense  that  Dalton's  atomic 
theory  is  true.  The  whole  of  science  is  built 
upon  materialism,  as  the  whole  of  chemistry  is 
built  on  the  atomic  theory,  and  the  foundation  is 
secure :  upon  scepticism  nothing  can  be  built. 
Let  me  reply  to  a  few  likely  criticisms. 

1  What ! '  say  the  thoughtless,  '  do  you  attri- 
bute the  whole  Universe  to  mere  chance,  to  the 
blind  and  meaningless  working  of  unchangeable 
mechanical  laws?'  And  why  not?  If  you  see 
anything  more  incredible  in  that  than  in  any 
other  of  the  ultimate  realities  which  face  us,  you 
have  grotesquely  missed  the  utterly  inconceiv- 
able mysteriousness  of  the  Universe.  If  we 
start  with  space  filled  by  evolving  nebula,  it  was 
as  likely  to  develop  into  this  particular  universe 
as  any  other.  The  odds  at  the  time  were 
infinity  to  one  against  any  named  development. 
I  will  answer  the  difficulty  by  proposing  another 
problem  of  the  same  character.  Here  it  is : — 
Given  the  infinity  of  space,  Required  to  prove 
that  Bergson  does  not  exist.  If  Bergson  exists, 

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SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

he  must  exist  somewhere :  is  it  suggested  that 
he  exists  in  Paris?  That  is  impossible,  for 
Paris  is  a  finite  area  in  infinite  space  :  therefore 
the  odds  against  Bergson  existing  in  Paris  are 
infinity  to  one.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  a  mathe- 
matical certainty  that  Bergson  does  not  exist  in 
Paris.  Equally  it  might  be  shown  that  he  does 
not  exist  in  any  other  locality.  Therefore  he 
does  not  exist  anywhere.  This  conclusion, 
which  can  be  deduced  with  apparent  inevitable- 
ness  from  the  infinity  of  space,  is  further  fortified 
by  deduction  from  infinity  of  time.  Bergson 
cannot  exist :  because  the  present  is  a  finite 
period  in  the  midst  of  infinity :  hence  it  is 
infinity  to  one  against  his  present  existence : 
therefore  he  does  not  exist. 

Now  I  state  these  paradoxes  for  the  purpose 
of  pointing  out  that  the  fallacy,  upon  which  they 
are  based,  is  precisely  the  same  fallacy  fallen  into 
by  those  who  exclaim  against  the  chance  evolu- 
tion of  the  Universe.  They  say  they  cannot 
conceive  chance  working  this  effect :  in  other 
words,  it  is  infinity  to  one  against  this  effect 
having  been  produced  by  chance.  But  we  live 
in  a  Universe  where  infinity  to  one  chances  are 

164 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

momentarily  taking  place.  Like  most  of  the 
objections  to  mechanical  materialism,  the  error 
lies  in  failing  to  perceive  the  hopeless  multitude 
of  inconceivabilities  by  which  we  are  unceasingly 
assailed.  People  will  only  appreciate  wonders 
with  which  they  are  unfamiliar.  Those  that  are 
familiar  have  ceased  to  strike  attention.  And 
hence  by  referring  unfamiliar  events  to  familiar 
causes,  a  difficulty  is  felt  by  those  who  have  lost 
their  marvellings  over  things  they  often  see.  In 
suggesting  that  events  hitherto  unexplained  are 
of  the  nature  of  mechanical  events,  they  think 
there  is  some  derogation  of  dignity,  some 
diminution  of  the  marvellousness  of  the  un 
familiar. 

Philosophy  fails,  then,  in  its  search  for  final 
truth.  Realism  and  materialism  being  the  as- 
sumptions which  underlie  every  step  of  intel- 
lectual progress,  we  must  be  content  with  them, 
not  as  finally  true,  but  as  satisfying  and  neces- 
sary working  hypotheses,  beyond  which  we 
can  go  no  further.  I  repudiate  all  attempts 
to  explain  the  Universe.  I  repeat,  as  in  chap- 
ter one,  that  the  feeling  we  have  of  a  neces- 
sity for  such  an  explanation  arises  from  the 

165 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

conformation  of  our  brains :  which  think  by 
associating  disjoined  ideas.  When  the  whole  of 
our  ideas  and  experiences  constitute  one  term, 
there  is  no  other  term  available  for  association. 
In  other  words,  there  is  no  further  knowledge 
possible.  Hence  we  must  reconcile  ourselves, 
as  best  we  can,  to  the  ultimate  fact,  that  while 
condemned  ever  to  feel  the  need  for  a  last 
explanation,  no  last  explanation  is  possible  or 
perhaps  even  exists.  The  '  disharmonies '  of 
Metchnikoff  here  find  their  extremest  instance. 
The  problem  of  metaphysics  is  a  shadowy 
spectre  which  must  for  ever  continue  to  haunt 
the  mind  of  man.  If  he  stretches  out  his  hand 
to  seize  it,  he  meets  nothing  substantial,  and 
only  falls  painfully  to  the  ground  :  for  the  spectre 
is  a  malign  but  inexpugnable  figment  of  his  own 
imagination. 


1 66 


CHAPTER   V 

THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

Est-ce  Ik  ce  rayon  de  1'essence  supreme, 

Que  1'on  nous  peint  si  lumineux  ? 
Est-ce  Ik  cet  esprit  survivant  a  nous-meme  ? 
II  nait  avec  nos  sens,  croit,  s'afFaiblit  comme  eux. 

Helas  !  il  perira  de  meme. 

VOLTAIRE. 

IN  the  previous  chapter,  I  have  traced  the 
gradual  progress  of  the  mechanistic  theory  of  the 
Universe  in  the  sphere  of  philosophy.  I  had  at 
first  intended  to  write  a  similar  chapter  tracing 
the  theory  through  the  history  of  science,  but 
the  task  appears  to  be  unnecessary.  For  while 
in  philosophy,  there  have  been  elements  and 
tendencies  of  all  kinds,  in  science  there  has  only 
been  one  tendency — that  towards  materialism. 
The  history  of  scientific  discoveries  is  a  history 
of  materialistic  successes  :  for  no  scientific  dis- 
covery has  ever  been  made  that  is  not  based 
upon  materialism  and  mechanism.  There  can 
be  no  mistaking  the  trend  of  science,  and  there 

167 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

appears  to  be  no  object  in  reciting  here  the  facts 
which  can  be  read  in  any  history.  The  same 
remarks  apply  to  the  progress  of  medicine. 

Now,  if  mechanism  is  universal  in  the  inor- 
ganic world,  is  it  not  equally  universal  in  the 
organic?  The  answer  of  Huxley  and  of  many 
men  of  science  is  in  the  affirmative.  I  propose 
to  describe  the  theory  of  life  which  ensues  from 
the  hypothesis  that  matter  and  energy  are  the 
sole  realities.  I  propose  to  describe  it  only,  not 
to  prove  it :  that  belongs  to  the  work  of  physio- 
logists. The  only  argument  which  I  wish  to 
employ  here  in  its  favour  is  that  supplied  by  the 
law  of  continuity  from  history.  Originally  every- 
thing was  explained  by  spiritual  agency:  gradu- 
ally mechanical  explanations  drove  out  the 
spiritual.  Nearly  always  the  mechanical  explana- 
tions met  with  great  opposition  ;  but  invariably 
they  triumphed.  At  present  their  supremacy  is 
admitted  almost  everywhere,  but  there  is  one 
small  corner  of  the  field  where  spiritual  '  explan- 
ations '  still  linger.  The  law  of  continuity  from 
past  history  suggests  that  that  corner  will  before 
long  be  reclaimed  like  the  rest.  But  it  does  not 
prove  it,  any  more  than  the  same  law  proves 

1 68 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

that  lower  animals  have  consciousness.  In  both 
cases,  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  probability. 
I  attempt  no  proof  of  the  automaton  theory :  I 
confine  myself  to  a  description. 

The  universe  is  conceived  as  consisting  of  a 
fixed  quantity  of  matter,  susceptible  neither  of 
creation  nor  destruction,  and  capable  only  of  chang- 
ing from  one  form  into  another.  When  a  candle 
is  burnt,  a  destruction  of  matter  appears  to  take 
place.  But  it  is  experimentally  proved  that  the 
sum-total  of  the  weights  of  the  carbon  dioxide 
and  other  gases  given  off  in  the  process  of  com- 
bustion is  exactly  equal  to  the  weight  of  that 
portion  of  candle  which  has  disappeared,  together 
with  the  oxygen  consumed.  And  these  gases 
may,  by  other  natural  or  artificial  processes, 
give  rise  again  to  a  solid  body  of  the  same 
weight  as  themselves.  Solid  may  change  to 
liquid,  and  liquid  to  gas;  but  the  total  quantity 
of  matter  in  our  universe  remains  unaltered. 

Parallel  and  complementary  to  the  theory  of 
the  '  Indestructibility  of  Matter '  is  the  theory 
of  the  'Conservation  of  Energy/  It  is  by  means 
of  energy  that  our  senses  are  affected  by  matter. 
Matter  may  be  in  a  state  of  rest  or  motion,  it 

169 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

may  emit  heat  or  light  or  sound,  it  may  be  in 
any  electrical  or  magnetic  condition.  And  it  has 
been  proved  that,  just  as  the  total  quantity  of 
matter  remains  unaltered  through  all  transforma- 
tions, so  the  total  quantity  of  energy  likewise 
remains  unaltered.  If  a  hot  body  becomes  cold 
its  heat-energy  appears  to  have  been  lost.  But 
it  has  been  experimentally  proved  that  the  sur- 
rounding bodies,  such  as  the  air  or  other  fluids 
or  solids,  have  gained  by  conduction,  convexion, 
or  radiation,  a  quantity  of  heat  exactly  equivalent 
to  that  which  has  been  lost  by  the  cooling  body. 
In  the  same  way,  a  body  in  motion  in  space 
continues  in  motion  (Newton's  first  law)  for  ever 
in  the  same  direction  and  at  the  same  velocity 
unless  diverted  by  some  other  body.  If  it  should 
collide  with  another  body,  thereby  impressing 
upon  it  some  of  its  own  motion,  the  energy  of 
motion  gained  by  the  second  body  is  exactly 
equal  to  the  energy  of  motion  lost  by  the  first, 
assuming  none  to  be  spent  as  heat,  or  in  other 
modes  of  energy. 

Energy,  though  unalterable  in  quantity,  is 
easily  changed  from  one  form  into  another.  If 
a  piece  of  lead  is  dropped  on  the  floor  its  motion 

170 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

is  immediately  destroyed.  But  at  the  precise 
instant  in  which  the  motion  is  annihilated,  there 
appears  energy,  in  other  forms,  which  is  shown 
to  be  exactly  equivalent  to  the  energy  of  motion 
lost.  A  certain  amount  of  heat  is  generated, 
sound  is  given  forth,  there  may  be  an  emission 
of  light,  etc.  etc.  It  is  known  exactly  how 
much  motion  is  equivalent  to  how  much  light,  to 
how  much  heat,  etc.  etc.  In  short,  energy,  like 
matter,  changes  with  the  greatest  facility  from 
one  of  its  forms  into  another,  but  the  sum-total 
of  all  the  energy  in  our  universe  remains  un- 
altered :  there  is  neither  any  creation  nor 
destruction. 

Viewed,  therefore,  in  its  widest  aspect,  the 
universe  consists  of  a  fixed  quantity  of  matter 
together  with  a  fixed  quantity  of  energy,  each 
of  which  is  undergoing  more  or  less  continuous 
transformation  from  one  of  its  forms  into  another. 
Events  are  simply,  as  Herbert  Spencer  put  it,  a 
'redistribution  of  matter  and  motion.'  The  laws 
which  govern  these  transformations  are  the  laws 
of  physics.  They  are  secondary  to  the  two 
primary  laws ;  but  resemble  them  in  being 
absolute :  no  exception  to  them  has  ever  been 

171 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

discovered ;  and  prophecies  of  future  events 
founded  upon  them  are  invariably  justified  with 
complete  precision.  If  the  distribution  of  matter 
and  energy  at  any  given  period  is  precisely  de- 
fined, it  is  theoretically  possible  to  deduce  its 
distribution  at  any  named  future  period,  or  to 
infer  back  to  its  distribution  at  any  period  now 
past.  Theoretically  possible  only,  because  mathe- 
matics— our  instrument  of  calculation — is  suffi- 
ciently advanced  to  enable  us  to  solve  such 
problems  only  when  the  conditions  to  be  con- 
sidered are  extremely  simple ;  and,  as  a  rule,  in 
Nature,  they  are  far  from  simple.  Nevertheless, 
it  is  no  longer  a  question  of  doubt  that  if  certain 
quantities  of  matter,  in  certain  forms,  in  certain 
relative  positions,  moving  in  certain  directions, 
are  endowed  with  certain  amounts  and  forms 
of  energy,  the  matter  and  the  energy  will  undergo 
transformations  and  redistributions  in  a  perfectly 
definite  and  theoretically  prophesiable  manner. 

I  have  mentioned  hitherto  only  a  few  of  the 
forms  of  kinetic  energy.  But  potential  energy 
assumes  forms  that  are  equally  interchangeable 
with  the  forms  of  kinetic  energy.  If  a  ball  is 
thrown  into  the  air,  its  upward  velocity  gradually 

172 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

diminishes,  until  it  momentarily  comes  to  a 
standstill,  before  commencing  its  descent.  The 
gradual  loss  of  motion  in  its  upward  flight 
appears  to  indicate  a  destruction  of  energy. 
The  gradual  increase  of  motion  in  falling  appears 
to  indicate  a  creation  of  energy.  But  the  fact  is 
interpreted  by  assuming  a  potential  energy  '  of 
position  ';  so  that  for  each  unit  of  kinetic  energy 
lost  in  the  ascent,  there  is  a  unit  of  potential 
energy  gained  by  the  more  elevated  position  of 
the  ball :  in  such  wise  that  its  capacity  for  doing 
mechanical  work  remains  unaltered.  Similarly 
in  the  descent,  the  potential  energy  given  by  an 
elevated  position  is  lost  exactly  pari  passu  with 
the  gain  of  kinetic  energy  or  motion. 

A  form  of  potential  energy  which  will  interest 
us  far  more  is  that  known  as  chemical  affinity. 
It  is  found  that  energy  impressed  upon  a  body 
may  be  locked  away  in  its  molecules  and  not  be 
re-transformed  for  indefinite  ages. 

It  is  possible  that  this  energy  may  exist  in  the 
form  of  a  rapid  vibration  or  some  other  con- 
dition of  the  atoms  within  the  molecule  :  with 
that  we  are  not  here  concerned  :  it  is  sufficient 
for  us  that  the  molecules  of  a  body  contain 

173 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

vast  stores  of  potential  energy,  and  that  the 
break-up  of  these  molecules  may  be  attended 
with  a  large  visible  liberation  of  energy,  in 
the  form  of  heat,  motion,  or  otherwise.  Take, 
for  instance,  the  molecules  of  gunpowder. 
They  contain  within  them  vast  quantities  of 
potential  energy  that  has  been  bestowed  upon 
them  in  course  of  manufacture.  The  spark 
breaks  up  the  molecules  of  gunpowder,  and  the 
contained  energy  is  transformed  partly  into  heat, 
but  mainly  into  motion,  causing  the  material 
particles  to  assume  the  gaseous  form  and  fly 
apart  with  great  velocity. 

Again,  the  value  of  coal  is  due  to  the  presence 
of  energy  in  its  molecules.  By  burning  coal,  or 
oxidising  it,  we  break  up  its  molecules,  and  their 
energy  takes  the  kinetic  form  of  light  and  heat. 

Now,  the  progress  of  mankind  in  modern 
times  has  depended  very  largely  on  what  we 
call  machines.  Since  all  that  men  can  do  to 
their  surroundings  is  to  change  matter  and 
energy  from  less  serviceable  to  more  serviceable 
forms,  it  is  clear  that  it  is  of  very  great  human 
advantage  to  arrange  matter  into  the  form  of 
a  machine  which  performs  with  regularity  some 

174 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

transformation  whose  necessity  is  constantly  re- 
curring. Accordingly  we  may  define  a  machine 
as  an  instrument  which  has  two  ends  :  into  one 
end  energy  of  a  certain  kind  is  placed  :  out 
from  the  other  end  comes  forth  that  same  energy 
transformed  into  the  shape  in  which  we  require 
it.  In  the  process  some  of  the  matter  and  energy 
are  lost  by  friction,  etc.;  the  higher  the  efficiency 
of  the  machine,  the  less  is  the  waste  attending 
the  transformation.  Thus  into  one  end  of  a 
steam-engine  we  place  coal,  that  is,  a  large  store 
of  chemical  energy  :  out  from  the  other  end  we 
get  motion  ;  a  shaft  is  turned,  or  a  locomotive 
started.  And  the  coal  from  which  this  energy 
has  been  extracted  is  transformed  into  worthless 
ash.  Take  again  the  machinery  for  supplying  a 
town  with  electric  light.  The  energy  employed 
is  the  chemical  energy  in  coal  :  by  burning,  it  is 
changed  to  heat :  the  heat  is  changed  to  motion  of 
a  wheel :  the  motion  is  transformed  into  electrical 
energy  :  in  that  form  it  travels  along  wires  to  the 
houses,  where  it  is  once  more  transformed  into 
light.  Just  as  the  object  of  a  water-pipe  is  to 
ensure  that  water  entering  at  one  end  shall  move 
to  a  given  spot  at  the  other  end,  instead  of 

175 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

spreading  hither  and  thither,  so  the  object  of  a 
machine  is  to  ensure  that  energy  entering  at  one 
end  shall  come  out  in  another  desired  form  at  the 
other  end,  instead  of  being  dissipated  all  over 
the  place  in  haphazard  forms.  The  machine  is 
an  instrument  for  securing  that  a  transformation 
of  energy  from  one  specific  form  to  another 
specific  form  shall  take  place  with  regularity. 

Mankind  makes  machines  :  does  Nature  also 
make  machines?  Is  the  redistribution  of  matter 
and  energy  in  Nature  entirely  unsystematic,  or 
are  there  centres,  here  and  there,  where  energy 
is  continually  being  transformed  in  some  specific 
direction  ? 

'  And  if  what  says  thy  Physics  well  them  scan, 
Ere  many  pages  have  been  turned  'twill  show 
That  art  of  yours,  as  far  as  e'er  it  can, 
Doth  follow  God's,  as  scholars  do  the  sage  ; 

.  So  as  God's  grandchild  seems  the  art  of  man.' 1 

So  far  from  machines  having  been  discovered 
by  man,  Nature  is  full  of  them.  But  since  human- 
made  machines  are  one  and  all  subordinated  to 
human  purposes,  while  Nature-made  machines 
have  no  such  function,  we  are  at  first  little  dis- 
posed to  recognise  them  as  machines.  We  think 

1  Dante,  Inferno, 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

of  a  machine,  with  regard  to  the  purpose  it 
fulfils,  not  with  regard  to  the  abstract  nature 
of  its  working.  Nevertheless  we  shall  find 
evidence  that  human-made  machines  are  but  the 
imitation  of  Nature's  machines,  a  poor  imitation, 
it  is  true — dull,  stupid,  unadaptable  instru- 
ments, far  inferior  to  Nature's  model,  yet  humbly 
utilising  the  same  root-principle  that  Nature 
has  adopted.  I  refer,  of  course,  to  living  organ- 
isms, both  of  the  animal  and  the  plant  king- 
doms. 

Let  us  consider  the  physiology  of  the  garden 
cabbage.  It  is  essentially  a  machine  for  con- 
verting light  into  chemical  energy  :  for  chang- 
ing simple  inorganic  substances  into  the  complex 
organic  substance  of  the  plant.  The  raw  materials, 
nitrogen,  hydrogen,  oxygen,  phosphorus,  sulphur, 
iron,  magnesium,  calcium,  potassium  and  others 
are  held  in  dilute  solution  in  the  soil  which  sur- 
rounds and  bathes  the  roots  of  the  cabbage.  By 
the  purely  physical  processes  of  osmotic  pressure 
and  capillary  attraction,  they  are  sucked  in 
through  the  root-hairs,  and  carried  upwards 
through  the  xylem  of  the  vascular  bundles  until 
they  reach  the  leaves.  Here  they  are  brought 
M  177 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

in  contact  with  carbon  dioxide  absorbed  by  the 
leaves  directly  from  the  air.  In  the  absence  of 
light,  nothing  further  happens.  A  cabbage  is  not 
a  perpetual  motion  machine,  and  cannot  elaborate 
complex  molecules  containing  stores  of  energy, 
until  that  energy  has  first  been  brought  in  from 
outside.  The  carbon  dioxide,  together  with  the 
mineral  salts  absorbed  through  the  roots,  con- 
stitute, in  the  presence  of  chlorophyll,  the  raw 
material  fitted  to  imbibe  and  hold  fast  the 
energy  of  light.  The  effect  of  sunlight  is  to 
cause  a  synthesis  of  these  inorganic  substances 
to  form  the  highly  complex  substance  called  pro- 
toplasm, oxygen  being  given  off  in  the  process. 
The  molecule  of  protoplasm  is  a  very  large, 
complex,  unstable  unit,  containing  a  great  quantity 
of  latent  energy,  obtained  by  transformation  of 
the  sunlight.  We  see,  therefore,  that  the  funda- 
mental life  activity  of  a  cabbage  is  exactly  that 
of  an  artificial  machine.  Matter  is  transformed 
from  one  shape  into  another  :  energy  undergoes 
a  corresponding  process.  Coal  is  the  petrified 
remains  of  wood,  which,  ages  ago,  bore  leaves 
and  entrapped  sunlight.  That  sunlight  lies 
stored  up  as  potential  energy  in  the  molecules 

178 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

of  coal ;  and  when  by  burning  it,  or  adding 
oxygen  to  it,  we  cause  a  break-up  of  the  mole- 
cules, the  long-stored  energy  is  surrendered  once 
more  in  the  form  of  heat  and  light. 

Now  from  the  plant-world,  let  us  transfer  our 
gaze  to  the  animal  world.  Let  us  plunge  at 
once  right  into  the  centre  of  the  controversy,  and 
consider  the  animal  whose  habits  and  natural 
history  are  best  known  to  us — Man.  I  speak  for 
the  moment  without  prejudice  as  to  soul,  mind, 
or  any  psychical  activity.  These  phenomena, 
which  we  know  only  in  ourselves,  are  altogether 
sui  generis :  I  shall  consider  their  character 
directly :  they  do  not  enter  into  the  working  of 
the  machine  as  such. 

Man  may  be  defined  as  a  machine  for  convert- 
ing chemical  energy  into  motion.  Doubtless 
other  forms  of  energy,  such  as  heat,  escape 
from  him,  as  well  as  motion.  Though  large 
in  quantity,  they  are,  however,  quite  sub- 
sidiary in  considering  his  reaction  on  the  uni- 
verse. A  petrol  engine  similarly  is  a  machine 
for  converting  chemical  energy  into  motion :  yet 
here,  the  efficiency  is  rarely  as  high  as  thirty 
per  cent.,  while  in  a  steam  engine  it  is  very 

179 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

much  lower.  But  with  all  his  infinite  complexity 
and  variety  of  possible  movements,  the  physio- 
logist finds  in  man  the  same  basic  principle  as  in 
a  motor  machine.  I  have  already  described  how 
the  cabbage  contains  within  its  substance  large 
stores  of  imprisoned  energy.  Man  eats  the 
cabbage ;  and  thus  with  his  food  accumulates  a 
store  of  energy,  which — as  in  the  case  of  the 
coal — is  liable  to  be  liberated,  as  soon  as  the 
complex  molecules  which  contain  it  are  broken 
up.  And  the  break-up  is  achieved  in  precisely 
the  same  way  as  in  the  case  of  coal,  namely  by 
oxidation.  The  burning  coal  draws  oxygen 
from  the  air  which,  coming  into  contact  with  the 
carbon  atoms  of  the  coal  molecule,  promptly  com- 
bines with  them  to  form  carbon  dioxide  :  the 
withdrawal  of  the  carbon  element  causing  a 
collapse  of  the  organic  molecule.  Man  likewise 
draws  oxygen  from  the  air  by  the  function  of  re- 
spiration :  the  oxygen  passes  through  the  slender 
membranes  of  the  lungs  into  the  blood-vessels, 
by  which  it  is  carried  to  every  part  of  the  body, 
causing  everywhere  oxidation  or  combustion, 
with  evolution  of  energy.  Withdraw  the  presence 
of  air  from  a  coal-fire,  and  it  immediately  goes 

r  80 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

out.     Withdraw  the  presence  of  air  from  Man 
and  he  promptly  dies. 

The  chemical  energy  thus  released  is  partly 
converted  into  motion.  The  entire  sum  of  man's 
operations  upon  Nature  is  comprised  in  moving 
the  relative  positions  of  things.  Nature  does  all 
the  work  :  man  can  do  no  more  than  arrange 
objects  in  such  positions  that  natural  laws  will 
change  them  automatically  in  the  direction  he 
desires.  '  He  moves  a  seed  into  the  ground;  and 
the  natural  forces  of  vegetation  produce  in  suc- 
cession a  root,  a  stem,  leaves,  flowers,  and  fruit. 
He  moves  an  axe  through  a  tree,  and  it  falls  by 
the  natural  force  of  gravitation  ;  he  moves  a  saw 
through  it  in  a  particular  manner,  and  the  physical 
properties  by  which  a  softer  substance  gives  way 
before  a  harder,  make  it  separate  into  planks, 
which  he  arranges  in  certain  positions,  with  nails 
driven  through  them,  or  adhesive  matter  between 
them,  and  produces  a  table,  or  a  house.  He 
moves  a  spark  to  fuel,  and  it  ignites,  and  by  the 
force  generated  in  combustion  it  cooks  the  food, 
melts  or  softens  the  iron,  converts  into  beer  or 
sugar  the  malt  or  cane-juice,  which  he  has 
previously  moved  to  the  spot.  He  has  no  other 

181 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

means  of  acting  on  matter  than  by  moving  it.'1 
The  manner  in  which  motion  is  achieved  is  also 
invariable :  it  is  purely  due  to  the  change  of 
shape  of  the  tissue  called  muscle,  by  which  in 
contraction  it  becomes  shorter  and  thicker,  or  in 
expansion  longer  and  thinner.  If  we  raise  our 
forearm,  it  is  because  the  biceps  muscle  connect- 
ing the  scapula  with  the  radius  bone  contracts 
and  thickens.  The  scapula  being  fixed,  the 
radius,  and  with  it  the  whole  forearm,  is 
necessarily  drawn  upwards  by  the  contraction. 
Man  contains  within  his  body  a  definite  number 
of  muscles.  His  sole  power  of  affecting  his 
environment  consists  in  his  capacity  to  contract 
these  muscles  in  definite  succession  or  simultane- 
ously. He  is  like  a  toy  or  puppet,  in  which  the 
arms,  legs,  and  movable  parts,  are  drawn  upwards 
and  downwards  by  wires.  Only  it  is  a  mechanical 
toy,  in  which  the  wires  work  of  their  own  accord 
for  a  short  time  after  they  have  been  wound  up, 
or  heated,  or  supplied  with  chemical  energy,  such 
as  food. 

I  have  hitherto  travelled  along  non-contentious 
ground.     The  facts  above  described  are  admitted 

1  Mill's  Political  Economy. 
182 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

by  every  one  who  has  taken  the  trouble  to  study 
the  matter. 

A  short  while  back,  I  referred  to  the  psychical 
manifestations  of  Man,  and  then  omitted  them 
from  the  discussion.  That  omission  must  now 
be  rectified.  We  have  now  to  take  note  of  the 
fact  that,  in  addition  to  the  two  fundamental 
elements  of  matter  and  energy,  whose  various 
manifestations  constitute  the  whole  of  our 
material  Universe,  there  is  a  third  element 
differing  from  the  other  two  at  least  as  much 
as  they  differ  from  one  another.  This  third  is 
variously  named  Mind,  Soul,  Psychic  activity, 
Consciousness,  according  to  the  theory  which  we 
hold  about  it.  It  differs  from  matter  and  energy 
primarily  in  its  complete  incapacity  for  ever  being 
made  known  to  our  outward  senses.  We  have 
never  seen  it,  or  heard  it,  or  smelt  it :  we  are  aware 
of  it  within  ourselves  only,  and  can  never  become 
directly  aware  of  it  in  any  other  person  or  any 
external  organism.  It  is  by  this  circumstance  in 
fundamental  opposition  to  the  material  phenomena 
we  have  hitherto  considered.  The  difference  be- 
tween subject  and  object  is  the  widest  difference 
that  falls  within  the  experience  of  humanity. 

183 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

Numerous  and  remarkable  theories  have  at 
different  times  been  put  forward  as  to  the  site 
of  the  soul.  Modern  science  has  disposed  of 
the  question,  and  we  now  know — not  indeed  its 
site,  for  that  which  is  not  material  cannot  have 
a  site — but  the  conditions  under  which  it  becomes 
manifest.  It  is  held  that  every  psychical  mani- 
festation is  accompanied  by  some  physical  and 
material  manifestation  in  some  portion  of  the 
brain.  The  precise  nature  of  these  physical 
manifestations  is  not  yet  known  in  detail.  But 
the  essence  of  the  automaton  theory  is  that  all 
the  actions  of  men  are  explicable  as  purely 
material  and  mechanical  sequences,  without 
invoking  the  assistance  of  mind  or  consciousness, 
or  anything  but  matter  and  energy  working  under 
their  ordinary  laws.  Consciousness  appears  only 
as  an  inert  accompaniment  of  material  cerebral 
changes.  This  is  the  theory  to  which  Huxley 
gave  the  name  of  epiphenomenalism. 

It  is  attacked  mainly  on  the  grounds  of 
introspection.  If  I  desire  to  raise  my  arm,  I  can 
do  so.  The  desire  is  a  fact  of  consciousness  : 
and  the  movement  is  a  fact  of  matter.  It  seems 
therefore  that  consciousness  has  broken  into  the 

184 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

course  of  physical  and  chemical  sequences.  But 
it  is  not  really  so.  For  the  desire  exists  not  only 
as  consciousness,  but  as  a  particular  state  of  the 
brain  ;  and  the  precedent  to  the  motion  of  the 
arm  is  not  the  mental  desire,  but  the  cerebral 
substratum  underlying  the  state  of  consciousness 
called  desire.  Until  educated,  we  are  quite 
unaware  that  any  cerebral  condition  does  underlie 
consciousness.  We  therefore  inevitably  assume 
that  consciousness  does  what  in  reality  is  only 
done  by  its  physical  concomitant.  An  illustration 
will  elucidate  the  difficulty. 

Suppose  there  existed  a  Tantalus  who  was 
condemned  for  evermore  to  strike  with  a 
hammer  upon  an  anvil.  Suppose  that  Tantalus, 
his  hammer,  and  his  anvil  were  concealed  from 
the  observer's  view  by  a  screen  or  otherwise, 
and  that  a  light,  carefully  arranged,  threw  the 
shadow  of  the  hammer  and  anvil  upon  a  wall 
where  it  could  easily  be  seen.  Suppose  an 
observer,  whose  mind  was  tabula  rasa  were 
set  to  watch  the  shadow.  Every  time  the 
shadow  of  the  hammer  descended  upon  the 
shadow  of  the  anvil,  the  sound  of  the  percussion 
is  heard.  The  sound  is  only  heard  when  the 

185 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

two  shadows  meet.  The  hammer's  shadow 
occasionally  beats  fast,  occasionally  slow  :  the 
succession  of  sounds  exactly  corresponds.  Per- 
haps the  hammer  raps  out  a  tune  on  the  anvil ; 
every  note  heard  follows  upon  a  blow  visible 
in  the  shadows.  The  two  series  correspond 
invariably  and  absolutely  ;  what  is  the  inevitable 
effect  upon  the  observer's  mind  ?  He  knows 
nothing  of  the  true  cause  of  sound  behind  the 
screen  :  his  whole  experience  is  an  experience  of 
shadows  and  sounds.  He  cannot  escape  the  con- 
clusion that  the  cause  of  each  sound  is  the  blow 
which  the  shadow  of  the  hammer  strikes  upon 
the  shadow  of  the  anvil. 

The  observer  is  in  the  position  of  an  intro- 
spective philosopher.  Introspection  teaches  us 
nothing  about  nerve-currents  or  cerebral  activity  : 
it  speaks  in  terms  of  mind  and  sensation  alone. 
To  the  introspective  philosopher,  it  is  plain  that 
some  mental  or  psychical  process  is  the  condition 
of  action.  He  thinks,  he  feels,  he  wills,  and  then 
he  acts.  Therefore  the  thinking  and  feeling  and 
willing  are  the  cause  of  the  acting.  Introspec- 
tion can  get  no  farther.  But  now  the  physiolo- 
gist intervenes.  He  skilfully  dissects  away  the 

1 86 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

screen,  and  behold !  there  is  a  real  hammer  and 
a  real  anvil,  of  which  nothing  but  the  shadow 
was  formerly  believed  to  exist.  He  proves  that 
states  of  consciousness  are  shadows  accompany- 
ing cerebral  functioning  ;  he  shows  that  the  cause 
of  action  lies  in  the  cerebral  functioning  and  not 
in  the  shadows  which  accompany  it.  For  all 
men  up  to  a  certain  age,  and  for  the  vast 
majority  of  men  of  all  ages,  that  screen  is  never 
removed;  they  never  learn  that  physical  processes 
are  invariable  concomitants  of  mental  processes. 
They  are  only  aware  of  the  mental  processes  and 
of  the  outward  result.  Necessarily  they  are 
bound  to  attribute  the  one  to  the  other.  The 
case  is,  indeed,  far  stronger  than  is  indicated  by 
the  analogy.  For  the  analogy  deals  with  only 
one  kind  of  action  ;  whereas  psychical  processes 
are  of  innumerable  kinds  and  the  connection 
between  particular  feelings  and  particular  motions 
is  welded  by  years  of  experience.  Need  we 
wonder  that  men  hesitate  to  recognise  the  illusory 
nature  of  the  causal  sequence  ? 

In  his  interesting  work  Body  and  Mind  Dr. 
M'Dougall  attempts  to  demolish  epiphenomen- 
alism.  This  work,  though  I  am  entirely  unable 

187 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

to  agree  with  it,  gives  the  case  against  mechanism 
in  a  far  more  scientific  and  valuable  form  than 
does  Bergson.  And  it  is  interesting  to  note  how 
little  really  can  be  said  against  the  theory,  even  in 
competent  hands.  Dr.  M'Dougall  attacks  epi- 
phenomenalism  on  various  grounds.  Firstly,  the 
'biological  argument  from  continuity,'  'for  the 
appearance  of  consciousness  at  some  undefined 
point  in  the  course  of  the  evolution  of  the  animal 
kingdom,  as  postulated  by  it,  constitutes  a  distinct 
breach  of  continuity.'  I  really  cannot  see  what 
biological  continuity  has  got  to  do  with  it.  We 
have  to  deal  with  the  fact  of  consciousness  and 
the  fact  of  cerebral  activity.  If  we  go  far  enough 
back  in  evolution,  we  either  have  to  suppose 
that  consciousness  began  somewhere,  or  that  it 
is  a  property  of  all  matter,  inorganic  as  well  as 
organic.  I  cannot  personally  see  any  a  priori 
objection  to  either  hypothesis,  or  any  possibility 
of  ever  ascertaining  which  is  correct.  Nor  can 
I  see  how  either  of  them  would  affect  epi- 
phenomenalism  one  way  or  the  other. 

Still  more  irrelevant  is  the  'argument  from 
inconceivability.'  Epiphenomenalism  does  not, 
as  Dr.  M'Dougall  alleges,  say  that  'material 

188 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

processes  generate  consciousness  out  of  nothing'; 
nor  does  it  offend  against  the  '  law  of  causation.' 
It  affirms  absolutely  nothing  save  that  mental 
states  are  found  invariably  accompanied  by 
physical  states.  It  does  not  say  that  the 
physical  cause  the  mental  states  :  I  should  object 
to  such  an  expression  as  being  applicable  only  to 
material  phenomena.  It  says  only  that  they  are 
accompanied  by  mental  states,  without  expressing 
any  opinion  as  to  the  generation  of  those  states, 
or  the  nature  of  their  dependence,  or  their  cause, 
or  anything  else  whatever  about  them,  except 
the  one  fact  given  by  experience  that  they  are 
found  to  accompany  definite  cerebral  conditions 
with  exact  regularity.  Cause  applies  only  to 
matter  and  motion :  it  cannot  be  alleged  in 
stating  the  connection  between  mind  and  body. 
All  we  know  is  that  the  connection  is  invariable  : 
and  beyond  that  there  is  nothing  more  to  be 
said. 

Dr.  M'Dougall's  next  objection  is  that  epi- 
phenomenalism  is  '  in  direct  opposition  to  the 
overwhelmingly  large  majority  of  philosophers 
of  all  times  and  of  all  races.'  But  so  was  organic 
evolution  before  Darwin  :  so  was  our  solar 

189 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

astronomy  before  Copernicus.  Moreover,  the 
opposition  is  least  among  those  who  know  the 
facts  best.  Physiologists,  by  Dr.  M'Dougall's 
own  admission,  have  very  generally  adopted  it : 
and  persons  who  are  not  physiologists  are  not 
competent  to  judge.  The  opposition  to  epi- 
phenomenalism  is  exactly  proportional  to  ignor- 
ance of  the  facts :  and  a  poll  of  physiologists 
would  not  improbably  disclose  a  majority  in 
favour  of  the  theory.  Yet  that  is  all  that  Dr. 
M'Dougall  has  to  say  against  the  theory. 
Surely  there  is  nothing  here  to  deter  us 
from  it. 

It  is  often  argued  that,  although  the  great 
majority  of  human  activities  are  in  the  last  analysis 
purely  automatic  or  mechanical,  yet  where  judg- 
ment or  choice  is  exercised,  there  consciousness 
does  in  fact  break  into  the  physico-chemical 
sequences.  This,  I  gather,  is  Bergson's  view. 
It  abandons  nearly  the  whole  of  mental  workings 
to  mechanism,  but  makes  a  last  attempt  to  save 
spiritualism,  in  the  sphere  where  its  disproof  is 
most  difficult.  The  adherents  of  this  view  liken 
the  action  of  mind  to  that  of  a  spark  on  gun- 
powder. They  admit  that  the  energy  used  is 

190 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

mainly  material  ;  but  they  think  that  where  the 
automatic  reaction  is  nicely  balanced  between  two 
or  more  possible  outlets,  mind  may  step  in  and 
direct  it  into  one  or  the  other.  This  is  a  subtle 
attempt  to  defend  the  principle  of  mind  acting  on 
matter,  without  breach  of  the  law  of  conservation 
of  energy.  But  the  attempt  fails.  For  energy 
cannot  even  be  directed,  without  the  addition  of 
more  energy,  however  slight.  The  gunpowder 
is  in  a  highly  unstable  condition — in  such  a 
condition  that  a  very  minute  external  influence 
will  suffice  to  disintegrate  it.  But  that  influence 
is  a  sine  qua  non ;  and  it  must  be  of  a  strictly 
material  order.  Making  passes  at  it  will  never 
explode  it ;  some  material  energy,  however 
slight,  must  be  used.  So  also  with  mind  and 
body  :  the  one  cannot  act  upon  the  other  without 
some  employment  of  material  energy,  that  is  to 
say,  without  some  creation  of  new  energy  which 
would  completely  traverse  the  fundamental 
doctrines  of  physics.  The  attempt  to  save  the 
principle  of  conservation  of  energy  by  reducing 
the  conscious  interference  to  a  vanishing  point, 
is  like  the  excuse  made  by  the  young  woman  for 
having  a  baby — namely,  that  it  was  only  a  very 

191 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

little  one.  But  unfortunately  the  breach  of 
principle  is  just  the  same,  however  small  it  is. 

But  why  assume  a  sparking  action  by  the 
mind,  when  there  is  no  need  for  it  ?  Does  the 
theory  not  bear  on  the  face  of  it  the  appearance 
of  a  last  desperate  attempt  to  save  a  discredited 
principle  ?  What  solitary  particle  of  evidence  is 
there  in  its  favour?  If  the  whole  Universe  is 
explicable  by  physical  laws,  if  the  origin  of  the 
animal  and  plant  kingdoms  is  likewise  so  explic- 
able, if  the  evolution  of  life  along  its  innumerable 
branches  has  no  other  cause,  if  nearly  the  whole 
of  human  activities  are  admittedly  to  be  ascribed 
to  it,  we  must  surely  look  for  some  very  solid 
grounds  for  accepting  the  view  that  in  one  small 
portion  of  human  activities  only,  a  wholly  and 
radically  novel  process  takes  place.  That  this 
should  happen  would  be  a  miracle  of  the  most 
incredible  character :  but  that  it  should  be  held 
as  the  last  refuge  of  a  theory,  driven  back  by 
degrees  within  smaller  and  smaller  limits,  is  what 
we  should  naturally  expect. 

The  physico-chemical  theory  affirms,  then,  the 
universal  domination  of  physical  law.  It  denies 
the  existence  of  any  '  spirit '  breaking  into 

192 


THE  AUTOMATON  THEORY 

mechanical  laws.  To  those  who  affirm  such 
existence  it  has  but  one  question  to  ask  : — where 
is  your  evidence  ?  It  will  not  be  put  off  with 
child's  talk  about  introspection  and  direct 
intuition.  Facts  are  required,  and  facts  alone 
can  settle  the  question.  Every  human  achieve- 
ment in  science,  commerce,  and  the  arts  has  been 
reached  solely  by  means  of  physical  law.  By 
physical  law  alone  can  we  explain  the  move- 
ments of  the  planets,  prophesy  eclipses  and 
astronomical  events,  which  enable  sailors  to 
navigate  the  ocean  in  perfect  security.  By 
physical  law  alone  can  we  forecast  what  parts 
of  the  earth's  surface  are  likely  to  overlie  coal  or 
minerals.  By  physical  law  we  are  able  to  build 
houses,  make  machines,  and  do  all  the  other 
wonderful  feats  of  civilisation.  By  physical  law 
we  are  able  to  recognise  disease,  its  causes,  and 
its  cure.  By  physical  law  we  are  able  to  foresee 
the  results  of  different  motives  acting  upon 
masses  of  mankind.  In  none  of  these  cases  has 
there  been  any  intervention  of  spiritual  influences  : 
for  any  such  intervention  must  upset  our  calcula- 
tions, which  only  consider  physical  facts.  If 
then  everything  that  has  ever  been  accomplished 
N  193 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

by  humanity  is  based  upon  the  assumption  of 
invariable  physical  law  :  if  all  the  facts  of  which 
we  have  experience  converge  to  the  same  con- 
clusion :  surely  we  may  ask  the  spiritualists — 
what  can  you  prophesy,  what  have  you  ever 
done  for  humanity,  what  facts  can  you  show  us  ? 
And  if  they  can  give  us  no  facts,  can  do  nothing 
for  humanity,  can  make  no  prophecy  that  may 
be  verified,  we  shall  then  see  in  their  hypothesis 
nothing  but  the  same  rotting  and  putrescent 
metaphysical  corpse  which  received  its  deathblow 
at  the  hands  of  Bacon  and  Descartes  several 
centuries  ago. 


194 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

'  He  that  is  giddy  thinks  the  world  turns  round.' 

SHAKESPEARE. 

WHEN  criticising  Bergson's  philosophy,  I  at- 
tempted to  indicate  some  of  the  logical  fallacies 
on  which  it  appeared  to  be  based.  Such  fallacies 
were  those  of  the  false  analogy,  misuse  of  words, 
premature  generalisation,  paralogism  at  large. 
More  important,  however,  than  the  logical  causes 
of  fallacies  are  the  psychological  causes.  What 
is  the  origin  of  the  state  of  mind  which  leads 
men  to  false  beliefs  ?  The  rules  of  logic  are 
clear  and  well  known.  Yet  the  knowledge  of 
these  rules  has  never  gone  far  towards  saving 
men  from  breaking  them ;  the  origin  of  fallacies 
must  therefore  be  much  more  deeply  rooted  than 
is  implied  in  merely  overlooking  the  well-known 
precepts  of  logic. 

The  question  as  to  how  men  come  to  contract 
195 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

beliefs  that  are  opposed  to  facts,  is  but  a  special 
case  of  the  more  general  question  as  to  the  origin 
of  beliefs  at  large.  What  is  a  belief  ?  Let  us  get 
rid  of  the  psychical  fact  altogether,  and  fix  our 
attention  on  its  physiological  counterpart.  For  if 
the  foregoing  chapters  are  correct,  it  follows  that 
a  belief  may  be  looked  upon  as  correlated  with 
some  specific  structure  in  a  part  of  the  brain. 
The  question  then  arises,  as  to  whether  it  is 
acquired  or  congenital.  The  easiest  way  to  solve 
this  question  is  by  looking  to  see  whether  beliefs 
are  hereditary ;  for  we  know  that  congenital 
characters  are  likely  to  be  inherited,  while  acquired 
characters  are  not.  The  result  of  such  an  in- 
quiry appears  to  be  that,  whereas  the  specific 
details  of  belief  are  purely  acquired,  the  tendency 
to  believe  along  certain  general  lines  is  congenital. 
Thus  I  should  suggest  that,  in  religion  for 
instance,  the  particular  dogmas  and  details  of  a 
creed  are  acquired  by  education ;  while  con- 
genitally  there  is  a  tendency  to  believe  in  the 
supernatural,  which  is  inherited  merely  as  a 
vague  and  undefined  feeling,  readily  becoming 
specific  and  defined  under  the  influence  of  teach- 
ings harmonious  with  it.  We  seem  to  be  driven 

196 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

to  this  opinion  by  the  very  wide,  though  not  uni- 
versal existence  of  a  belief  in  the  supernatural. 
We  in  England,  adhering  to  Christianity,  which 
does  not  embrace  one-third  of  the  population  of 
the  world,  shall  have  no  difficulty  in  admitting 
that  the  bulk  of  that  religious  opinion  is  erroneous. 
We  shall  agree  that  if  a  man  is  taken  at  hazard 
from  somewhere  on  the  Earth's  surface,  there  are 
strong  probabilities  that  he  will  have  a  religion 
of  some  sort,  and  that  his  religion  will  be  for  the 
most  part  or  entirely  erroneous.  That  is  to  say, 
that  the  real  origin  of  religious  beliefs  is  an  innate 
and  congenital  tendency  to  believe  in  the  kind 
of  things  that  a  religion  teaches — the  tendency 
being  rendered  definitive  by  the  particular 
teaching  acquired  during  childhood. 

In  order  that  I  may  not  be  suspected  of  trying 
to  manufacture  a  case  against  opponents,  let  me 
hasten  to  add  that  there  is  just  as  strong  evidence 
in  favour  of  the  innateness  of  the  beliefs  which  I 
have  endeavoured  to  support,  as  for  the  opposite 
beliefs.  The  Aristotelian-minded  philosophers 
appear  to  derive  their  community  of  belief  from  a 
strong  resemblance  in  congenital  mental  features. 
An  inspection  of  the  more  extreme  among  them 

197 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

discloses  a  number  of  characteristics  held  in  com- 
mon. They  have  generally  been  atheists  :  they 
have  been  radicals  in  social  life,  tending  in  modern 
times  towards  socialism  or  republicanism  :  they 
have  been  rebels  against  authority,  despising  the 
conventions  of  social  life,  as  well  as  the  mandates 
of  superiors  in  their  hierarchy :  they  have  had  a 
strong  scientific  leaning  :  they  have  been  con- 
spicuously destitute  in  the  historical  sense  (as  is 
often  pointed  out  by  Lange) :  they  have  been 
indifferent  to  art :  their  style  of  writing  has 
always  been  singularly  lucid  (Epikurus,  Hobbes, 
Biichner,  Spencer)  :  they  have  been  contemptu- 
ous of  book-learning  (e.g.  Hobbes'  remark  : — 
'  If  I  had  read  as  much  as  other  people,  I 
should  probably  have  known  as  little';  so  also 
Demokritus  and  Spencer).  Of  course,  I  am  aware 
that  numerous  exceptions  may  be  called  up  to 
most  of  these  features.  I  may  be  reminded  that 
Gassendi  had  a  strong  historical  sense :  that 
Hobbes  is  the  great  upholder  of  monarchies  : 
that  Omar  Kayyam,  Leonardo  da  Vinci,  and 
Goethe  were  great  artists  :  that  Hartley  was  a 
churchman.  Nevertheless  there  is  a  very  pro- 
nounced general  resemblance  of  character,  which 

198 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

is  especially  conspicuous  when  compared  with  the 
opposite  school. 

We  seem,  therefore,  to  be  justified  in  as- 
suming that  beliefs  are  the  outcome  of  a  con- 
genital disposition.  The  individual  is  born  with 
a  certain  mode  or  tendency  to  belief:  and  if 
during  life  he  is  brought  into  contact  with  theories 
harmonious  with  that  tendency,  he  is  likely  to 
accept  them.  Here  then  we  at  once  see  the 
ultimate  origin  of  fallacies.  Whether  a  man 
believes  in  a  true  theory  or  a  false  one  appears 
to  be  a  matter  of  heredity  as  much  as  anything 
else.  He  derives  from  his  ancestors  his  mental 
tendencies  just  as  much  as  the  shape  of  his  nose. 
If  he  lives  in  an  enlightened  period,  those 
tendencies  will  of  course  crystallise  in  a  more 
reasonable  form  than  if  he  had  lived  in  a  period 
of  ignorance.  That  tendency  which  will  make 
a  man  famous  in  one  age,  will  leave  him  in 
obscurity  in  another.  If,  then,  beliefs  are  largely 
due  to  chance,  why  are  not  fallacies  more  wide- 
spread than  is  actually  found  ?  Natural  selection 
must  have  operated  powerfully :  those  whose 
congenital  tendencies  cause  them  to  espouse 
true  beliefs  will  survive  and  have  offspring,  while 

199 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

those  whose  congenital  tendencies  lead  them 
into  error  will  die  out.  Moreover,  we  shall 
expect,  on  this  theory,  to  find  that  fallacies  are 
most  rampant  where  natural  selection  is  least 
operative.  May  we  not  see  here  a  cause  for  the 
survival  in  metaphysics  of  the  method  of  '  intui- 
tion' long  since  abandoned  in  practical  life? 
For  a  metaphysical  system  can  have  little  sur- 
vival-value for  the  individual  that  holds  it. 

Now  I  wish  to  carry  the  hypothesis  astep  further. 
Sir  Ray  Lankester  has  shown  that  the  intellectual 
progress  of  mankind  has  been  accompanied  by 
a  loss  of  instinct,  and  a  gain  of  '  educability/ 
That  is  to  say  that  a  lower  animal,  for  instance, 
has  a  great  many  instincts,  and  can  do  a  great 
deal  when  it  is  born  without  education,  but 
that  it  has  very  little  power  of  learning  anything 
further  by  experience  or  education.  Man,  on  the 
contrary,  is  born  with  singularly  few  instincts  or 
capabilities  of  acting  :  but  instead  of  this,  he  has 
enormous  capacities  of  being  educated.  The 
brain  of  man  approaches  a  tabula  rasa  (as 
affirmed  by  Helvetius)  on  which  can  be  written 
a  very  great  deal  that  was  not  originally  implicit 
there.  The  brain  of  a  lower  animal  has  already 

200 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

been  written  upon,  and  not  much  more  can  be 
done  with  it.  Its  innate  characteristics  are  a 
bar  to  the  acquisition  of  foreign  conceptions. 
Applying  this  general  theory  to  the  special  case 
of  beliefs,  we  may  gather  that  the  primitive  and 
congenital  tendency  to  believe  along  certain  lines 
is  likely  to  weaken  with  evolution,  giving  place 
more  and  more  to  a  completely  open  mind,  in 
which  the  tabula  rasa  is  realised  to  so  great  an 
extent  that  any  doctrines  presented  will  be 
assimilated  or  rejected  with  equal  impartiality. 
In  a  low  type  of  mind,  we  should  expect  to  find 
the  range  of  possible  beliefs  closely  limited  by 
the  congenital  tendency  ;  in  a  high  type  of  mind, 
we  should  expect  to  find  the  various  possibilities 
of  belief  far  greater  in  number,  and  the  beliefs 
themselves  more  emancipated  from  the  weaker 
instinctive  feelings.  That  this  is  just  what  we 
do  find  is  so  manifest  as  to  call  for  no  illustra- 
tion. The  man  of  enlarged  intelligence  is  pre- 
pared to  accept,  within  limits,  almost  any 
proposition  when  he  is  shown  solid  reasons  for 
believing  in  it.  The  undisciplined  mind,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  prepared  to  accept  nothing  that 
is  not  in  harmony  with  its  original  bent ;  it  is 

201 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

securely  bound  by  the  shackles  of  its  own  con- 
stitution :  we  call  it  narrow,  and  the  name  is 
something  more  than  a  mere  analogy. 

It  appears  to  me  that  in  this  progressive  re- 
lease of  the  mind  from  its  congenital  tendencies 
of  belief,  we  have  the  physiological  counterpart  of 
the  movement  which  I  described  in  Chapter  iv. 
I  there  endeavoured  to  show  that  the  progress 
of  philosophy,  in  so  far  as  it  differs  from  positive 
science,  is  a  removal  of  the  superstitions  and 
fallacies  which  cumber  the  path  of  true  know- 
ledge. The  work  of  philosophy  is  done  when 
the  ground  is  thoroughly  cleared,  when  no 
further  obstacle  remains  to  bar  the  advance  of 
science.  Now  these  obstructive  superstitions 
and  fallacies  are  the  outward  and  visible  sign  of 
instinctive  tendencies  that  are  out  of  accord  with 
objective  facts.  Their  destruction  leaves  the 
mind  tabula  rasa,  on  which  the  results  of  experi- 
ence may  be  recorded ;  in  the  history  of  philo- 
sophy, we  see  the  record  of  a  real  step  in  the 
mental  evolution  of  man.  Beginning  at  an  age 
when  man  was  dominated  by  congenital  instincts 
to  the  almost  complete  exclusion  of  acquired 
experience,  history  shows  the  gradual  loss  of 

202 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

those  instincts,  corresponding  to  a  gain  in 
educability,  a  gradual  progress  to  that  highly 
cultivated  mental  condition,  in  which  all  truths 
presented  by  nature  are  accepted  with  equal 
readiness,  without  emotional  drag.  We  see  also 
that  Bergson,  in  his  admiration  of  instinct,  has 
selected  just  the  very  quality  which  it  is  the  chief 
business  of  philosophy  to  eradicate.  The  errors 
of  which  his  metaphysics  consist  rest  upon  the 
same  standard  of  belief  that  actuated  man  before 
the  dawn  of  science. 

Psychologically,  the  above  facts  are  spoken  of 
as  the  influence  of  feeling  or  emotion  on  belief. 
Everybody  knows  that  obsession  of  the  mind  by 
a  powerful  emotion  excludes  the  entry  of  all  con- 
ceptions, that  oppose  the  emotion,  and  conjures  up 
all  sorts  of  conceptions,  true  or  false,  that  gratify 
it.  A  man  in  love  sees  nothing  but  extravagant 
virtues  in  his  mistress — a  commonplace  woman. 
A  man  in  terror  sees  the  approach  of  danger  in  the 
most  harmless  occurrence.  A  man  of  jealous 
constitution  will  for  ever  be  creating  fancied  occa- 
sions for  jealousy. 

'  Thou  art  not  ever  jealous  for  the  cause  ; 
But  jealous,  for  thou  'rt  jealous.' 

203 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

A  man  who  is  always  on  his  dignity  will  believe 
that  his  friends  are  constantly  slighting  him,  and 
so  on.  These  observations  are  so  common  that 
there  is  no  need  to  delay  over  them.  I  come  at 
once  to  the  feelings  which  are  chiefly  injurious 
in  the  realm  of  philosophy. 

The  strongest  feelings  which  affect  humanity 
are  those  which  ensure  the  preservation  of  life, 
and  the  perpetuation  of  the  species.  The  feel- 
ing in  favour  of  self-preservation  is  of  such 
strength  as  to  offer  the  most  emphatic  welcome 
to  all  theories  which  affirm  a  continued  life  after 
death,  and  to  reject  emphatically  and  angrily 
all  opposing  theories.  Hence  we  may  expect 
to  find  widely  spread  among  humanity  a  con- 
viction in  an  after  life — a  feature  which,  amid 
their  manifold  diversities,  most  religions  possess 
in  common.  We  may  expect  also  that  this  con- 
viction will  begin  to  weaken  only  when  culture 
and  discipline  have  cleared  the  mind  to  an  ad- 
vanced point :  we  may  expect  that  the  conviction 
will  be  most  powerful  when  the  intellectual 
discipline  has  been  feeble. 

The  influence  of  the  reproductive  emotions  is 
more  obscure  in  operation,  but  no  less  profound. 

204 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

It  is  possible  that  they  are  the  supporting  fabric  of 
the  whole  of  religious  asceticism.  Frenzy  in  these 
two  spheres  is  well  known  to  lead  to  self-tortures 
of  an  incredible  description,  and  similar  in  kind. 
I  referred  to  the  Greek  Cynics  as  a  likely  instance 
of  the  connection.  Sokrates  may  have  been 
another  case.  The  terrible  deed  of  Origen  offers 
us  a  clue.  Sexual  crimes  are  known  to  be 
relatively  frequent  in  religious  paranoia.  Just  as 
certain  phases  of  religious  belief  are  based  on 
perverted  sexuality,  so  it  appears  probable  that 
metaphysical  systems  may  often  have  a  similar 
foundation.  A  deep  organic  emotion  must  have 
sustained  Benedict  Joseph  Labre,  who  gave  up 
his  body  as  a  breeding  ground  for  lice ;  or 
Simeon  Stylites,  who  bound  a  rope  round  him- 
self which  became  imbedded  in  his  flesh  and 
caused  putrefaction,  so  that  an  intolerable  stench 
was  produced,  and  worms  dropped  from  him 
whenever  he  moved.  Let  me  pass  hastily  from 
so  disagreeable  a  topic. 

The  errors  of  Plato's  metaphysics  are  plainly 
due  to  emotional  interference.  He  expressly 
set  up  the  aesthetic  and  other  sentiments  as  the 
test  of  truth.  The  Ptolemaic  astronomers  were 

205 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

similarly  deluded.  They  argued  that  the  heavenly 
bodies  could  move  in  no  other  orbits  but  circles, 
since  a  circle  alone  was  a  perfect  curve.  The 
apparent  movements  were  accounted  for  with 
extreme  ingenuity  by  their  systems  of  epicycles, 
or  circular  wheels.  On  the  rim  of  the  largest 
wheel  was  fixed  the  axle  of  a  smaller.  On  the 
rim  of  this  again  was  fixed  the  axle  of  yet  another 
wheel ;  and  by  supposing  revolutions  of  all  these 
wheels  together,  it  was  found  possible  to  explain 
the  motion  of  a  planet  with  marvellous  approxi- 
mation to  accuracy. 

The  love  of  harmony  and  completeness  for  a 
theory  has  led  to  innumerable  false  systems  of 
philosophy.  Leibnitz  is  a  specially  conspicuous 
instance.  The  belief  in  teleology  has  an  exactly 
similar  foundation.  It  is  an  unpleasant  thought 
that  the  Universe  has  in  it  no  beneficent  inten- 
tion, that  we  are  purely  the  sport  of  mechanical 
laws.  Hence  that  belief,  however  plainly  facts 
suggest  it,  will  not  be  easily  received. 

The  Ecstasy  of  the  Alexandrian  school  is  a 
definite  abrogation  of  intellect  in  favour  of 
emotion.  Much  modern  mysticism  has  the 
same  foundation. 

206 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

The  ethical  sentiments,  admirable  and  necessary 
though  they  are,  frequently  intrude  into  purely 
intellectual  spheres.  Men  are  apt  to  be  guided 
by  their  opinion  as  to  what  morally  '  ought '  to 
be,  when  they  are  inquiring  as  to  what  actually 
'  is.'  An  interesting  example  was  afforded  by 
Mr.  Arthur  Balfour  in  his  article  on  Bergson  in 
the  Hibbert  Journal  for  October  1911.  The 
admirable  philosophic  and  scientific  tone  of  that 
article,  indeed,  constitutes  it  one  of  the  best 
English  criticisms  of  Bergson  that  has  yet  been 
printed  :  and  in  singling  out  what  appears  to  me 
a  fallacy,  I  must  not  be  understood  as  wishing 
in  any  way  to  belittle  the  merits  of  a  valuable 
essay.  Mr.  Balfour  defends  freedom  of  the 
will  '  partly  because,  on  ethical  grounds,  I  am 
not  prepared  to  give  it  up.'  Now  ethical  grounds 
can  have  nothing  possibly  to  do  with  the  fact  of 
freedom  or  necessity.  A  fact  is  none  the  less  a 
fact,  if  its  moral  consequences  are  injurious.  Of 
course  I  emphatically  repudiate  the  suggestion 
that  injurious  moral  results  could  conceivably  flow 
from  mechanism  :  I  believe  the  contrary  is  the 
case.  But,  however  that  may  be,  Mr.  Balfour's 
argument  amounts  to  this  :  freedom  is  ethically 

207 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

desirable — therefore  freedom  is  true.  It  ought 
to  be  true ;  therefore  it  is  true.  I  venture  to 
think  that  Mr.  Balfour  has  allowed  his  moral 
enthusiasm  to  run  away  with  the  facts. 

The  bearing  of  determinism  on  moral  re- 
sponsibility, although  irrelevant  to  its  truth  as  a 
theory,  is  so  important  as  to  justify  a  brief 
digression. 

Mankind  are  so  constituted  that  certain  acts, 
called  anti-social  or  criminal  acts,  arouse  among 
them  hostile  emotions  against  the  offender.  How 
do  these  hostile  emotions  come  to  be  implanted 
in  humanity?  In  just  the  same  way  that  the 
other  structures  and  functions  of  the  body  are 
developed — viz.,  by  natural  selection.  Societies 
in  which  anti-social  acts  arouse  no  hostility  fall 
to  pieces  in  consequence.  Only  those  societies 
can  survive  in  which  anti-social  acts  call  forth 
among  the  people  hostile  emotions  bringing 
about  an  attack  upon  the  offender,  and  his  sup- 
pression. No  society  can  reach  a  high  civilisa- 
tion unless  throughout  their  members  there 
exists  the  nervous  organisation  which  supports 
the  sentiments  of  anger  and  hostility  against 
criminals  :  and  this  physical  nervous  organisation 

208 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

is  the  groundwork  of  what  we  call  our  moral 
code.  We  can  now  easily  see  that  no  theory  of 
determinism  can  affect  moral  responsibility. 
We  shall  continue  to  condemn  crime,  and  to 
visit  our  wrath  upon  criminals,  just  so  long  as 
we  continue  to  feel  hostility  towards  criminal 
actions  :  and  if  we  ever  become  so  civilised  that 
the  feeling  of  hostility  dies  out,  that  time  will 
mark  the  commencing  disintegration  of  our 
society.  It  is  the  vice  of  the  Lombroso  school 
of  criminology  to  interpret  determinism  as  though 
it  were  fatalism,  and  under  this  fallacy  to  advocate 
the  relaxation  of  moral  responsibility.  A  wider 
comprehension  of  scientific  determinism  would 
enhance  rather  than  diminish  the  sentiments  of 
morality. 

Many  people  will  be  loth  to  admit  that  there 
is  any  opposition  between  the  quest  for  truth  and 
the  quest  for  morals.  Certainly,  in  the  question 
of  freedom,  I  can  see  no  such  opposition  :  but  in 
other  questions,  I  think  we  must  recognise  that 
there  is  no  pre-established  harmony  between  the 
two.  Let  me  take  instances.  Many  philoso- 
phers have  held  that  religion  was  false  but  neces- 
sary for  morality.  I  am  not  about  to  discuss  the 
o  209 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

veracity  of  this  opinion  :  I  wish  only  to  affirm 
that  there  is  no  contradiction  in  it,  logical  or 
other  :  that  the  opinion  may  very  likely  be  true  : 
that  its  truth  or  untruth  can  only  be  attained  by 
appealing  to  experience.  Hobbes  laid  it  down 
as  a  right  policy  for  a  sovereign  to  erect  a  super- 
stition into  a  religion,  if  it  appeared  to  be  for  the 
good  of  the  people.  Voltaire  justified  a  belief 
in  religion  on  the  same  grounds.  I  may  add 
another.  Supposing  that  the  public  could  be 
induced  to  accept  the  superstition  that  the  soul 
of  a  man  after  death  entered  into  the  body  of 
a  new  baby  at  hazard,1  might  not  the  stimulus 
for  social  amelioration  be  enormous  ?  Black 
distress  and  poverty  might  soon  be  cleared  away, 
if  the  public  could  be  made  to  think  that,  so 
long  as  it  remained,  it  might  be  their  own  fate 
before  long.  I  do  not  know  whether  this  would 
be  so  or  not ;  I  only  wish  to  emphasise  that  the 
quest  for  truth  and  the  quest  for  morals  are  not 
necessarily  associated. 

Montesquieu  fell  into  this  error  when  he  said 

1  An  F.R.S.  has  recently  published  a  book  in  favour  of  this 
theory.  I  am  driven  to  suppose  that  he  has  delivered  himself 
of  this  preposterous  nonsense  for  the  purpose  of  deluding  the 
public  for  what  he  thinks  their  advantage. 

2IO 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

that  laws  '  are  the  necessary  relations  derived  from 
the  nature  of  things.'  This  is  true  for  science  ; 
it  is  not  true  for  ethics.  When  it  is  a  question 
of  formulating  facts  as  is  done  by  science,  then 
laws  may  be  defined  after  the  manner  of  Mon- 
tesquieu. But  about  human-made  laws,  or 
the  laws  proposed  by  ethics,  there  is  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  the  '  nature  of  things.' 
Ethical  laws  are  simply  statements  of  what  we 
think  ought  to  happen,  or  what  we  intend  shall 
happen.  They  are  relative  to  us.  Scientific 
laws  state  what  facts  exist  :  they  are  altogether 
independent  of  us,  and  of  our  '  oughts '  and 
'shalls.' 

As  regards  materialism,  Rudolf  Wagner  denied 
it  and  Czolbe  asserted  it,  both  alike  on  the  wholly 
irrelevant  grounds  of  a  '  moral  feeling  of  duty.' 
Whether  materialism  is  true  is  one  question  : 
whether  it  is  wholesome  for  the  public  is  another. 
Neither  truth  nor  public  welfare  is  likely  to  be 
advanced  by  confusing  them. 

A  further  instance  of  the  moral  bias  we  may 
adduce  from  the  Meditations  of  Marcus  Aurelius. 
In  his  constant  endeavour  to  depreciate  pleasure, 
he  alleges  that  the  good  man  may  be  happy 

211 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

while  tortured.  I  am  not  going  to  deny  the 
possibility  of  it :  but  at  best  it  wants  proof,  and 
none  is  offered.  Yet  the  myriads  of  people  who 
have  read  the  Meditations  probably  accept  it  to 
a  very  large  proportion,  because  it  has  an  agree- 
able sound.  The  appeal  is  not  to  intellect  but 
to  emotion. 

The  philosophy  of  Sokrates  was  vitiated  by 
its  complete  abandonment  of  science  for  ethics. 
The  moral  fallacy,  as  Lange  justly  observes, 
'  thoroughly  corrupted  '  the  physics  of  Aristotle. 
Part  of  the  benefit  of  a  scientific  training  is  no 
doubt  due  to  the  frequent  compulsion  to  accept 
undesired  beliefs  and  to  abandon  cherished  con- 
victions. The  compulsory  recognition  of  un- 
pleasant facts  is  the  best  possible  mental  discip- 
line preparatory  to  the  study  of  Nature.  The 
frequency  of  the  '  moral '  fallacy  is  gradually 
becoming  widely  perceived  :  it  seems  to  have 
deeply  influenced  Nietzsche,  who  is  now  widely 
read. 

It  remains  for  me  to  apply  these  observa- 
tions to  the  metaphysics  of  Professor  Bergson. 
That  unfortunate  philosopher  appears  to  have 
accumulated  within  his  works  innumerable  ex- 

212 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

amples  of  almost  every  kind  of  fallacy  that  human 
nature  is  subject  to.  His  '  Huxley '  lecture  at 
Birmingham  in  May  1911,  printed  in  \h&Hibbert 
Journal,  constitutes  a  veritable  storehouse  of 
the  kind  of  fallacies  we  have  been  considering. 

1  In  my  opinion,  the  aspirations  of  our  moral 
nature  are  not  in  the  least  contradicted  by  positive 
science,'  says  the  Professor.  Why  then  is  it  that 
the  chief  obstacle  to  scientific  progress  in  the 
past  has  been  the  aspirations  of  moral  nature  in 
our  predecessors  ?  The  aspirations  of  the  moral 
natures  of  the  Ptolemaic  astronomers  demanded 
perfect  circles  for  the  planetary  orbits,  Are  they 
not  contradicted  by  the  fact  that  these  orbits 
are  imperfect  ellipses  ?  The  moral  nature  of 
men  was  not  only  contradicted  but  shocked 
when  they  were  informed  that  they  were  de- 
scended from  ape-like  ancestors.  The  disease 
and  suffering  which  overwhelm  mankind  must 
contradict  the  moral  aspirations  of  any  one  but 
the  most  brutalised.  The  whole  history  of  scien- 
tific discoveries,  which  have  been  hailed  as 
immoral,  have  plainly  contradicted  the  aspirations 
of  contemporaries. 

1  How  could  there  be  disharmony  between  our 
213 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

intuitions  and  our  science,  how  especially  could 
our  science  make  us  renounce  our  intuitions, 
if  these  intuitions  are  something  like  instinct — 
an  instinct  conscious,  refined,  spiritualised — and 
if  instinct  is  still  nearer  life  than  intellect  and 
science?'  It  is  perhaps  unkind  to  select  a 
passage  from  a  peroration,  more  especially  since 
its  error  is  so  obvious.  What  is  the  good  of 
asking  us  how  there  can  be  disharmonies  between 
intuition  and  science,  when  every  body  in  the 
world  except  metaphysicians  knows  that  there  is 
such  disharmony  ?  I  have  attempted  to  exhibit 
the  function  of  philosophy  as  the  eradication  of 
false  intuitions,  leaving  the  mind  tabula  rasa  for 
empirical  knowledge.  Bergson  would  have  us 
believe  that  the  intuitions  must  be  right :  why 
then  does  history  show  that  they  have  constantly 
been  wrong?  And  why  do  men  have  such 
diverse  intuitions  on  the  same  subject  ?  Surely 
not  more  than  one  of  them  can  be  right,  and 
then  it  follows  that  the  rest  are  wrong.  Bergson 
appears,  so  far  from  having  cleared  his  mind  of 
the  original  weeds  before  he  began  his  philo- 
sophy, to  have  carefully  cultivated  and  manured 
them  :  he  now  shows  them  off  as  fine  plants. 

214 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

Undoubtedly  their  growth  is  luxurious,  far 
more  luxurious  than  is  known  among  more  valu- 
able plants  ;  but  they  are  just  as  much  weeds  as 
they  were  at  the  beginning. 

In  this  same  'Huxley'  lecture,  Bergson 
furnishes  another  instance  of  belief  justified  by 
emotion.  '  Philosophers  who  have  speculated  on 
the  significance  of  life  and  the  destiny  of  man 
have  not  sufficiently  remarked  that  Nature  has 
taken  pains  to  give  us  notice  every  time  this 
destiny  is  accomplished  ;  she  has  set  up  a  sign 
which  apprises  us  every  time  our  activity  is  in 
full  expansion  ;  this  sign  is  joy.  I  say  joy  ;  I  do 
not  say  pleasure.  Pleasure,  in  point  of  fact,  is 
no  more  than  an  instrument  contrived  by  nature 
to  obtain  from  the  individual  the  preservation 
and  the  prolongation  of  life  ;  it  gives  us  no  in- 
formation concerning  the  direction  in  which  life 
is  flung  forward.'  Of  course  I  dispute  the  ter- 
minology from  beginning  to  end  :  I  do  not  know 
what  is  meant  by  life  being  flung  forward  :  that, 
however,  is  not  my  present  point.  What  I  wish 
to  emphasise  is  the  confusion  between  feelings 
and  outward  facts.  It  is  alleged  that  '  the  direc- 
tion in  which  life  is  flung  forward  '  is  indicated 

215 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

by  the  sentiment  of  joy.  Let  us  now  note  how 
completely  observation  negatives  Bergson's 
sentimentally  derived  result. 

(1)  Joy  does  not  accompany  the  full  expansion 
of    our    activity.       Otherwise     we     should    be 
animated    by  joyful    emotions  when   running  a 
mile  race,  or  working  out  a  mathematical  equa- 
tion.    Joy  is  distinctly  characteristic  of  states  of 
diminished  activity,  when  there  is  no  strain  on 
any   faculty,    but   rather   a   gentle    stimulus   on 
them. 

(2)  Why  should   Nature  wish  to  apprise  us 
when  our  activity  is  in  full  expansion  ? 

(3)  Why  should  she  have  selected  joy  as  the 
sign  of  such  full  expansion?     Before    Bergson, 
nobody  had  ever  previously  marked  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  sign  :  it  was  lost  upon  all  pre-exist- 
ing humanity,  and  Nature's  purpose,  therefore, 
remained  unfulfilled.     The  old  teleological  notion 
was  that  the  moon  was  placed  in  the  sky  to  give 
illumination   by  night.     The   notion   was    con- 
demned when    people  observed   that  the  moon 
was  in  the  sky  as  often  in  daytime  as  in  night- 
time ;  and  that  even  at  night,  it  was  less  than 
a  half  moon  for  a  fortnight  in  every  month.     But 

216 


THE  ORIGIN  OF  FALLACIES 

that  ideological  absurdity  is  as  nothing  to 
Bergson's.  For  he  posits  'joy'  as  teleological  : 
it  is  a  sign  (which  no  one  can  be  expected  to  recog- 
nise) to  inform  humanity  of  what  it  is  entirely 
useless  for  them  to  know ! 

Bergson  goes  on  to  inform  us  that  true  joy  '  is 
always  an  emphatic  signal  of  the  triumph  of  life.' 
This  sentence,  with  its  context,  is  intended  to 
convey  an  impression  like  the  fanfare  of  trum- 
pets. Yet  the  cold  analyst  must  ask  what  it 
means.  Philosophy  is  not  advanced  by  high- 
sounding  sentences :  we  want  to  get  at  real 
meanings.  Darwin  has  remarked  in  his  '  Ex- 
pression of  the  Emotions '  that  joyousness  is  a 
main  characteristic  of  a  large  class  of  idiots : 
an  observation  which  is  endorsed  by  every 
alienist.  Are  we  then  to  infer  that  the  triumph 
of  life  is  most  emphasised  among  idiots?  We 
need  no  further  instances  of  the  extreme 
absurdities  in  which  Bergson  is  landed  by  his 
emotionally-inspired  obiter  dicta. 

Thus  while,  in  a  former  chapter,  we  saw  the 
numerous  logical  fallacies  contained  in  the  Berg- 
sonian  metaphysics,  we  now  are  able  to  contem- 
plate their  psychological  origin.  Instinctive 

217 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

feelings,  which  in  science  are  a  main  obstacle 
to  knowledge,  are  here  taken  as  a  means  to 
knowledge.  The  fallacy  is  at  the  root  of  every 
other  system  of  metaphysics  ever  invented. 
Metaphysics  is  discredited  even  more  by  its 
psychological  origin  than  by  its  logical  methods. 


218 


CHAPTER    VII 

THE   TRUE   PROVINCE   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

' .  .  .  Grey  are  all  theories, 
And  green  alone  Life's  golden  tree.' 

GOETHE. 

I  HAVE  endeavoured  to  show  that  there  are  two 
elements  of  positive  value  in  philosophy  :  the 
one,  increase  in  our  positive  knowledge  and 
more  correctly  described  as  science ;  the  other, 
dissipation  of  error.  Among  the  Greeks  all 
branches  of  knowledge  were  confused  under 
the  name  philosophy.  With  advancing  civilisa- 
tion, the  various  divisions  came  to  be  marked  off 
constantly  more  sharply  from  one  another. 
Science  has  completely  broken  off ;  and  Theology 
is  more  or  less  independent.  But  there  are  still 
comprised  under  the  term  philosophy  a  number 
of  separate  studies,  some  of  which  deal  with  real 
facts  and  approximate  to  science,  others  which 

219 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

deal  with  pseudo-facts  and  approximate  to  meta- 
physics. Such  are  psychology,  ontology,  epis- 
temology,  logic,  ethics,  etc.  The  ultimate  goal 
of  philosophy  will  have  been  attained,  when  all 
of  these  have  either  been  recognised  as  branches 
of  science,  or  condemned  as  products  of  super- 
stition and  ignorance.  There  is  no  room  for  a 
class  of  'moral  science'  intermediate  between 
natural  science  and  metaphysics. 

Ontology  need  not  detain  us  :  the  attempt  to 
solve  the  ultimate  riddle  of  existence,  in  such  a 
way  as  to  satisfy  our  curiosity,  is  plainly  futile. 
Epistemology,  the  science  or  pseudo-science 
which  treats  of  the  validity  of  our  knowledge, 
appears  to  me  to  have  no  more  secure  basis  than 
ontology.  It  suffices  that  relatively  to  ourselves 
our  knowledge  is  valid.  What  may  hold  good 
in  the  absolute  is  a  question  beyond  the  range 
of  facts  or  evidence,  and  therefore  childish  to 
discuss.  Psychology,  on  the  other  hand,  is  now 
almost  completely  emancipated  from  philosophy, 
and  takes  rank  as  one  of  the  special  sciences. 
In  the  future  its  position  will,  no  doubt,  be  fixed 
as  one  of  the  departments  of  nerve  physiology. 
Logic  similarly  has  become  a  science.  It  has, 

220 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

indeed,  made  no  great  advances,  neverthe- 
less its  province — that  of  laying  down  rules  for 
the  evaluation  of  evidence  and  for  methods  of 
research — is  a  clear  and  legitimate  region  for 
science  to  occupy.  Ethics,  similarly,  is  or  will 
become  a  branch  of  science  of  very  great  im- 
portance. The  regulation  of  conduct  and  social 
life  can  only  be  successful  when  founded  upon 
a  set  of  scientific  inductions  as  to  what  kind  of 
conduct  is  most  conducive  to  human  welfare. 
But  we  have  far  to  go  yet  in  physiology  and 
psychology  before  a  reliable  system  of  ethics 
can  be  built  up.  Metaphysics,  according  to 
the  views  adopted  in  this  work,  is  hopelessly 
and  permanently  discredited.  Does  nothing 
remain,  to  which  the  title  of  philosophy  may  be 
applied  ? 

The  philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer,  with  the 
exception  of  the  short  Part  i.  of  First  Principles, 
is  a  philosophy  into  which  metaphysics  does 
not  enter.  Spencer  defined  philosophy  as  the 
science  which  deals  with  inductions  of  a  wider 
generality  than  any  of  those  covered  by  the 
special  sciences.  Just  as  the  generalisations  of 
biology  are  of  wider  scope  than  those  of 

221 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

morphology,  physiology,  embryology,  etc.  ;  so, 
according  to  Spencer,  the  generalisations  of 
philosophy  are  those  which  hold  good,  not  of 
biological  data  only,  but  of  astronomical,  geolo- 
gical, psychological  data,  in  short  of  all  orders 
of  phenomena  whatever.  According  to  this 
view,  physics  should  be  erected  to  philosophic 
rank.  For  its  laws — such  as  the  conservation 
of  energy,  and  the  laws  of  motion — are  likewise 
applicable  to  every  order  of  phenomena.  In- 
deed, by  an  inspection  of  his  philosophy,  we  find 
that  Spencer's  philosophic  laws  are  really  laws 
of  physics,  and  their  validity  is  to  be  decided  by 
physical  principles.  The  general  opinion  ap- 
pears to  be  opposed  to  their  validity ;  but  it  may 
be  remarked  that,  even  on  a  favourable  supposi- 
tion, no  single  principle  of  the  smallest  practical 
importance  has  ever  at  any  time  been  deduced 
from  them.  Unlike  Newton's  laws,  which 
carried  with  them  vast  results  for  human  know- 
ledge and  welfare,  Spencer's  laws  have  hitherto 
been  completely  barren. 

There  appears,  therefore,  to  be  nothing  else 
whatever  to  bring  under  the  name  of  Philosophy 
in  the  future.  Parts  of  it  will  continue  to  branch 

222 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

off  as  true  science,  and  as  such  to  flourish  and 
multiply ;  others  will  branch  off  as  metaphysics, 
and  so  decay  and  disappear.  Ignorance,  super- 
stition, and  pseudo-knowledge  will  ultimately  be 
vanquished.  It  is  in  this  last  sphere  that  the 
most  important  work  still  remains  to  be  done. 
For  the  workings  of  'intuition,'  and  of  the 
pseudo-knowledge  which  arises  therefrom,  have 
to  be  combated  not  only  in  the  sphere  of  belief, 
but  also  in  the  sphere  of  conduct.  Nothing  can 
be  conceived  of  greater  importance  to  an  indi- 
vidual than  a  correct  '  philosophy  of  life ' :  a 
guide  to  conduct  beyond  and  in  addition  to  those 
inculcated  by  ethics.  If  men  are  animated  by 
superstitions  in  the  sphere  of  belief,  it  is  no  less 
true  that  they  unthinkingly  adopt  many  false 
principles  in  the  sphere  of  conduct.  It  is  a  work 
of  fundamental  importance  for  philosophy,  to 
destroy  the  superstitions,  not  only  of  thought, 
but  also  of  action. 

It  was  assumed  by  the  older  psychologists, 
especially  by  Jeremy  Bentham  and  his  disciple 
James  Mill,  that  the  sole  prompting  of  human 
actions  arose  from  the  desire  to  avoid  pain  or  to 
secure  pleasure,  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  words. 

223 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

They  undoubtedly  went  too  far.  It  is  plain  that 
this  would 'be  the  end  of  life,  if  men  were  rational 
beings :  it  is  plain  that  it  ought  to  be  the  end  of 
life.  But  it  is  not,  for  men  are  not  yet  rational 
beings :  they  have  still  their  instincts  to  fight 
against. 

A  vast  proportion  of  human  occupations  are 
due  to  mere  habit  of  thinking  and  doing  which 
has  been  acquired  by  chance  or  handed  down  by 
heredity.  Certain  aims  or  doctrines  fill  the  mind 
so  powerfully  as  to  get  translated  into  action 
quite  irrespective  of  the  pleasures  or  pains  in- 
volved in  them.  The  idte  fixe  is  a  much  larger 
factor  in  human  prosperity  than  most  people  are 
aware  of.  Obsessions  seize  the  mind,  and  work 
it  fatally  in  the  direction  they  indicate.  Just  as 
looking  over  a  high  cliff  may  so  enthral  the  mind 
as  to  admit  no  ideas  from  outside  but  compel 
the  subject  to  precipitate  himself  down  it  by  the 
mere  irresistible  force  of  suggestion,  so  in  practi- 
cal life  minor  obsessions  are  for  ever  swaying 
the  mind  and  leading  it  to  act  out  its  precon- 
ceptions without  the  smallest  regard  to  its 
own  interest.  When  these  obsessions  are  not 
anti-social,  they  raise  no  comment  or  hostility. 

224 


When  they  are  highly  social,  they  are  encour- 
aged, and  the  subject  is  held  up  to  praise  and 
admiration. 

Now  it  is  clear  that  all  such  obsessions  are 
bad.  They  are  not  founded  upon  reason  or  fore- 
thought :  their  result  upon  humanity  is  a  matter 
of  pure  chance :  while  in  many  cases  they  will 
happen  to  be  advantageous,  in  many  other  cases 
they  will  happen  to  be  deleterious.  They  are 
altogether  inferior  to  those  modes  of  activity 
which  are  the  product  of  reasoned  forethought, 
and  which  are  thereby  decided  to  be  of  beneficial 
import.  They  are  false  guides  along  the  path  of 
life.  For  every  one  the  journey  through  life 
begins  in  darkness,  and  only  increasing  experi- 
ence lights  the  way.  Lanterns  are  put  out  to 
mark  our  road,  the  laws  of  science,  or  rather  of 
Nature,  on  the  one  hand ;  and  the  laws  of 
morality,  or  of  Man,  on  the  other  hand.  But 
besides  these  lanterns,  whose  exact  location  we 
should  study  well,  the  wayfarer  is  puzzled  by 
innumerable  will-o'-the-wisps  which  float  away 
in  the  darkness  before  him,  and  are  all  too 
likely  to  be  mistaken  for  the  true  beacons.  These 
will-o'-the-wisps  are  not  animated  with  any 
p  225 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

special  hostility  to  him.  He  may  follow  one 
which  travels  straight  along  the  right  path ;  he 
may,  on  the  other  hand,  be  led  into  an  inex- 
tricable bog  :  and  in  almost  every  case,  there 
will  be  some  deviation,  resulting  in  exactly  co- 
ordinate diminution  of  his  life's  prosperity. 
Many  writers  have  taken  pains  to  indicate  these 
ignes  fatui. 

More  than  six  centuries  ago,  they  were  stig- 
matised by  Dante  at  the  outset  of  his  Divina 
Commedia.  Wandering  in  the  valley  before  he  met 
Virgil,  he  was  in  danger  of  losing  his  path  on  three 
distinct  occasions.  On  the  first,  it  was  a  beauti- 
ful spotted  leopard  whose  gorgeous  colours  nearly 
led  the  wanderer  to  an  acquaintance  which  would 
have  been  fatal  to  him.  On  the  second  and 
third,  he  was  terrified  by  a  roaring  lion  and  a  she 
wolf.  The  lion  is  ambition,  the  wolf  is  avarice, 
the  beautiful  leopard  is  luxury. 

Spinoza,  similarly,  in  his  earliest  work  On 
the  Improvement  of  the  Intellect,  specifies 
Divitias,  honor  em,  atque  libidinem,  as  the  objects 
in  which  men  think  that  supreme  happiness 
consists.  Goethe,  also,  in  his  masterpiece,  put 
into  the  mouth  of  Faust  a  condemnation  of  the 

226 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

vanities  which  he  had  discovered  in  his  experi- 
ence of  life  : — 

'  Cursed  be  at  once  the  high  ambition 
Wherewith  the  mind  itself  deludes  ! 
Cursed  be  the  glare  of  apparition 
That  on  the  finer  sense  intrudes  ! 
Cursed  be  the  lying  dream's  impression, 
Of  name,  and  fame,  and  laurelled  brow  ! 
Cursed,  all  that  flatters  as  possession, 
As  wife  and  child,  as  knave  and  plough  ! 
Cursed  Mammon  be,  when  he  with  treasures 
To  restless  action  spurs  our  fate  ! 
Cursed  when  for  soft  indulgent  leisures, 
He  lays  for  us  the  pillows  straight ! 
Cursed  be  the  vine's  transcendant  nectar, — 
The  highest  favour  Love  lets  fall ! 
Cursed,  also,  Hope  ! — cursed  Faith,  the  spectre  ! 
And  cursed  be  Patience  most  of  all ! ' 

Byron  wrote  in  a  similar  strain  : — 

'  Few  mortals  know  what  end  they  would  be  at, 
But  whether  glory,  power,  or  love,  or  treasure, 
The  path  is  through  perplexing  ways,  and  when 
The  goal  is  gained,  we  die,  you  know — and  then  ? 

The  pessimism  of  Schopenhauer  appears  to 
be  partly  founded  on  irrational  intuitions.  The 
conception  of  life  put  forward  by  him  and 
von  Hartmann  is  that  happiness  can  never  be 
found  ;  for  mankind  are  ever  striving  to  satisfy 
unfulfilled  wants  :  and  if  they  fulfil  these,  ennui 
instead  of  satisfaction  results,  driving  them 

227 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

continually  to  the  invention  of  new  wants. 
This  philosophy  would  be  natural  enough  to 
one  who  followed  ignes  fatui  too  confidently. 

Schopenhauer  gathered  only  pessimism  from 
knowledge.  Far  more  profound  was  the  great 
materialist  de  Lamettrie,  who  laid  down  the 
general  principle : — '  Plus  on  a  d'esprit,  plus  on 
a  de  penchant  au  plaisir.'  Pailleron  in  his  fine 
play  Le  Monde  ou  fon  s'ennute,  has  admirably 
exposed  the  fallacious  life-doctrines,  to  which  I 
allude.  I  now  proceed  to  indicate  the  influence 
upon  a  true  philosophy  of  life,  of  those  mechan- 
istic and  determinist  doctrines  that  I  have  advo- 
cated in  this  book. 

In  the  first  place,  it  ought  to  be  a  matter  for 
universal  rejoicing  that  the  Universe  is  swayed 
wholly  by  physical  law.  For,  by  means  of 
science,  we  can  discover  physical  law,  and  utilise 
it  for  our  own  advantage.  If  there  were  any 
breach  in  the  regularity  or  universality  of  law, 
our  inductions  would  fail  us,  and  our  efforts  to 
ameliorate  our  lot  would  be  frustrated.  Meta- 
physicians like  to  think  of  '  spirit '  as  an  indepen- 
dent variable,  not  subject  to  any  law  or  regularity 
of  operation ;  and  therefore  never  capable  of 

228 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

being  brought  under  human  control.  The 
doctrine  of  mechanism,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a 
doctrine  of  hope.  It  holds  out  to  mankind  the 
highest  prospect  of  success  in  their  efforts  to 
control  and  improve  their  environment. 

The  notion  of  the  Universe  which  we  have 
adopted  is  simply  that  of  matter  and  energy 
undergoing  transformation  and  redistribution  in 
certain  precise  ways  which  we  call  the  laws  of 
physics.  We  have  seen  reason  to  believe  that 
animals  and  plants  are  as  completely  subject  to 
physical  law  as  is  inorganic  matter.  The  matter 
composing  an  organism  is  synthetised  from 
inorganic  matter,  by  natural  physical  processes  : 
on  the  death  of  the  organism  it  undergoes  de- 
composition, and  becomes  inorganic  once  more. 
So  too,  the  energy  contained  in  an  organism  is 
derived  from  the  ordinary  external  sources  of 
energy :  it  undergoes  transformation  in  accord- 
ance with  physical  law,  and  passes  out  of  the 
body  into  inorganic  matter  once  again.  In  short, 
an  organism  represents  a  little  whirlpool  of 
matter  and  energy.  At  certain  points  in  their 
redistribution  there  spring  up  these  centres  of 
activity  where  the  matter  and  energy  are  con- 

229 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

centrated  into  a  sort  of  knot  or  whirlpool,  drawing 
to  itself  copious  supplies  of  matter  and  energy 
from  without,  and  as  constantly  sending  them 
back.  We  found  that  there  was  no  obstacle  to 
prevent  an  infinite  science  and  an  infinite 
mathematics  from  prophesying  every  future 
event  in  the  Universe,  and  looking  back  upon 
every  past  event.  Yet  our  own  particular 
whirlpool  discloses  to  us  the  existence  of  con- 
sciousness, whose  existence  we  could  never  have 
suspected  if  we  had  looked  purely  outward. 
And  by  the  law  of  continuity  we  are  driven  to 
assume  the  existence  of  consciousness  not  only 
in  all  other  human  beings,  but  in  lower  animals, 
down  possibly  to  the  very  lowest.  But  when 
we  examined  this  new  factor  of  consciousness, 
we  found  it  to  be  possessed  of  no  significance 
whatever,  in  accounting  for  the  changes  and 
events  which  occur  in  our  visible  or  tangible 
universe.  In  vain  did  we  examine  the  innumer- 
able attempts  made  by  metaphysics  to  give  it  an 
active  role  in  affairs  :  not  one  of  them,  we  found, 
had  advanced  our  knowledge  or  understanding 
by  a  hair's  breadth.  In  vain  we  turned  to 
science  :  science  at  all  events  can  explain  and 

230 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

prophesy :  science  can  achieve  results  patent  to 
every  one :  science  can  transform  the  face  of 
continents  :  surely  we  shall  learn  here  what  part 
consciousness  plays  in  events.  In  vain  :  con- 
sciousness is  unknown  to  science.  Astronomy, 
geology,  biology,  get  on  without  it.  Physics 
and  chemistry  have  seen  no  traces  of  it.  Mathe- 
matics never  heard  of  it.  In  no  department  has 
any  trace  of  its  working  ever  been  discovered ; 
and  we  found  ourselves  reduced  to  regarding  it 
as  an  inert  accompaniment  of  certain  cerebral 
processes,  without  ever  knowing,  postulating,  or 
so  much  as  guessing  anything  further  about  it. 
An  unsatisfactory  and  irritating  conclusion  no 
doubt,  not  deserving  our  esteem  or  possessing  any 
other  virtue  than  that  of  being  strictly  in 
harmony  with  the  facts. 

But  is  this  not  fatalism  and  irreligion  ?  No, 
it  is  not.  Huxley  has  refuted  both  charges.  On 
the  ground  of  irreligion,  he  points  out  that  this 
view  has  been  held  by  the  whole  school  of  pre- 
destinarian  theologians,  typified  by  St.  Augus- 
tine, Calvin,  and  Jonathan  Edwards.  Fervent 
Christians  like  Leibnitz  and  Hartley  were  largely 
instrumental  in  advancing  it.  In  fact  its  origin 

231 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

is  largely  due  to  the  exertions  of  some  of  the 
best  among  men,  and  of  the  most  orthodox  among 
Christians. 

And  now  for  fatalism.  Determinism  is  the 
statement  of  an  ascertained  fact :  fatalism  is  an 
unhealthy  mental  effect  wrought  in  an  individual 
by  learning  that  fact.  Fatalism  takes  the  point 
of  view  that  it  does  not  matter  what  an  individual 
does,  since  all  is  predetermined  and  subject  to 
law.  Now  the  truth  of  determinism  not  being 
in  any  way  affected  by  its  results  on  humanity, 
wholesome  or  unwholesome,  we  have  only  to 
look  and  see  what  its  results  are,  and  rejoice  or 
despond  accordingly.  And  when  we  look,  we 
find  that  it  does  in  fact  only  give  rise  to  fatalism 
among  uncivilised  races  and  persons  of  feeble 
intelligence.  Determinism  makes  an  Arab  a 
fatalist :  the  knowledge  of  determinism  has  upon 
him  a  detrimental  effect :  he  is  not  fitted  to 
learn  it.  But  did  the  knowledge  of  determinism 
have  that  effect  on  Calvin  or  on  Jonathan 
Edwards?  Did  it  have  it  upon  Huxley  himself? 
Where  in  the  lives  of  these  great  men,  who 
profoundly  stirred  humanity  in  favour  of  what 
they  thought  right, — where  in  their  lives  can  we 

232 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

find  the  signs  of  indifference  and  feebleness 
which  we  designate  as  fatalism  ?  Determinism 
is  a  scientific  principle,  and  it  is  true.  Fatalism 
is  an  ethical  principle,  a  mode  of  conduct,  and 
cannot  therefore  be  brought  under  the  category 
of  true  or  false,  but  only  as  commendable  or 
regrettable.  Determinism  brings  fatalism  only 
to  the  feeblest  minds.  But  for  those  who  are 
strong  enough  it  is  better  to  know  the  truth,  for 
on  strong  minds  determinism  will  have  an  in- 
vigorating effect  exactly  contrary  to  fatalism. 

It  is  characteristic  of  the  type  of  mind  opposed 
to  determinism  that  its  effect  on  practical  life 
should  be  looked  upon  as  bad  or  fatalistic.  I 
now  propose  to  show  that  on  other  types  of 
mind  its  effect  on  conduct  is  just  the  reverse ; 
that  it  leads  to  what  may  be  called,  for  want  of 
a  better  term,  anti-fatalism.  Fatalism  is  a 
resignation  to  fate  in  the  bad  sense :  anti- 
fatalism  is  a  resignation  to  fate  in  the  good 
sense.  Shakespeare  stamped  himself  as  an 
anti-fatalist,  when  he  put  into  the  mouth  of 
Hamlet : — (  There  is  nothing  either  good  or  bad, 
but  thinking  makes  it  so.'  The  actual  physical 
sufferings  which  we  experience  in  life  are  as 

233 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

nothing  compared  with  the  forebodings  and 
gloomy  anticipations  of  suffering,  which  in  most 
cases  are  never  realised.  With  science  and 
commerce  in  the  highly  developed  state  now 
attained,  the  amenities  of  life  for  the  bulk  of 
the  people  are  superior  to  anything  available 
even  to  kings  and  plutocrats  two  or  three 
generations  ago.  Security  from  death  and 
disease,  from  violence  and  misfortune,  has  never 
reached  so  high  a  pitch  as  at  present.  The 
amount  of  real  suffering,  apart  from  imagined  or 
anticipated  suffering,  that  falls  to  the  lot  of  most 
people,  has  never  been  reduced  to  so  low  a  level. 
If  man  were  a  reasonable  animal  his  life  would 
be  a  glorious  progress  of  joy  and  happiness. 
But  alas ! 

'  Da  er  kein  Elend  hat,  so  will  er  Elend  machen.' 

He  vitiates  and  poisons  his  existence  in  the  fear 
that  some  unpleasant  and  improbable  event  will 
injure  him !  He  is  discontented  with  his  position 
in  society,  with  his  income,  or  what  not !  And 
if  in  any  of  these  he  had  a  lift  up,  he  would  be 
equally  discontented  again.  Yet  the  anti- fatalist 
will  look  upon  all  unavoidable  evils  as  necessary 

234 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

conditions  of  existence.  He  will  not  complain 
of  bad  luck,  for  he  knows  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  luck  :  the  evil  had  to  be,  and  cannot  be  re- 
medied by  poring  over  it.  He  will  not  brood 
over  a  false  step  once  taken  :  for  he  knows  that 
the  necessity  for  it  was  implicit  in  the  nebula  of 
our  solar  system  myriads  of  ages  ago,  and  that 
the  consequences  of  it  are  similarly  determined. 
Determinism  causes  the  weak  to  court  the 
evils  in  life :  it  causes  the  strong  to  court  the 
goods  in  life.  The  religious  belief  of  Benvenuto 
Cellini  kept  him  happy  and  contented  while 
starving  in  the  filthiest  of  dungeons.  It  led  the 
martyrs  glorying  to  the  stake.  Their  attitude 
was  but  one  form  of  determinism  :  a  belief  that 
events  follow  a  course  absolutely  pre-ordained, 
and  therefore  demanding  no  vain  regrets  or 
bitterness  from  ourselves.  The  religion  of  both 
Mohammedans  and  Christians  has  inculcated 
determinism.  Among  the  less  civilised  Mo- 
hammedans, it  has  brought  about  fatalism ; 
among  the  more  civilised  Christians  it  has 
brought  about  anti-fatalism.  When  the  Scrip- 
tures advocate  humility  and  reverence  to 
God,  surely  that  is  the  same  thing  as  a  con- 

235 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

tented  acquiescence  in  the  unalterable  facts  of 
Nature. 

There  is  yet  one  further  principle,  the  defence 
of  which  has  always  constituted  an  important 
task  of  philosophy.  It  is  a  principle,  perhaps 
exceeding  in  importance  any  hitherto  mentioned. 
It  ranks  next  after  Truth  as  the  highest  virtue 
attainable  by  a  philosopher  or  man  of  science  :  it 
is  the  principle  of  Toleration.  Any  limitation  in 
the  liberty  of  opinion  or  the  liberty  of  speech  is 
a  bar  to  the  progress  of  Truth.  All  frowning 
upon  unpopular  views  is  a  defence  of  ignorance 
and  superstition,  and  a  brake  upon  the  wheel  of 
Progress.  For  we  must  remember  that  the 
Truth  about  a  matter  remains  the  Truth, 
whether  we  attack  or  defend  it.  One  who 
brings  forward  a  theory  that  we  dislike  does  not 
alter  the  facts.  If  his  theory  is  true,  then  we 
had  better  get  over  our  dislike  and  accept  it 
with  thanks ;  if  it  is  not  true,  at  any  rate  it  is 
brought  into  the  open  where  a  public  discussion 
can  take  place  on  it,  and  if  it  is  found  to  be 
erroneous,  it  may  be  executed  and  do  no  further 
harm.  If  it  had  never  been  brought  out,  it 
might  have  continued  to  live  secretly  and  do 

236 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

unbounded  harm  for  want  of  a  refutation.  In 
short,  if  it  is  true,  it  ought  to  be  publicly  pro- 
claimed from  the  housetops ;  if  it  is  error,  it 
ought  to  be  publicly  exposed.  In  either  case 
toleration  is  necessary ;  for  otherwise  the  theory 
will  lurk  hidden  in  dark  corners ;  and  we  shall 
either  lose  its  benefits,  or  suffer  from  its  errors. 

Those  to  whom  the  human  race  owes  the 
most  have  too  often  been  those  to  whom  it 
paid  the  least.  For  new  views  are  as  likely 
as  not  to  be  opposed  to  the  prepossessions  of 
the  day.  Anything  which  attacks  our  prepos- 
sessions is  unpleasant ;  anything  which  is  un- 
pleasant prompts  to  retaliation,  in  the  absence 
of  the  mighty  principle  of  Toleration.  The 
retaliation  is  gross  and  brutal  in  proportion  to 
the  grossness  and  brutality  of  prevailing  civilisa- 
tion and  sentiments :  it  is  an  emotional  con- 
dition and  therefore  inept  and  indifferent  to 
Truth.  In  religious  history,  the  facts  are  plain. 
So  it  has  been  in  science  and  philosophy,  from 
the  earliest  times  to  the  latest.  Anaxagoras  had 
to  fly  his  country  for  asserting  that  the  sun  was 
not  the  chariot  of  the  deity  Helios.  The  great 
Sokratea,  who  did  more  to  urge  a  rigid  sense  of 

237 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

duty  than  any  other  living  man  prior  to  Aristotle, 
was  forced  to  drink  the  hemlock.  Not  forced  in 
the  literal  sense,  certainly.  Sokrates  was  a  de- 
terminist,  and  recognising  his  fate,  met  it  with 
a  true  philosophic  equanimity  and  unmoved 
happiness,  which  contrasted  violently  with  the 
anguish  of  his  friends.  Sokrates  spent  his  life 
in  a  determined  war  against  error.  He  refuted 
one  by  one  the  fallacies  of  the  Sophists,  notwith- 
standing their  popularity  and  fashionableness. 
The  earliest  among  the  great  exponents  of  ethics, 
he  was  condemned  to  death  for  corrupting 
youth !  Discredited  as  are  the  metaphysics  of 
Plato,  his  Dialogues  must  remain  a  standard 
work  for  the  exhibition  of  a  certain  kind  of  true 
life-philosophy. 

If  intolerance  was  rampant  among  the  Greeks, 
it  was  still  more  so  in  Europe  in  the  Middle 
Ages.  Giordano  Bruno  did  perhaps  more  than 
any  other  man  to  pave  the  way  for  the  great 
intellectual  awakening  associated  with  the  names 
of  Bacon  and  Descartes.  He  espoused  the 
astronomical  system  of  Copernicus  and  travelled 
all  over  Europe,  lecturing  and  making  converts 
to  the  new  discoveries.  Bruno  stood  to  Coper- 

238 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

nicus  in  the  same  relation  that  Huxley  stood  to 
Darwin  :   as  the  great  protagonist  and  fighting 
interpreter  of  the  new  theory.     Like  Huxley,  he 
overflowed  with  energy,   was  full   of  wit,    and 
utterly  indifferent   to  the  abuse  of  the  crowd. 
Like  Huxley,  he  compelled  people  to  accept  the 
truth,  whether  they  would  have  it  or  not.     Like 
Huxley's,  his  language  was  direct :  he  referred 
to  the  philosophers  of  Oxford  as  '  a  constellation 
of  pedants,  whose  ignorance,  presumption,  and 
rustic     rudeness    would    have    exhausted    the 
patience  of  Job.'    Rash  language  in  barbarous 
times ;   but  we  must  remember   that  in   those 
days,  the  statutes  of  the  University  fined  every 
Bachelor  and  Master  of  Arts  five  shillings  for 
every  point  of  divergence  from  Aristotle ;  and  it 
was  Bruno's  mission  to  destroy  the  influence  of 
that  philosopher,   sanctified  as  he  was  by  cen- 
turies of  implicit  faith   and    stupid  veneration. 
For  seven   years,  he  was  kept  in  the  Roman 
prison.     At  length  his  persecutors  induced  him 
to  deny  all  his  theories  save  one,  the  plurality  of 
worlds.     And  for  that  one,  he  went  to  the  stake 
with  as  little  trepidation  as  Sokrates  drank  the 
poison.      He  was   forced   to   kneel   before  the 

239 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

cardinals  and  illustrious  theologians  to  receive 
the  excommunication  and  curses  of  the  Church. 
The  sentence  of  burning  alive  left  him  unmoved: 
— '  I  suspect  you  pronounce  this  sentence  with 
more  fear  than  I  receive  it.'  At  any  moment  a 
retractation  would  have  saved  him,  but  he  would 
not  give  it.  A  week  later  he  perished,  silent 
and  self-sustained,  and  his  ashes  were  blown  by 
the  winds  over  the  Campo  di  Fiora.1  It  is  to 
the  work  of  Bruno,  and  men  like  Bruno,  that  we 
owe  all  the  blessings  which  civilisation  brings  us 
to-day. 

In  modern  times  the  hostile  sentiment  towards 
the  propagandists  of  unpleasant  views  expresses 
itself  less  barbarously  ;  but  it  remains  a  powerful 
force  in  arresting  the  progress  of  prosperity. 
Priestley,  the  discoverer  of  oxygen,  with  strong 
inclinations  to  materialism,  has  exercised  an 
immense  effect  in  the  progress  of  science.  His 
reward  during  life  was  the  hatred  of  the  people, 
who  attacked  him  and  burnt  his  house  down.  To 
Jenner  we  owe  the  near  extinction  of  smallpox, 
formerly  one  of  the  most  dangerous  and  universal 
of  diseases.  Abuse  and  accusations  of  immorality 

1  Lewes  :  History  of  Philosophy,  vol.  ii, 
240 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

were  the  chief  thanks  accorded  to  him  by  his 
contemporaries.  The  need  for  liberty  and  tolera- 
tion is  almost  as  great  in  the  twentieth  century 
as  it  was  in  the  Middle  Ages.  The  majority 
of  people,  taking  only  a  statical  view  of  society, 
do  not  even  dream  of  the  revolutions  in  habits 
and  opinions  that  are  destined  still  to  be  wrought ; 
the  vital  necessity  for  the  widest  toleration  of  all 
views  cannot  therefore  be  adequately  appreciated 
by  them.  Although  the  positive  penalty  in- 
flicted upon  benefactors  is  not  so  brutal  as  it 
was,  there  still  remains  in  full  force  that  blind, 
destructive  instinct  which  makes  the  dog  bite 
the  hand  extended  to  rescue  it. 

In  general,  all  new  discoveries  that  have  any 
appearance  of  materialism  excite  dislike.  The 
German  materialists  of  last  century  proposed 
views  which  had  indeed  much  that  was  crude 
and  imperfect,  together  with  much  that  was  true. 
Their  doctrines  should  have  been  examined  with 
impartial  criticism,  under  which  the  chaff  would 
have  been  eliminated,  and  humanity  would  have 
profited  by  the  grain.  Instead  of  this,  they  were 
met  by  a  storm  of  indignation  and  abuse  ;  so 
that,  instead  of  calm  criticism,  both  sides  adopted 
Q  241 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

an  attitude  of  angry  dogmatism,  and  no  practical 
results  issued.  Humanity  was  doubly  the  loser: 
firstly,  by  the  failure  to  benefit  by  whatever 
truth  might  have  been  elicited  :  secondly,  by 
the  failure  to  condemn  whatever  errors  were 
involved,  leaving  these  errors  to  circulate  almost 
unconsciously  and  work  mischief  which  should 
have  been  avoided.  In  England,  similarly, 
many  still  remember  the  storm  of  hostility  which 
met  the  materialist  doctrine  of  organic  evolution, 
now  universally  accepted. 

Between  the  advocates  and  opponents  of  a 
doctrine,  only  that  side  has  anything  to  fear 
from  discussion  which  is  likely  to  be  refuted. 
Impartial  discussion  always  makes  for  truth,  and 
those  who  drag  in  emotion,  only  obscure  the 
issue  and  prevent  the  elucidation  of  the  Truth. 
It  is  in  their  interest  to  do  this,  only  when  their 
faith  is  weak.  The  stronger  their  conviction, 
the  more  will  they  welcome  an  opportunity  to 
defend  it  by  sound  arguments,  the  greater  will 
be  their  resentment  against  those  who  knowingly 
falsify  the  discussion  by  emotional  heat.  Magna 
est  veritas,  et  praevalebit  will  be  their  motto. 

Philosophy  appears,  therefore,  still  to  have 
242 


THE  TRUE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

before  it  a  large  sphere  of  usefulness  in  the 
break-up  of  erroneous  intuitions  about  conduct. 
Parallel  with  this  mental  clearance,  new  principles 
will  have  to  be  elaborated  in  substitution  :  this 
will  be  the  task  of  psychology  and  ethics.  It  will 
perhaps  then  be  discovered  that  the  true  satisfac- 
tion of  humanity  is  far  removed  from  the  idols 
they  run  after.  Of  the  three  divisions  of 
mind,  recognised  in  modern  psychology,  feel- 
ing, intellect,  activity,  it  will  perhaps  be  re- 
cognised that  the  first  alone  is  paramount,  and 
the  last  two  subsidiary  to  it.  The  life  of  intellect 
and  the  life  of  action  are  what  the  public  now 
look  upon  as  most  desirable.  In  the  history  of 
philosophy  and  of  psychology,  the  influence  of 
feeling l  has  nearly  always  been  underestimated. 
Pierre  Bayle  took  a  step  towards  pointing  out  its 
importance.  Rousseau  went  much  farther.  The 
psychology  of  Bain  gave  it  great  importance. 
Metaphysics,  on  the  other  hand,  has  scarcely  re- 
cognised it.  When  psychology  has  taken  its  pro- 

1  I  use  this  very  vague  word  in  the  strict  sense  accorded  to  it 
in  such  works  as  Prof.  Bully's  Human  Mind,  to  indicate  those 
modes  of  consciousness  which  are,  in  a  peculiar  sense,  affections  of 
the  subject.  My  suggestion  is  that  happiness  depends  less  on  the 
immediate  external  stimulus  than  on  the  nervous  reaction. 

243 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 

per  place  as  a  branch  of  physiology,  it  will  perhaps 
be  found,  not  only  that  feeling  is  the  most  import- 
ant element  of  mind,  but  possibly  also  that  it 
yields  most  when  farthest  divorced  from  intellect, 
and  activity.  The  opposition  between  feeling 
and  intellect  has  been  emphasised  all  through 
this  book.  There  is  a  corresponding  opposition 
between  feeling  and  activity  :  for  the  surest  way 
of  reducing  feeling  is  by  expending  it  in  action. 
Hitherto,  poets  rather  than  philosophers,  have 
taught  us  where  to  look  for  the  deepest  forms  of 
happiness  ;  and,  not  least,  the  poet  whose  inspira- 
tion came  most  direct  from  Nature  and  was  least 
sullied  by  artificial  ambitions  : 

'  What  is  life  when  wanting  love  ? 

Night  without  a  morning  : 
Love 's  the  cloudless  summer  sun, 
Nature  gay  adorning.' 


244 


CONCLUSION 

PROFESSOR  BERGSON'S  philosophy  is  contained  in 
three  volumes.  I  here  summarise  my  main 
objection  to  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  each  : — 

1.  Time  is  a  stuff  both    '  resistant  and  sub- 

stantial.' Where  is  the  specimen  on 
which  this  allegation  is  founded  ? 

2.  Consciousness  is  to  some  extent  independent 

of  cerebral  structure.  Professor  Bergson 
thinks  he  proves  this  by  disproving  a 
crude  theory  of  localisation  of  mental 
qualities.  Will  he  furnish  evidence  of  its 
existence  apart  from  cerebral  structure  ? 

3.  Instinct   leads   us   to  a  comprehension   of 

life,  that  intellect  could  never  give.  Will 
Professor  Bergson  furnish  instances  of  the 
successes  of  instinct  in  biological  inquiries, 
where  intellect  has  failed  ? 

I  venture  to  think  that,  until  these  questions  are 
answered,  we  are  not  called  upon  to  consider 
further  the  merits  of  Professor  Bergson's  philo- 
sophy. 


245 


INDEX 


ABELARD,  67. 
Abstractions,  tendency  to  material- 
ise, 101-2,  130. 
Abubacer,  131. 
Achilles  and  the  tortoise,  paradox 

of,  in. 
Affection,  in  relation  to  perception, 

41-2. 

Albertus  Magnus,  133. 
Alembert,  D',  146. 
Alexandria : 

early  progress  of  science  in,  127-8 ; 

philosophy  in,  128-9. 
Alexandrian    School,    Ecstasy    of, 

206. 
Alpetragius,  asserts  the   power  of 

inspiration,  131. 
Ammophila  wasp,  case  of,  88-9. 
Amoeba,  85. 
Analogy,  use  and  misuse  of,  57-9, 

63-S.  78,  79.  ipi. 
Anaxagoras,    philosophy    of,    113- 

14,  persecuted  for  truth's  sake, 

237- 
Anaximander  of  Miletus,  doctrines 

of,  108-9. 
Anaximenes,  108. 
Animal  spirits,  134. 
Animals,  characterised  by  instinct, 
27; 

nervous  system  of,  28. 
Antisthenes,  121. 
Aphasia,  sensory,  48-9,  98,  99. 
Archimedes,  127. 
Aristarchus  of  Samos,  127. 

of  Samothrace,  127. 

Aristippus,  120. 


('  r '  signifies  '  rtftrred  to.') 

Aristotelians,   their    community  of 


belief  derived  from  resemblance  in 

congenital  mental  features,  197-8 ; 

r.  104,  106. 
Aristotle : 

affirmed  the  empirical    method, 
122; 

but  failed  in  its  application,  123 ; 

demanded  facts  and  observation  of 
nature,  126-7 » 

elements  of  value  in  his  work,  107 ; 

his  De  partibus  animalium,  126  ; 

influence  of,  on  philosophy  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  129-30; 

metaphysical  taint  in,  106 ; 

Nature,  his  theory  of,  89,  90 ; 

physics  of,  vitiated  by  moral  bias, 
212 ; 

r.  28,  35,  no,  114,   123,   131, 

133.  134,  239. 
Asceticism,  possible  foundation  of, 

204-5. 

Assassins,  the,  131-2. 
Associationism.     See  Psychology. 
Astronomy,  its  method  of  consider- 
ing time,  69. 
Augustine,    St.,  a    predestinarian, 

231- 

Aurelius,  Marcus,  moral  bias  in  his 

philosophy,  211-12. 
Autricuria,  Nicolaus  de,  case  of,  132. 

BACON,  FRANCIS  (Lord  Verulam) : 
inductive   method    of   reasoning 
placed  upon  rational  basis  by, 

135; 
list  of  fallacies,  his,  136  ; 


247 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 


Bacon,  Francis — continued: 

mechanistic  tendencies   of,    132, 

139,  141.  ISO,  194  5 
r.  238. 

Roger,  cited  on  obscurity  of 

diction,  5-6;  writings  of,  133. 

Bain,  Dr.  Alexander,  243. 

Balfour,  Rt.  Hon.  Arthur  J.,  his 
article  on  Bergson  criticised, 
207-8. 

Basutos,  a  superstition  of,  101. 

Bayle,  Pierre,  writings  of,  145,  243. 

Beliefs,  influenced  by  sentiment  or 
emotion,  1 12,  120,  203-8,  211- 

15; 

nature  of,  196-202. 
Bentham,  Jeremy,  doctrines  of,  223. 
Bergson,  Henri : 
Ammophila  wasp,  on,  88-9  ; 
analogy — 

between  his  philosophy  and  that 

of — 

Arabic  writers,  131  ; 
early    Greek     philosophers, 

no ; 

Fichte,  158; 
Hegel,  159-60; 
Heraklitus,  113; 
false,  in  works  of,  57-9,  63,  64, 

79,84,  95.101.  1955 
Balfour,  Mr.  A.  J.  on,  207  ; 
body,  his  theory  of  functions  of, 

38; 

evidence,  lack  of  positive,  to  sup- 
port his  assertions,  7-8,  55,  75, 
98-101,  195  ; 

evolution,  on  three  directions  of, 
80; 

fallacies  in  his  work,  212-18; 
the  Mannikin,  55-6,  59, 60,  72, 
73,  88,  loo; 

Huxley,  his  attitude  towards,  69- 

7i,  90; 

incomprehensibility  of  his  theo- 
ries, 7,  16,  32,  98-9,  103,  160; 

idealism  of,  91-2 ; 

ignorance,  will  not  confess,  89-90 ; 

independence  of  consciousness, 
his  theory  of,  246  ; 


Bergson,  Henri — continued: 

instinct  in  plants,  on,  82-3  ; 

intellect  and  movement,  on  re- 
lation between,  85-6 ; 

intelligence  and  instinct  con- 
trasted by,  29-32,  33,  59-62, 
86,87,203,246; 

intuition,  his  theory  of,  8,  31-2, 
33,  59-62,  136,  214; 

lesions,  on,  40-1,  44; 

life,  on  stream  or  current  of,  64-5, 
74-9,  80 ; 

maternal  love,  on,  84  ; 

memory,  on,  43-52,  98-101; 

metaphysics  of,  in  relation  to 
facts,  2,  203 ; 

methods  of  reasoning,  100-1  ; 

motion,  theory  of,  34,  83,  85  ; 

nothing,  his  analysis  of,  33-4, 
no; 

Pecten's  eye,  deductions  from 
structure  of,  22-6,  72-7  ; 

pain,  on,  41-2,  94,  96-7; 

perception,  on,  35-43,  49,  95,  96, 

975 
parallelism,  his  refutation  of,  35, 

57-8,  93 ; 
questionable  statements  made  by, 

59,66; 

sensory  aphasia,  on,  48-9; 
'  snowball'  analogy,  his,  18,  63  ; 
Spencer's  philosophy,  on,  34 ; 
success,  his  criterion  of  superi- 
ority, 84-5 ; 
sympathy,  a   certain  use  of  the 

term,  31,  89; 
time,  his  theory  of,  7,  17-21,  62-3, 

64,67-71,  157,  246; 
torpor,  instinct  and  intelligence, 

on,  27,  28-9 ; 
vital   impetus,  his   theory  of,  7, 

10-11,    24,   25-7,    31,   33,  67, 

100,  158  (see  also  Life); 
words,  his  misuse  of,  54,  59,  64, 

70-1,  80,  81,  85,  101,  102-3, 

136,  195- 

Berkeley,   George,    Bishop,   philo- 
sophy of,  153-4. 
Berkeleyan  Idealism,  13,  153. 


248 


INDEX 


Biology,    part    played    by  natural 

selection  in,  148 ; 
science  of,  does  not  progress  by 

instinct,  60. 
Birds,  25,  80,  85. 

Body  and  Mind,  M'Dougall,  com- 
mented on,  187-90. 
Body,  and  mind,  relation  between, 
35,  58, 145  (seealso Parallelism) ; 
Bergson's  theory  of  the  function 

of,  38-40 ; 
'  directing    memory  towards  the 

real,'  51-2. 
Boileau,  quoted,  160. 
Bois-Reymond,  Du,  148. 
Boyle,  Hon.  Robert,  cited  on  animal 

automatism,  144. 

Brain,  connection  of,  with  conscious- 
ness and  mind,  57-8,  100  ; 
in  relation  to  memory,  44-5,  47- 

52; 
in  relation  to  perception,  36-9, 

41,93.95; 

man's,  200-1 ; 

representation  of  words  in,  48, 99. 
Brown-S^quard,  78  note. 
Bruno,    Giordano,    doctrines    and 

death  of,  134  ; 

persecuted  for  truth's  sake,  238- 

40. 
Biichner,  his  Kraft  und Staff,  147-8; 

lucidity  of,  147-8,  198. 
Bulletin  dt  la  Socittt  Fratifaise  de 

Philosophic,  June  1901,  Bergson's 

article  in,  35. 
Byron,  quoted,  16,  227. 

CABANIS,  contributions  of,  to  psy- 
chology, 148. 

Cabbage,  physiology  of  a,  177-8, 
180. 

Calvin,  John,  a  predestinarian,  231, 
232. 

Causation,  law  of,  189. 

Cellini,  Benvenuto,  235. 

Cerebral  mechanism,  44. 

Cerebral  processes  (or  disturbances), 
consciousness  an  accompaniment 
of,  36-7,  41,  184-90,  231. 


Chance,  non-existent,  113,  114. 
Characters,  acquired  or  congenital, 

question  of   inheritance   of,   24, 

196. 

Charles  II.,  progress  of  science  dur- 
ing his  reign,  143. 
Chemical  affinity.     See  Energy,  po- 
tential. 
Chemistry,     attitude     of,    towards 

time,  69. 

Chinooks,  superstitions  of,  102. 
Chlorophyll,  stores  light,  178. 
Chlorophyllian  function  in  plants, 

28. 

'  Coat  and  nail '  analogy,  57-8. 
Coleridge,  ambiguity  of,  criticised 

by  Byron,  1 6. 
Comte,    Auguste,    philosophy    of, 

149. 
Consciousness  (see  also  Mind) : 

an  accompaniment,  not  a  cause, 
230-1 ; 

Berkeley'sdeductionsfrom,  153-4 ; 

connection  of,  with  brain,  58-9, 
100  (see  Cerebral  processes) ; 

evolution  of  a,  20,  65  ; 

immateriality  of,  183  ; 

in  relation  to  pain,  97-8  ; 

in  relation  to  mobility,  80  ; 

in  relation  to  time,  17-19,  21 ; 

motive  principle  of  evolution,  the, 
32; 

not  recognised  by  mechanism,  13; 

physical  basis  of,  184-91  ; 

presence  of,  in  animals  unproven, 

138-9. 

Continuity,  law  of,  139,  1 68,  188. 
Copernicus,    escaped     persecution, 
133-4 ; 

doctrines      of,      advocated      by 
Hobbes,  140 ; 

relation  of  Bruno  to,  238-9 ; 

r.  127,  190. 

Cremonini,  scholasticism  of,  133. 
Critical    Exposition    of  Bcrgsoris 

Philosophy,  J.  M'Kellar  Stewart, 

61. 

Cynics,  the  Greek,  121,  205. 
Czolbe,  211. 


249 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 


DALTON,  JOHN,  his  atomic  theory, 

163. 
Dante,  his  Inferno  quoted,  176 ; 

on  ignes  fatui,  226. 
Darwin,  cited  on  '  joyousness,'  217  ; 
his  theory  of  Evolution,  10,  52, 

73,  77  note,  189; 
Huxley's  relation  to,  239. 
Demokritus,  contemptuous  of  book- 
learning,  198 ; 
influence     of,    on    Alexandrian 

science,  127 ; 
philosophy  of,  113,  114-15; 

'•  54- 
Dt  partibus  anitnaliumt  Aristotle, 

126. 
De     rerutn     Natura,     Lucretius, 

128. 
Descartes,   Rene",   affirmed    animal 

automatism,  138  ; 
mechanistic    tendencies    of    his 
philosophy,  132,    135-7,   150, 
194,  238. 
Determinism,  bearing  of,  on  moral 

responsibility,  208-9  5 
distinction  between,  and  fatalism, 

232-5 ; 

influence  of,  on  true  philosophy 

of  life,  228. 
Dictionnaire  Histortque  et  Critique^ 

Bayle,  145. 
Diderot,  r.  146,  150. 
Differential  Calculus,  153. 
Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  108. 

the  Cynic,  121. 

Duration.     See  Time. 

EDUCABILITV,  200,  203. 
Edwards  Jonathan,  a  predestinarian, 

231,  232. 
Eleatic    School.     See    Philosophy, 

Greek,  early. 

Emotions   or   sentiments,    ethical, 
207-8 ; 

influence  of,  on  beliefs,  1 12,  120, 
203-8,  211-15; 

reproductive,  204-5  > 

self-preservation,  204. 
Empedokles,  philosophy  of,  1 14. 


Energy,  Conservation  of,  169-171, 

191; 

Kinetic,  172-3,  174; 
Potential,  172-4, 178; 

chemical  affinity,  172-4  ; 
redistribution    of,     171-2,    176, 

178,  229  ; 
relation    of,    to    motion,    170-1, 

I73'4>  175,  179-82. 
England,  philosophy  in,  55,    133, 

140,  242. 

Epicureanism,  128. 
Epikurus,  lucidity  of,  198 ; 
misunderstood,  120,  124-5  » 

r-  134.  139.  144- 
Epiphenomenalism,  defined,  184 ; 

discussed,  187-90. 
Epistemological  inquiry,  III,  220. 
Erasistratus,  127. 

Ethics,  a  branch  of  science  yet  un- 
defined, 220,  221  ; 
confusion  between,  and  science, 

119-22  ; 
influence  of  correct  philosophy  of 

life  on,  223-4 ; 
relation  of,  to  truth,  209-13. 
Ethics,  Spinoza,  152. 
Eucken,  R.,  cited,  123. 
Euclid,  127. 
Evolution,  consciousness  the  motive 

principle  of,  32  ; 

early  unpopularity  of  materia- 
list doctrine  of,  in  England, 
242; 

fundamental  direction  of,  81-2 ; 
main  roads  of,  80-2  ; 
similar    structure    occurring    on 

divergent  lines  of,  22,  71-7. 

See  also  Life  and  Vital  Impetus. 

Evolution,  Crfatrice  L\  sketch  of, 

17-35  J 

criticism  of,  59-90. 
Experience,   subjective  and  objec- 
tive, 36 ; 

versus  intuition,  3. 
Eye,  a  bird's,  25  ; 

of  Pearly  Nautilus,  76,  77  ; 

ofPecten,  23-5,  72-7; 

of  vertebrates,  23,  72,  75,  76. 


250 


INDEX 


FALLACIES  : 

:    Bergson's.    See  Bergson. 
clearance  of,  by  true  philosophy, 

202  ; 

moral,  212 ; 

origin  of,  195,  199,  217-18  ; 
survival  of,  200. 

Fatalism,  distinction  between,  and 
determinism,  231-5. 

Feeling  (a  quality  of  mind),  psy- 
chological importance  of,  under- 
estimated, 243-4. 

Feuerbach,  147. 

Fichte,  postulates  a  vital  impetus, 

158; 
r-93- 

Force,  possible  resolution  of  matter 
into,  92  note,  149,  156. 

GALEN,  assumed  the  existence  of 

animal  spirits,  134  ; 
laid  the  foundations  of  medicine, 

128. 
Galileo,   Physics  of,   35,  90,   132, 

'S3- 

Gall,  his  system  of  phrenology,  TOO. 
Gassendi,    philosophy    of,    139-40, 

144; 
strong  historical  sense  of,  198. 

German  metaphysics.  See  Meta- 
physics. 

Germany,  philosophic  materialism 
in,  147. 

Goethe,  quoted  on  vanities,  226-7  » 
r.  198. 

Grote,  George,  quoted  on  Plato, 

I2I-2. 

HABIT-MEMORY.    See  Memory. 
Habits  of  thinking,  the  ictte  fixe, 

224-5. 

Hallucination,  95. 
Hartley,  David,  198,  231. 
Hartmann,  E.  von,  227. 
Harvey,  William,  his  discovery  of 

the  circulation  of  the  blood,  135. 
Hegel,  absolute  idealism  of,  105  ; 

analogy  between,  and  Bergson, 
159-60; 


Hegel — continued  : 
metaphysical    philosophy    of,   6, 

93,  114,  158,  160. 
Heraklitus,    philosophy    of,    in, 

113.  "5- 

Herophilus,  127. 

Hibbert    Journal,     Mr.     Balfour's 

article  in,  207 ; 
Bergson's  '  Huxley,'  lecture  in, 

213,  215. 
Hipparchus,  127. 
Hobbes,    Thomas,    cited    on    the 

expediency  of  religion,  210  ; 
lucidity  of,  198 ; 

philosophy  and  writings  of,  139, 
140; 

r-  55- 
Holbach,  D',  a  materialist,  195  ; 

his  Systeme  de  la  Nature,  146. 
Homme  Machine,  Z',  De  Lamettrie, 

145. 
Hume,  David,  complete  scepticism 

of,  154-5.  158. 
Humility  of  the  Life-stream,  26,  78, 

79- 

Huxley,  attitude  of,  towards  'time,' 
compared  with  Bergson's,  21,  68- 

7U 

Bergson's  attitude   towards,  69- 

71,90; 

defines  epiphenomenalism,  184  ; 

demands  positive  evidence,  98  ; 

mechanistic  views  of,  168; 

not  a  fatalist,  232  ; 

resemblance  of  Bruno  to,  239  ; 

says  the  mechanical  view  is  not 
irreligious,  231  ; 

r.  138,  148. 

Huyghens,  doctrines  of,  144. 
Hylozoism,  Greek,  104-5. 
Hymenoptera,  27,  80 ; 

pre-eminence  of,  84-5. 

IDEALISM,  attractiveness  of,  12  ; 
Berkeleyan,  13,  153. 

Ideas,  Divine,  2 ; 
innate,  141,  142. 

Ignes  fatui.      See   Will-o'-the- 
wisps. 


251 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 


Image-memory.    See  Memory. 

Images,  auditory,  47-8  ; 
theories  of,  38,  39,  42, 46,  49,  50, 
9i-2,  93- 

Immobility,  relativity  of,  30. 

Inconceivabilities,  156-7,  162,  165. 

Indetermination,  Bergson's  use  of 

the  term,  39,  40  ; 
inserted  by  life  into  matter,  28. 

Individuation,  tendency  of  the  or- 
ganism towards,  19. 

Inductive   method,    origin    of,    in 
Alexandria,  127. 

Infinity,  108-9. 

Insect  societies,    alleged  probable 
language  of,  86. 

Instinct,  a  characteristic  of  hymen- 

optera,  27,  80 ; 
apparent    manifestations    of,    in 

plants,  31,  82-3  ; 
closeness  of,  to  life,  8,  31,  214  ; 
contrasted  with  intelligence,   8, 
29-32,  33,  59-62, 86,  87,  200-3 ; 
in  relation  to  structure,  87. 
See  also  Intuition. 

Instruments,  organised  and  unor- 
ganised, 29. 

Intellect,    in    relation    to    feeling, 

243-4  5 

in  relation  to  mobility,  30-1,  85. 
Intelligence,  characteristic  of  man, 

27,80; 
contrasted  with  instinct,  8,  29-32, 

33,  59-62,  86,  87,  200-3. 
Intolerance,  rampant  in  the  Middle 

Ages,  238 ; 
still  powerful,  240-1. 
Introspection,  failure  of,  186-7. 
Intuition,  definitions  of,  33,  214  ; 
survival  of,   in    metaphysics,   3, 

200. 

See  also  Instinct. 
Ionian    School.      See    Philosophy, 

Greek,  early. 
Isidore  of  Seville,  his  Encyclopedia, 


JAMES,  WILLIAM,  Pragmatism  of, 
8-9. 


Jenner,  Edward,  public  treatment 

of,  240-1. 

Johnson,  Dr.  Samuel,  154. 
Joy,  a  sign  that  '  our  activity  is  in 
full  expansion,"  215 ; 

statement  questioned,  216-17. 
Judgment  or  choice,  a  problem  of, 

190-2. 

KANT,  IMMANUEL,  his  definition  of 

'  self,'  6 ; 

theories  of,  17,  160-2. 
Kayyam,  Omar,  198. 
Kepler,  6l,  132. 
Kraft  und  Staff,  Buchner,  147-8. 

LABRE,  BENEDICT  JOSEPH,  205. 
Lamarckism,  77-8  note. 
Lamettrie,  De,  cheerfulness  of  his 

philosophy,  228  ; 
his     L'Homme    Machine,    and 
general  tenor  of  his  writings, 
145-6. 
Lange,   F.   A.,    cited,    104    note, 

123,  132,  149,  198,  212. 
Lankester,  Sir  Ray,  cited  on  '  edu- 

cability,'  200. 

Laws,  ethical  and  scientific,  21 1. 
See  also  under  individual  headings 
as  Causation. 

Leibnitz,  G.  W.,  beliefs  of,  influ- 
enced by  feeling,  206 ; 
philosophy  of,  152-3 ; 
predestinarianism  of,  231  ; 

'•,  74,  93- 

Lesions,  nerve,  effects  of,  40-1. 
Lewes,  G.  H.,  cited  on  Aristotle, 

122-3. 

Life,  stream  or  current  of  (also  called 
Vital  Impetus) : 

humility  of,  26,  78-9  ; 

'independence'  of,  66-7 ; 

is  mobility,  83  ; 

psychological  character  of,  74-5  ; 

supplies     '  indetermination '     in 
matter,  28 ; 

r.y  19-20,  25-6,  32,  64,  65,  76, 
77,  82. 

See  also  Evolution. 


252 


INDEX 


Light,  focusing  of,  75  ; 

storage  of,  in  presence  of  chlor- 

ophyl,  178. 

Locke,  John,  his  contributions  to 
psychology,  141-2 ; 

and  attack  on  Scholasticism,  143  ; 

r-,  55.  147. 
Logic,  province  of,  220- 1 ; 

rules  of,  195. 
Lombroso  school  of  criminology, 

209. 
Lucretius,    Bruno    influenced    by, 

134; 
his  De  rerum  Natura,  128. 


M'DouGALL,  Dr.  W.,  theories  of, 

criticised,  187-90. 
Machines,   organic  and   inorganic, 

174-82. 
Man,  goal  of  Evolution,  the,  27, 

32,  82,  84-5 ; 
machine,  the,  179-82  ; 
psychical  manifestations  in,  183. 
Mannikin  fallacy,  55.    See  Bergson. 
Materialism,  scientific,  assailed  and 

defended,  163-5; 
awakening  of,  in  philosophy,  135; 
Berkeley's  refutation  of,  153-5  '•> 
came   to  the  fore  with  the  Re- 
vival of  Learning,  132 ; 
element  of  metaphysical  fancy  in 

pure,  13 ; 
English,  133 ; 
Epikurus  adheres  to,  125  ; 
expediency  of,  as  a  general  belief 

questioned,  211 ; 
nineteenth-century,  147-8 ; 
only  sound  working  hypothesis, 

157,  162-3,  165  ; 
progress  of  science  based  upon, 

167-8 ; 
reputed  to  have  been  espoused  by 

the  Assassins,  131-2  ; 
spiritualism  contrasted  with,  139, 

141,  192-4; 

wane  and  wax  of,  123,  149-50. 
Materialists,  German,  doctrines  of, 
241-2. 


Maternal  love,   Bergson's  analogy 

on,  84. 
Mature  et  Mtmoire,  a  brief  account 

of,  35-53  ? 

criticism  of,  91-101  ; 

paralogism  in,  57-8. 
Matter : 

action  of  Life  upon,  26,  32  ; 

indestructibility  of,  169-71  ; 

indetermination  inserted  in,  by 
Life,  28 ; 

memory,  relation  of,  to,  52  ; 

mind,  relation  of,  to,  53  ; 

obstacle  to  the  vital  impetus,  an, 
78; 

organised  by  Life,  64  ; 

possible  resolution  of,  into  force, 
92  note,  149,  156; 

reality  of,  150-1,  155-6; 

redistribution  of,  171-2,  178, 
229; 

theoretically  perceptible  without 

sense-organs,  96. 

Mechanism,  scientific  (ste  also  Ma- 
terialism) : 

attitude  of,  towards  time,  17 ; 

Bergson's  attempted  refutations 
of,  20-2,  67-77 ; 

denies  'spirit,'  192-4; 

progress  of,  in  Alexandria,  127  ; 

supremacy  of,  ought  to  tend  to 

happiness,  228-9. 
Mechanistic  view  of  the  Universe, 

9-12. 

Medicine,  science  of,  attitude  of,  to- 
wards time,  69 ; 

does  not  work  by  intuition,  60- 1 ; 

progress  of,  materialistic,  168. 
Meditations    of    Marcus    Aurelius, 

211-12. 

Memory,  Bergson's  theory  of,  43- 
52,  98,  101  ; 

-habit,  45-6,  47 ; 

-image,  46. 

Metaphysics,   cannot  explain  con- 
sciousness, 230 ; 

contrasted  with  positive  science, 
1-4,  6,  8,  12,  80-1,  89,  92-3, 
95.  104-7,139,  150-1; 


253 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 


Metaphysics — continued : 
errors  in  Bergson's,  203  ; 
errors  in  Plato's,  205  ; 
German,  55,  105  ; 
inutility  of,  160-2,  166,  218,  221, 

223; 
obscurity   of,    4-6,    7,    16,    129, 

162  ; 
theories  of    Hume  and    Hegel, 

absolutely  barren,  158-9; 
underestimates  feeling,  243. 
Metchnikoff,     '  disharmonies '     of, 

1 66. 
Middle  Ages,  intellectual  decadence 

of,  129,  141,  150; 
Oxford  University  in,  239. 
Mill,  James,  doctrines  of,  223. 

John  Stuart,  cited,  156,  iSl-2. 

Mind  (see  also  Consciousness)  : 
assumed    '  sparking '    action    of, 

190-2; 

body  in  relation  to,  35,  58,  145  ; 
divisions     of     mental     activity, 

243-4  5 

reality  of,  assumed,  150-1,  155. 
Mobility,    failure    of    intellect    to 

grasp,  30-1  ; 
is  Life,  83. 
Moleschott,  r.,  147. 
Molluscs,  eyes  of,  72,  75-7. 
Montesquieu,  quoted  on  laws,  211. 
Morality,  various  views  of,  120-1. 
Moral  responsibility,  bearing  of  de- 
terminism on,  208-9. 
Motion,   Bergson's  theory  of,   34, 

83,  85  ; 

relation    of,    to    energy,    170-1, 
173-5.  179-82. 

NATURAL  SELECTION,  influence  of, 
on  beliefs,  199-200 ; 

operates  in  condemnation  of  anti- 
social acts,  208-9. 
Nature,  'joy-signal' in,  215-17; 

machines    made    by,    176.     See 

Machines. 

'  Nail  and  coat '  analogy,  57-8. 
Neo-Darwinism,  Bergson's  attitude 

towards,  86. 


Neo-Lamarckism,  24,  25,  73. 

Nerve  lesions,  influence  of,  on  per- 
ception, 40-1. 

Nervous  system,  the,  28. 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac : 
doctrines  of,  introduced  by  Vol- 
taire to  France,  146  ; 
Leibnitz,  in  relation  to,  152-3  ; 
manner  of  his  discovery  of  gravi- 
tation, 14 ; 
theories   of,  opposed  by  Hegel, 

1.59; 

utility  of  his  discoveries,  222  ; 

r.,  61,  115,  144,  170. 
Nietzsche,  212. 

Nominalism  versus  Realism,  130. 
Nothing,  Bergson's  analysis  of,  33-4, 

no. 

Nouns,  proper,  48,  49. 
Number,    Pythagorean    theory  of, 

109,  1 10. 

OBJECTS,  in  relation  to  perception, 

36-7,  95- 

Obscurity  of  metaphysical  argu- 
ments, 4-7,  16,  113,  160-2. 

Obsessions,  244-5. 

Occam,  William  of,  133. 

Ontological  inquiry,  in,  220. 

Organism,  tendency  of  the,  towards 
individuation,  19. 

Origen,  205. 

Oxford  University  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  239. 

PAILLERON,  his  Le  Monde  ou  ran 
s'ettnute,  228. 

Pain,  Bergsonian  and  physio- 
logical theories  of,  contrasted, 
41-2,94,96-7. 

Paracelsus,  134, 

Parallelism,     psycho-physical    (see 
also  Body  and  Mind)  : 
Bergson's  attempted  refutation  of, 

35.  58,  93  5 
defence  of,  94. 

Parmenides,  philosophy  of,  no, 
III. 


254 


INDEX 


Past,  the,   existence  of  in   'real' 
time,  18-19; 

'gnawing  into  the  future,'  51  ; 

survives  under  two  forms,  44,  46. 
Pearly  Nautilus,  eye  of,  76-7. 
Pecten,  eye  of,  23, 24, 72,  74,  75,  77. 
Perception : 

connection  of,  with  brain,  36-9, 

40-1,93-5; 

memory, relation  of,  to,  43,  49-50; 
nerve  lesions,  effect  of,  on,  40-1  ; 
pain  in  relation  to,  41-2,  96  ; 
theory  of,  in  Matter e  et  Mtmoite, 

35  et  W> 
Philology,  127. 
Philosophy : 
Arabic,  131  ; 

Bergson's  definition  of,  34 ; 
dissipates  errors  and  superstitions, 

107-8,  126,  135,  141,  202; 
English,  55,  133,  140; 
failure  of,  in  search  for  final  truth, 

165; 
Greek,  early,  108-11  ; 

later,  111-25  ; 

influence  of,  on  conduct,  223-4, 

242-3 ; 

misuse  of  words   in   Greek,  54 

(see  also  Obscurity) ; 
net  result  of,  125-6,  127  ; 
of  life,  influence  of  determinism 

on,  228-35  5 
opposed    tendencies    in,    104  tt 

sqq.  ; 

should  not  countenance    '  intui- 
tions,' 214  ; 

two  elements  of  value  in,  219. 
Phrenology,  100. 
Physico-chemical    theory    of    life. 

See  Mechanism. 

Physics,  relation  of,  to  philosophy 

according  to  Spencer's  view,  222. 

Plants,  evolution  of,  27-8,  81-2,  86 

(see  also  Cabbage) ; 
instinct  said  to  be  manifested  by, 

31.82-3; 
sexual  generation  a  luxury  in,  28, 

Si  ; 
torpor  in,  27,  80. 


Plato,    beliefs    of,    influenced    by 
emotion,  205  ; 

deduction  taught  by,  127  ; 

nature  of  value  in  his  writings, 
106,  238 ; 

philosophy  of,  criticised,  121-3. 
Platonists,  104,  105-6. 
Pleasure,    differentiated   from  joy, 

215. 

Plotinus,  philosophy  of,  128-9,  J34- 
Polybius,  127. 
Pragmatism,  8. 
Pragmatists,  1 1 6. 
Priestley,  Joseph,  unpopularity  of, 

240. 

Proclus,  128. 

Protagoras,  philosophy  of,  1 1 6. 
Protoplasm,  genesis  of,  178. 
Psychology,    association    doctrine, 
13-14,  50,  166; 

contributions     of     Cabanis     to, 
148; 

Locke's  contributions  to,  141-2  ; 

independent  of  philosophy,  220  ; 

feeling  underestimated  by,  243. 
Ptolemaic  astronomers,  the,  205-6, 

213. 

Ptolemy,  127,  131. 
Pyrrho,  scepticism  of,  123. 
Pythagoras,  philosophy  of,  109-10. 

RAVAISSON,  quoted,  52. 
Realism  versus  nominalism,  130. 
Realists,    mediaeval,    opinions    of, 

66. 

Re-birth,  theory  of,  210. 
Redistribution  of  matter  and  energy, 

171-2,  178,  229. 
Religion,  expediency  of,  discussed, 

209-10; 

explained  by  tendency  and  educa- 
tion, 196-7  ; 
overcomes     science     in     Middle 

Ages,  129. 
Representation,   of  images,   38-40, 

44- 

Robinet,  147. 
Rousseau,  J.  J. ,  243. 
Royal  Society,  foundation  of,  143. 


255 


SCIENCE  AND  PROFESSOR  BERGSON 


SCEPTICISM,   absolute,    barrenness 

of,  iSS.  157,  162. 
Schelling,  F.  W.  J.,  158. 
Schlegel,  F.,  cited,  104,  105. 
Scholasticism,  90,   129,    133,    134, 

143- 

Schopenhauer,  pessimism  of,  227-8. 
Science,  confusion  of,  with  ethics, 

119-21  ; 
contrasted  with  metaphysics,  1-4, 

6,   8,   12,  80-1,  89,  92-3,  95, 

104-7,  139,  150-1; 

demands  proof  of  'spirit,'  149, 
192-4; 

disharmonies  between,  and  in- 
tuitions, 214,  218 ; 

early  progress  of,  in  Alexandria, 
127-8; 

finds  no  cause  in  consciousness, 

231; 

has  become  divorced  from  philo- 
sophy, 219; 
modern,     attitude     of     towards 

'soul,'  184; 
overcome  by  religion  in  Middle 

Ages,  129; 

progress  of,  based  upon  material- 
ism, 148,  167. 

Self,  the,  Kant's  definition  of,  6. 
Sensory  aphasia,  48-9,  98,  99. 
Sentiment.     See   Emotion   or  feel- 
ing. 

Shakespeare,  quoted  on  determin- 
ism, 233. 
Sokrates : 

attacks  the  Sophists,  119; 
moral  bias  of,  212  ; 
persecuted  for  truth's  sake,  237-8, 

2395 

philosophy  of,  119-21,  123; 
title  of,  to  fame,  118  ; 
r.,  205. 
Sophists,  attacked  by  Sokrates,  118- 

195 

philosophy  of,  116-17; 

r.,238. 

Soul,  theories  concerning  the,  184. 
Souvenirs  Entomohgiques,   Fabre, 

88. 


Space,  considered  by  science,  17  ; 

inconceivability  of,  156. 
Spencer,  Herbert : 

attacks  misuse  of  words,  55  ; 

barrenness  of  his  laws,  222  ; 

Bergsonian  criticism  of,  34  ; 

cited  on  '  redistribution,'  171  ; 

lucidity  of,  198 ; 

materialistic   basis  of  his  philo- 
sophy, 149; 

philosophy  of,  138,  221-2  ; 

theories  of,  somewhat  similar  to 

Kant's,  161-2. 

Spinal  cord,  functions  of,  38. 
Spinoza,  his  philosophy  and  Ethics, 
151-2; 

r.,74,93,  226. 

1  Spirit,'  an  independent  variable, 
228; 

an  unsound  hypothesis,  157  ; 

Bergsonian  theory  of,  65,  89,  92 ; 

existence  of,  denied  by  mechanism, 

149,  192-4. 

Spirits,  'animal,'  134. 
Spiritualism,  hard-pressed,  139,  145, 

149; 
Harvey's   discovery   a   blow   to, 

135; 
in  Middle  Ages,  141. 

Stewart,  Dr.  J.  M'Kellar,  his 
Critical  Exposition  of  Bergson's 
Philosophy,  6l. 

Stoicism,  128. 

Structure,  nerve,  in  relation  to  in- 
stinct, 87  ; 
of  eyes.     See  Eyes. 

Structures,  similar  complex,  occur- 
ring on  divergent  lines  of  evolu- 
tion, 22  et  sqq. 

Stylites,  Simeon,  205. 

Success,  a  sign  of  superiority,  84-5. 

Superstitions,  dissipated  by  philo- 
sophy, 107,  108,  126,  135,  141, 
202. 

Sympathy,  Bergson's  use  of  the 
term  in  relation  to  instinct,  31, 
89. 

Systeme  de  lit  Nature,  D'Holbach, 
146. 


256 


INDEX 


TANTALUS  analogy,  185-7. 
Teleological  view  of  the  Universe, 

9-II,  22. 

Teleology,    abandoned  by    Demo- 
kritus,  114; 

belief  in,  influenced  by  feeling, 
206; 

fallacies  of,  152,  216-17  » 

supported  by  Sokrates,  120,  123. 
Tendencies,  primitive  and  special, 

27-8. 

Thales,  108. 

Theology,    independent    of   philo- 
sophy, 219. 

Time,  Bergson's  theory  of,  7,  17- 
21,62-3,  67-71,  157,  246; 

concreteness  or  substantiality  of, 
1 8,  21,  33,  64,  67,  68  j 

Huxley's  attitude  towards,  21,  69. 
Toland,  John,    quoted   on    animal 

automatism,  144. 
Toleration,  relation    of,    to  truth, 

236-7. 

Torpor,  in  plants,  27-8,  80,  81. 
Truth,  emotion  obscures,  242  ; 

'  in  its  way,'  Bergsonian  assertion 
criticised,  24,  77-8  note  ; 

in  relation  to  ethics,  209-13  ; 

in  relation  to  toleration,  236-7. 

UNFORESEKABLENESS  of  the  future, 

19,  20. 

Universe,  the,  Bergson's  theory  of, 

IO-II; 

contrasted  views  of,  9-13  ; 
description  of,  169  et  sqq.  ; 
physico-chemical  theory  of.     See 
Mechanism. 


VARIATIONS,  accumulation  of  in- 
sensible, 23  ; 

origin  of,  according  to  Bergson, 
24-6. 

Verbs,  characteristics  of,  48,  49. 

Vertebrates,   eyes  of,   72,    75,    76, 

77- 

Vinci,  Leonardo  da,  198. 

Vision,  one  branch  of  the  Life- 
stream,  25,  77. 

Vital  Impetus,  Bergson's  theory  of, 
7,  lo-ii,  24,  25-7,  31,  33,  67, 
100,  158.  See  also  Life. 

Vogt,  Karl,  147. 

Voltaire,  philosophy  of,  146-7, 
210 ; 

>%  155- 
Vortices,    Descartes'      theory     of, 

137. 

Vries,  de,  mutation  theory  of,  23, 
77  note. 


WAGNER,  Rudolf,  211. 
Will-o'-the-wisps,  225-6,  228. 
Words,  images  or  representations 

of,  in  the  brain,  47-9,  99  ; 
misuse  of,  54-5,  59,  64,  70-1,  80, 

81,  85,   101,  102-3,  115,  140, 

143.  195- 

XENOPHANES,  philosophy  of,  1 10. 

ZENO  of  Elea,  philosophy  of,  34, 
I  IO-II. 

Zeno,  the  Stoic,  128. 


257 


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at  the  Edinburgh  University  Press 


Ul'SB   LIBHAKY 


